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This thesis attempts to investigate the issue of family-related partiality within 
the frameworks of three theories, communitarianism, care ethics, and early 
Confucianism. The issue of impartiality and partiality has been extensively 
debated in moral and political thinking. On the one hand, impartiality is generally 
recognized as crucial for moral and political theories. On the other hand, partial 
treatment for some people is also widely deemed acceptable, if not sometimes 
morally required. Such views are especially persuasive regarding people who are 
connected with us in special ways, our fellow countrymen, our neighbors, our 
friends, our family members. Among the subjects of partial treatment, family 
members are undoubtedly recognized as the main focus of partiality and the most 
compelling cases in support of partiality usually involve family members. This 
thesis will investigate how communitarianism, care ethic, and early Confucianism 
can address the issue of family-related partiality as well as the similarities and 
differences among different approaches, which may also help us better understand 
these three theories. 
The discussion of communitarianism in this thesis is limited to the so-called 
“modern-day communitarianism” mainly started by Charles Taylor, Michael 
Walzer, Michael Sandel, and Alasdair MacIntyre. Care ethics refers to the moral 
and political theorizing widely recognized as starting with Carol Gilligan and Nel 
Noddings. Early Confucianism refers to three major texts, The Analects of 
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Confucius, Mengzi, and Xunzi.  
The examination of family-related partiality in each theory will be further 
distinguished into two kinds, the general version and the particular version of 
family-related partiality. While the general versions may reveal the similarities 
among these three theories in general, especially in relation to the issue of 
partiality, the particular versions appeal to particular characteristics for each 
theory.   
For the general version of family-related partiality, it is related to the 
conception of self in each theory, the examination of which will not only show the 
similarities regarding the conception of self in each theory but also indicate the 
differences in terms of the extent of partiality toward family members.   
Unlike the similar construction of general version of family-related partiality 
for all three theories, the particular version of family-related partiality varies from 
one to another, which may better represent the unique characteristics for each 
theory. For communitarianism, the particular version appeals to the concept of 
community for communitarianism.  For care ethics, the particular version of 
family-related partiality is related to the idea of caring.  For early Confucianism, 
the particular version of family-related partiality is connected with the idea of 
filial piety.   
In the end, when we consider together the general and the particular version 
of family-related partiality, we may conclude that communitarianism provides 
relatively weaker support for partial concerns for family members while care 
v 
 
ethics and early Confucianism both provide stronger support, despite different 
interpretations of caring and the consideration of other essential ideas in early 
Confucianism. This is obviously only a preliminary result for an endeavor that can 
be developed in both directions. It can be further developed into a thorough 
investigation of partiality and impartiality or comprehensive comparative studies 
of communitarianism, care ethics, and early Confucianism. This thesis, however, 
ends here as it aims to further our understanding of communitarianism, care ethics, 
and early Confucianism in relation to the issue of family-related partiality and 




Chapter One  
Introduction 
 
The Nature of the Enquiry 
 
 This thesis attempts to investigate the issue of family-related partiality 
within the frameworks of three theories, communitarianism, care ethics, and early 
Confucianism. The issue of impartiality and partiality in general has been 
extensively debated in moral and political thinking.1 This may not be surprising 
or by itself endow the issue with extraordinary status, since almost everything in 
moral and political theory has been widely discussed, but it does suggest that the 
investigation of this issue is of some significance. There are arguments supporting 
both impartiality and partiality. On the one hand, impartiality is generally 
recognized as crucial for moral and political theories. Impartiality is sometimes 
                                                        
1  See, for example, John Kekes, “Morality and Impartiality,” American 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1981, pp. 295-303; John Cottingham, 
“Ethics and Impartiality,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 43, 1983, pp. 83-99; Thomas 
Nagel, Equality and Partiality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991; Marilyn 
Friedman, “The Practice of Partiality,” Ethics, Vol. 101, No. 4, 1991, pp. 818-835; 
Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995; John 
Cottingham, “The Ethical Credentials of Partiality,” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Vol. 98, 1998, pp. 1-21; David Brink, “Impartiality and 
Associative Duties,” Utilitas, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2001, pp. 152-172; Susan Mendus, 
Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002; Amitai Etzioni, “Are Particularistic Obligations Justified? A Communitarian 
Examination,” Review of Politics, Vol. 64, No. 4, 2002, pp. 573-598; Amartya Sen, 
“Open and Closed Impartiality,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 99, No. 9, 2002, pp. 
445-469; Joseph Raz, Value, Respect, and Attachment, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004; David Miller, “Reasonable Partiality Towards 
Compatriots,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 8, 2005, pp. 63–81. 
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assumed to be the defining character to differentiate moral discourse from 
non-moral ones, or at least a necessary part of moral requirement.2 Public policies 
are generally expected to manifest an impartial attitude toward everybody, or at 
least citizens within the national border. The enforcement of law is closely 
connected with impartiality to the extent that legal justice is viewed as impartial 
and judges are required to be impartial to both sides.3 On the other hand, partial 
treatment for some people is also widely deemed acceptable, if not sometimes 
morally required. Such views are especially persuasive regarding people who are 
connected with us in special ways, our fellow countrymen, our neighbors, our 
friends, our family members. Among the subjects of partial treatment, family 
members are undoubtedly recognized as the main focus of partiality and the most 
compelling cases in support of partiality usually involve family members.4 One 
way of examining the issue of partiality in general and family-related partiality in 
                                                        
2 John Kekes, “Morality and Impartiality,” p. 295; Richard Double, “Morality, 
Impartiality, and What We Can Ask of Persons,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1999, p. 149; Robert E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a 
Public Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 266; Roger 
Trigg, Morality Matters, Oxford: Blackwell, 2005, p. 138. 
3 Leslie Paul Thiele, Thinking Politics: Perspectives in Ancient, Modern, and 
Postmodern Political Theory, New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2002, pp. 211-212; 
William C. Heffernan, "Social Justice/Criminal Justice," in From Social Justice to 
Criminal Justice: Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Law, edited by 
William C. Heffernan and John Kleinig, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 
74; Barbara Hudson, "Punishing the Poor: Dilemmas of Justice and Difference," 
in From Social Justice to Criminal Justice: Poverty and the Administration of 
Criminal Law, p. 201; Richard Dagger, Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and 
Republican Liberalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 182; John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1999, p. 210. 
4 See, for example, Robert E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy, pp. 
267-268.   
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particular would be to address the issue in the framework of one particular theory. 
For example, as the dominant moral and political theory today, liberalism is 
committed to the ideal of impartiality. For liberalism, the pursuit of impartiality is 
connected with the recognition of the rights of others and the neutrality of the state 
with equal autonomous individuals who pursue different plans.5 The issue of 
impartiality and partiality in relation to family is addressed by drawing a 
dichotomy of the public and the private after advocating impartiality, and then, 
trying to accommodate certain tendencies toward partiality. 6  Although this 
strategy may prove to be convenient, it faces strong critiques in relation to this 
(alleged) dichotomy of the public and the private. For example, the dichotomy of 
the public and the private is argued to be connected with and reinforce the 
inequalities between men and women in the society.7 Instead of engaging in 
                                                        
5 Bert van den Brink, The Tragedy of Liberalism: An Alternative Defense of a 
Political Tradition, New York: State University of New York Press, 2000, p. 173; 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1999, p. 52; Thomas Nagel, “Moral Conflict and 
Political Legitimacy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1987, pp. 
215-216; Chandran Kukathas, “Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Political 
Community,” Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 13, 1996, p. 80; Tim Mulgan, 
“The Place of the Dead in Liberal Political Philosophy,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1999, p. 53. 
6 Even so, there is still the tension between impartiality within the national border 
and that beyond it, which is represented in the debates of liberal nationalism and 
liberal cosmopolitanism. See, for example, Kok-Chor Tan, Justice without Borders: 
Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Patriotism, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004.   
7 Susan Moller Okin, “Gender, the Public, and the Private,” in Feminism and 
Politics, edited by Anne Phillips, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 
116-141; Iris Marion Young, “Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some 
Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral and Political Theory,” in Feminism as 
Critique: On the Politics of Gender, edited by Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla 
Cornell, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, pp. 63-67. 
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debates on how liberalism can address the issue of partiality, we may also find it 
inspiring to investigate how such issue can be handled by other theories. For 
example, among the opponents of liberalism, communitarianism, care ethics, and 
early Confucianism can provide different strategies to address the issue of 
partiality in relation to the family. It is the aim of this thesis to investigate how 
communitarianism, care ethic, and early Confucianism can address the issue of 
family-related partiality as well as the similarities and differences among different 
approaches, which may also help us better understand these three theories. 
In order to clarify the focus of this thesis and avoid confusion, two points 
must be made clear at the beginning of this thesis. First, it is not the assumption of 
this thesis that these three theories can better handle the issue of family-related 
partiality than other theories, or vice versa. Attempts will not be made to compare 
these three theories with other moral and political theories, which is necessary to 
either support or refute either of the above view. Such comparative studies, with 
communitarianism, care ethics, and early Confucianism on one side, and 
liberalism, utilitarianism, for example, on the other, are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. The thesis will limit itself to examining these three theories.   
Communitarianism, care ethics, and early Confucianism all provide answers 
to the issue of family-related partiality within the framework of each theory and 
they are put together here as it will be demonstrated that they all hold seemingly 
positive views toward family-related partiality. It does not follow that they all 
render unconditional support for family-related partiality as each of them imposes 
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restrictions on the scope of family-related partiality in its own way. The one 
difference between them and other moral and political theories, liberalism and 
utilitarianism for example, is that they begin with the inclination toward partiality 
in general and family-related partiality in particular and move on to accommodate 
wider moral concerns while other theories may start with the inclination toward 
impartiality in general and move on to accommodate our partial concerns.  
Second, the comprehensive comparative studies of these three theories are 
also beyond the scope of this thesis. Even for a limited comparative investigation 
of these three theories, there are many other perspectives from which we can 
conduct such comparative studies and the adoption of family-related partiality as 
the focus here does not imply that this topic is necessarily better than other topics 
for achieving more in-depth understanding of these three theories. This thesis 
merely claims that the issue of family-related partiality would provide a unique 
and interesting angle from which these three theories can be studied.  
Although both communitarianism and care ethics are modern products from 
the west while early Confucianism originated more than two thousand years ago 
in China, it will be established in the end that the distance between the modern 
and the ancient, between the west and China, is not beyond mutual comprehension, 
and mutual appreciation and accommodation is a real possibility. 8  In the 
following sections of this chapter, the concept of family-related partiality will be 
                                                        
8 Obviously, it is not the assumption of this thesis that modern western moral and 
political theories are only represented by communitarianism and care ethics, or 
ancient Chinese thoughts are represented only by early Confucianism.  
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introduced and reasons will be presented why this term is chosen. Since in fact 
two--general and particular--versions of family-related partiality will be examined 
in communitarianism, care ethics, and early Confucianism, clarification is needed 
to explain the differences between the general version and the particular version of 
family-related partiality. For the exploration of family-related partiality in three 
theories, it will be divided into two parts in each theory, with the former focusing 
on the general version of family-related partiality and the latter, the particular 
version of family-related partiality. The general version of family-related partiality 
in each theory is based on the conception of self which would provide the 
possibility for comparative studies concerning the similarities and differences of 
the conceptions of self in three theories. It is called the general version because 
the conception of self in relation to this kind of family-related partiality can be 
identified not only in all three theories, but also in other theories, and it provides a 
general starting point for justifying partiality. In contrast, the particular version of 
family-related partiality is based on an ideal both essential and unique in each 
theory, that is, the concept of community in communitarianism, the concept of 
caring in care ethics, and the concept of filial piety in early Confucianism; not all 
moral or political theories have ideals which support family-related partiality in 
such particular ways.  
Second, the three theoretical frameworks will be briefly presented in which 
the issue of family-related partiality will be addressed, that is, communitarianism, 
care ethics, and early Confucianism.  
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Third, attempts will be made to introduce a common structure for examining 
how these three theories deal with the issue of family-related partiality through the 
conceptions of self and its relation to the general version of family-related 
partiality. Unlike the particular version of family-related partiality in each theory 
which concentrates on different ideals, the general versions of family-related 
partiality in all three theories bear close resemblance as they are based on the 




 Generally speaking, impartiality is understood as referring to the equal 
treatment of everybody, which closely connected with the idea that everybody 
should be given equal moral weight. This is obviously not the only definition of 
impartiality. According to Marilyn Friedman, impartiality can be defined as 
referring to “an absence of bias or prejudice.”9 Although equal treatment of 
everybody may actually suggest the “absence of bias or prejudice,” the worry here 
is that the definition of impartiality as “an absence of bias or prejudice” may 
suggest, either implicitly or explicitly, the embedment of positive moral evaluation 
in this concept, which may hinder the investigation of family-related partiality. It 
should also be pointed out that the above definition of impartiality at the 
beginning which incorporates both equal treatment and equal moral weight may 
                                                        
9 Marilyn Friedman, "The Impracticality of Impartiality," Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. 86, No. 11, 1989, p. 646. 
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not be accurate since equal moral weight for everybody does not always go 
together with equal treatment of everybody as other things are almost never 
equal.10  
In contrast, partiality refers to the departure from impartiality, during which 
some people are awarded special treatment for reasons often thought to be morally 
unjustifiable or even reprehensible.11 
 However, not all departures from impartiality can be called partiality. 
Sometimes people may put the well-being of others above their own and it is 
clearly not what we usually include in the category of partiality, at least not the 
kind of partiality which will be discussed in this thesis, although it departs from 
impartiality. For example, during the Second World War, some people put the 
well-being of others above themselves by risking their lives to save Jews under 
Nazi’s rule.12  
                                                        
10 For the purpose here, however, we can simply put aside the possible gap 
between these two understandings of impartiality without damaging the attempt to 
appreciate the differences between impartiality and partiality. 
11 It is only for the purpose of clarification here that I present such dichotomy 
between impartiality and partiality. It will become clear in the following chapters 
that such dichotomy is an overstatement, if not wholly misconceived.  
12 See Kristen R. Monroe and Michael C. Barton, Ute Klingemann, "Altruism and 
the Theory of Rational Action: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe," Ethics, Vol. 101, 
No. 1, 1990, pp. 103-122. Objection may be raised that for such cases, people did 
not really put the well-being of others above themselves since they were risking, 
not sacrificing, their lives for the lives of others’. It should be pointed out that 
such description of departure from impartiality is for the purpose of theoretical 
clarification and whether such cases do exist may not prove to be crucial. 
However, I would like to provide some other relevant and more vivid cases, which 
may more readily accommodate my description of such departure from 
impartiality. See Kristen Renwick Monroe, The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of 
a Common Humanity, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. ix-x. 
  9
In contrast with impartiality, which indicates that everybody should be treated 
equally, partiality suggests that from the agent’s point of view, other things being 
equal, she should be given more moral weight or some people, because they are 
special to her in some way, should be given more weight compared with others. 
The former kind of partiality is usually called egoism. It is the latter kind of 
partiality which will be investigated in this thesis.13 
It also should be pointed out that departures from impartiality can go both 
ways. The departure in the other direction, that is, from the agent’s point of view, 
other things being equal, other people should be given more moral weight 
compared with the agent herself, such as the case of rescuing Jews during Nazi’s 
rule, is what is usually meant by altruism. The theme of this thesis, that is, 
family-related partiality, should be characterized as a specific departure from 
impartiality, which gives more weight to some people because they are one’s 
family members compared with the way one treats others who are not thus related 
to oneself.   
It is widely observed that people give special treatment to their family 
members, their friends, people from the same town, their compatriots, people who 
speak the same language, people who believe in the same God, and fellow human 
beings (as compared with animals). But there is a big difference between the 
reality and the normative. The existence of partial practice does not automatically 
                                                        
13 Egoism may go even further to claim that other people should be given no 
moral weight. Richard Kraut, What Is Good and Why: the Ethics of Well-being, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009, pp. 39, 54. 
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suggest its universal acceptance or justification, but it does require explanation, if 
not justification, of this phenomenon.  
Since impartiality is generally cherished in Western liberal moral and political 
theories, partiality is sometimes given a bad name. For example, A. W. 
Musschenga claims that “[u]ndoubtedly, impartiality has always been looked upon 
as one of the defining characteristics of right actions and morally good persons... 
Becoming a moral person implied: learning to resist and control one’s always 
present self-regarding tendencies.”14 Idil Boran also asserts that “[i]t is commonly 
held that morality requires an agent to be always impartial in assessing the 
morally right course of action in a given situation.”15 But questions are raised by 
our everyday experience that may contradict the above high praise for impartiality 
and the rejection of partiality. This may explain why theoretical adjustment has 
been made to accommodate our everyday experience of partial practice. Moral 
and political theorists have accepted the unavoidability of partial practice for some 
time. As Friedman admits, “[h]ardly any moral philosopher, these days, would 
deny that we are each entitled to favor our loved ones. Some would say, even 
more strongly, that we ought to favor them, that it is not simply a moral option. 
This notion of partiality toward loved ones is lately gaining wide philosophical 
acclaim.”16  
                                                        
14 A. W. Musschenga, "The Debate on Impartiality: An Introduction," Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 8, 2005, p. 1.  
15 Idil Boran, "On Distinguishing Between Types of Impartiality," Journal of 
Value Inquiry, Vol. 38, 2004, p. 333. 
16 Marilyn Friedman, "The Practice of Partiality," p. 818. 
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As pointed out above, there are many kinds of partial practice according to 
different recipients of partial treatment. In this thesis, efforts will be made to 
investigate the partial treatment toward family members, that is, the partiality of 
children to their parents, and of parents to their children, the partiality between 
spouses, and those between siblings. Obviously, the relationships between parents 
and children, between spouses, and between siblings, are not an exhaustive list of 
all possible family relationships. In different cultures and during different periods, 
family may have different scopes and include different relationships besides the 
most basic ones which may be commonly observed. Family members may include 
grandparents, grandchildren, uncles, aunts, cousins, etc. and for each concrete case, 
a family may include other kinds of relationships or lack certain of the 
above-mentioned relationships.  
What is family? Various definitions of family have been constructed in an 
attempt to accommodate various kinds of social institutions that we may refer to 
as families. The problem has become more complicated since families have 
changed dramatically ever since industrialization, and even more so in the past 
several decades.17 We have seen more and more single-parent families, blended 
families with at least one spouse who already has a child or more from a previous 
relationship, homosexual families, families with absent parents and grandparents 
                                                        
17 Mark Hutter, "History of Family," in The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, 
edited by George Ritzer, Oxford: Blackwell, 2007, p. 1594; Gary Stanley Becker, 
A Treatise on the Family, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1991, pp. 1-2; 
Pamela McMullin-Messier, "Family," in Encyclopedia of Social Problems, edited 
by Vincent N. Parrillo, London: Sage Publications, 2008, pp. 352-354. 
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raising the grandchildren, etc. It takes another thesis, perhaps several, to articulate 
a concept which can accommodate all the changing social realities. What matters 
here, however, is that a simple definition of family which consists of a couple and 
children would suffice for the purpose of the discussion of family-related partiality 
in this thesis. Obviously, there are variations of family which may not fall in the 
mainstream of this concept, such as adopted family, homosexual family, etc. 
Whether the final conclusions in this thesis can apply for all kinds of families, or 
social groups which we usually refer to as families, have important moral and 
political implications, but it is also beyond the scope of this thesis and will be left 
for further investigations.   
The immediate question in response to the focus on family-related partiality 
would be: what are the differences between family members and other people 
whom we also usually give partial treatment, such as people from the same town 
and compatriots?18 
One obvious answer would be blood ties. A big problem with this answer in 
relation to family is that it would exclude spouses, and adopted family members, 
all of whom are not considered marginal in thinking about family. However, it is 
indeed argued that it is the blood ties that unite people together in the family for 
                                                        
18 And people of the same race perhaps. Although I do not want to make some 
“politically incorrect” remarks, I still would like to point out that, from the agent’s 
position, what is really troubling about racism is not the different treatment of 
people, but the assumption of the inferiority of and hatred toward certain people. 
See, for example, Lawrence Blum, “Racism: What It Is and What It Isn’t”, in 
Education, Democracy, and the Moral Life, edited by Michael S. Katz, Susan 
Verducci, and Gert Biesta, Dordrecht: Springer, 2009, p. 77. 
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Confucianism, which even leads to the resistance to, if not rejection of, the 
practice of adoption.19 
By blood ties, if we refer to the importance of the continuity of certain 
qualities-carrying genes in relation to their physical manifestation, we as children 
may be compelled to exclude family members such as parents while 
contemplating on blood ties. Parents did contribute but would not continue to 
contribute to the project. In contrast, it follows that we should pay more attention 
to our children, our siblings (and ourselves) who will contribute to the 
continuation of these genetic qualities.20 Moreover, if what matter are those genes 
in relation to certain genetic qualities, it may not be a wild guess that genes which 
carry similar, if not same, qualities can be identified in someone else who is not a 
family member. If we refer to certain combinations of genes as well as the 
similarities among them, we can include parents but how exactly can we argue for 
the similarities between combinations of genes? One possible answer might be 
that for parent and child, the child can be considered as part “of a continuous 
biological process” which “began as an episode in the biological life of the 
                                                        
19  Ren-Zong Qiu, “Sociocultural dimensions of infertility and assisted 
reproduction in the Far East,” in Current Practices and Controversies in Assisted 
Reproduction: Report of a meeting on "Medical, Ethical and Social Aspects of 
Assisted Reproduction”, held at WHO Headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, 
17–21, September 2001, edited by Effy Vayena, Patrick J. Rowe, and P. David 
Griffin, Geneva: World Health Organization, 2002, p. 78. 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.122.5172&rep=rep1&ty
pe=pdf, accessed on 1th, August, 2010.  
20 Michael W. Austin, “The Failure of Biological Accounts of Parenthood,” 
Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 38, 2004, p. 499. 
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parent.”21 The argument is, however, different from those that concentrate on the 
fact that genetic parents brought into this world their children who in turn are 
entitled with some special claims.22 It rests on the discontinuity of self in different 
times and draws on the stance that one has reason to be partial to oneself in 
different times and that genetic similarities between a self in different times (hence 
multiple selves) and those between one and one’s genetic child are similar. It 
therefore follows that one has “reason to respond to [one’s] relationship to [one’s] 
genetic child in a way that is similar to the way in which [one has] reason to 
respond to [one’s] relationship to [oneself] at other times.”23 For this thesis, 
however, it would suffice to claim that we only consider the circumstances where 
blood ties coincide with closeness, either in the past or in the present, for family 
members.  
Another possible answer toward why family members are different might be 
that we are more closely related to our family members both physically and 
emotionally. But what about our close friends as well as our colleagues? We may 
spend more time with people with whom we study and work, and establish more 
intimate relationships with our close friends than with some of our family 
members. In modern industrialized societies, many people go to various places to 
                                                        
21 Niko Kolodny, “Which Relationships Justify Partiality? The Case of Parents 
and Children,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2010, p. 70. It 
should be noted, however, that such explanation cannot accommodate siblings.  
22  Tibor R. Machan, “Between Parents and Children,” Journal of Social 
Philosophy, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1992, pp. 20-21. 
23 Niko Kolodny, “Which Relationships Justify Partiality? The Case of Parents 
and Children,” p. 71. 
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search for employment opportunities and make a living away from their family, 
which locates people physically farther away from their family members, such as 
parents, siblings. Besides, even the most optimistic observers cannot deny the 
existence of dysfunctional families, where family members are abused either 
mentally or physically or both. The assumption of closer physical and emotional 
relatedness does not hold for such dysfunctional families.  
But the fact that we call these families dysfunctional suggests that we usually 
have a general ideal of a family implying physical and emotional closeness. This 
ideal may not be realized in each and every family we encounter. But let us briefly 
consider other categories of people whom we give special treatment, people who 
speak the same language, those who believe in the same God, and those who are 
our compatriots. We would not be surprised to find people in these categories 
whom we do not like or even resent. Just as these examples would not render the 
whole investigation on the partiality toward compatriots unnecessary, the special 
cases of dysfunctional family or other families where members are not partial to 
one another would not make the issue of family-related partiality misconceived. 
Perhaps the previous answer for the difference between family members and other 
groups of people we give special treatment needs a minor revision to avoid 
possible attacks from empirical evidence: we are simply generally more closely 
related to our family members both physically and emotionally.  
What is more important for this thesis concerning the term “family” is why 
the term “family-related partiality” is adopted. For example, why not use the term 
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“family-based partiality” in this thesis? There are three reasons why the term 
“family-related partiality”, rather than family-based partiality for example, is 
chosen in this thesis. The term “family-related partiality” emphasizes family 
relations and refers to the partial treatment toward family members, that is, the 
partiality of children to their parents, and of parents to their children, the partiality 
between spouses, and between siblings, in which partiality arises because of the 
particular family relationships. In contrast, “family-based partiality” may give the 
misleading impression that the family as an institution serves as the basis of 
partiality.  
The first reason is related to translation in connection with early 
Confucianism. Unlike the term “family-related partiality”, “family-based 
partiality” and its possible overemphasis on family as an institution will highlight 
the difficulties of locating the exact translation of the term “family” in early 
Confucianism. In modern mandarin, “jia 家” translates “family”. The formation 
of Chinese character jia 家 is composed of two parts, one referring to the 
Chinese character for “pig” and the other the character for “house.”24 It is clear 
that jia originally refers to the place where pigs are kept and subsequently where 
one lives.25 If early Confucian texts are examined, convincing evidence can be 
found that during the time of these early Confucian texts, jia sometimes refers to 
the social group including parents, children, husband and wife. In some cases, jia 
                                                        
24 Yi Liyun, Han Zi Zi Yuan Xi Tong Yan Jiu, Beijing: Renmin University of 
China Press, 1998, p. 258. 
25 Xu Shen, Shuo Wen Jie Zi, Changsha: Yue Lu Shu She, 2006, p. 150; Tang 
Kejing, ed., Shuo Wen Jie Zi Jin Shi, Changsha: Yue Lu Shu She, 1997, p. 988. 
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also includes the larger social group of relatives and even those not related by 
blood or marriage, and it may not be easy to separate these two kinds of meanings 
of jia at the time. The term jia also has other meanings in the texts of early 
Confucianism.  
The potential problem in connection with the equation of family with jia is 
that, despite occasions when jia in early Confucianism is usually translated as 
family, the English term “family” suggests an entity distinctively separated from 
other entities, especially the state. In early Confucianism, however, such 
separation of family and state cannot be accepted without scrutiny. For the three 
main early Confucian texts, The Analects of Confucius, Mengzi, and Xunzi, the 
exact character jia appears 11 times in Analects, among which 4 times it refers to 
the nobles (da fu) and/or their feudal estate and 7 times it refers to the family in 
general, or household.26 In Mengzi, jia appears 31 times, among which 17 times it 
refers to the nobles (da fu) and/or their feudal estate and 14 times it refers to the 
family in general, or household.27 In Xunzi, jia appears around 55 times, among 
which 23 times it refers to the nobles (da fu) and/or their feudal estate,28 10 times 
                                                        
26 For the former, see Analects, 3.2, 5.8, 16.1, and for the latter, see Analects, 12.2, 
12.20, 17.16, 19.23, 19.25, 12.20. Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr., The 
Analects of Confucius: a Philosophical Translation, New York: Ballantine Books, 
1998.   
27 For the former, see Mengzi, 1A.1, 1B.9, 2A.1, 2A.4, 3A.4, 3B.3, 3B.10, 5B.3, 
6B.15, 7A.11, and for the latter, see Mengzi, 1A.3, 1A.7, 3A.3, 3B.2, 3B.3, 3B.7, 
4A.5, 4A.8, 6B.1, 7A.22. James Legge, The Works of Mencius, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1895.      
28 See, Xunzi, 2.2, 4.7, 6.4, 8.8, 9.2, 9.17, 9.19, 10.11, 11.1a, 13.2, 14.2, 15.5, 17.9, 
25.18, 27.17, 27.27, 27.41, 27.61, 29.3. John Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and 
Study of the Complete Works, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. 
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it refers to the theories of certain schools of thought,29 1 time it refers to a 
person’s name,30 and 21 times it refers to the family in general or household.31 It 
is difficult to determine in many cases whether jia refers to the nobles (da fu) 
and/or their feudal estate or the family in general especially when jia is 
accompanied with guo (state) as in guo jia. In Xunzi, guo jia has been consistently 




Thus, a man without ritual will not live; an undertaking lacking ritual 
will not be completed; and a nation without ritual will not be tranquil. 
(Xunzi, 2.2)32 
 
Hence, [i]n lives without ritual people cannot survive; In affairs 
without ritual success does not thrive; To states without ritual peace 
does not arrive. (Xunzi, 2.2)33 
In Mengzi, guo jia is usually translated as state and occasionally as state and 




For people to follow the doctrines of Hsü, would be for them to lead 
one another on to practise deceit. How can they avail for the 
government of a State? (Mengzi, 3A.4)34 
 
                                                        
29 See, Xunzi, 8.13, 21.1, 21.4, 22.3f, 22.6a, 25.14, 27.105. 
30 See, Xunzi, 27.58. 
31 See, Xunzi, 4.3, 5.2, 8.2, 9.12, 9.13, 9.17, 12.6, 14.7, 15.1d, 15.1f, 16.6, 19.4c, 
21.8, 26.4, 27.35, 27.52, 27.57, 27.91, 27.97, 27.100, 28.3.  
32 All translation of Xunzi, unless otherwise specified, is from John Knoblock, 
Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works. 
33 Eric L. Hutton, “Xunzi,” in Readings in classical Chinese philosophy, edited by 
Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, New York: Seven Bridges Press, 
2001, p. 254. 
34 All translation of Mengzi is from James Legge, The Works of Mencius. 
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孟子曰：“人有恆言，皆曰‘天下國(guo)家(jia)’。”(Mengzi, 4A.5)  
 
Mencius said, 'People have this common saying, “The kingdom, the 
State, the family.” (Mengzi, 4A.5)  
In Analects, guo and jia are occasionally accompanied by each other where 




I have heard that a nation or a family does not worry that it has little 
but that little is unevenly apportioned, does not worry that it is poor 
but that it is unstable. (Analects, 16.1)35 
 
1have heard that those who administer a state or a family do not worry 
about there being too few people，but worry about unequal distribution 
of wealth. They do not worry about poverty, but worry about the lack 
of security and peace on the part of the people. (Analects, 16.1)36 
 
I have always heard that what worries the head of a state or the chief 
of a clan is not poverty but inequality, not the lack of population, but 
the lack of peace. (Analects, 16.1)37 
 
As for me, I have heard that the ruler of a state or the head of a 
household: does not worry that his people are poor, but that wealth is 
inequitably distributed; does not worry that his people are too few in 
number, but that they are disharmonious; does not worry that his 
people are unstable, but that they are insecure. (Analects, 16.1)38 
 
What I have heard is that the head of a state or a noble family worries 
not about underpopulation but about uneven distribution, not about 
poverty but about instability. (Analects, 16.1)39 
 
I have heard that the possessors of states or noble families do not 
                                                        
35 Burton Watson, The Analects of Confucius, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2007.  
36 Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1963. 
37  Simon Leys, The Analects of Confucius, New York: W. W. Norton and 
Company, 1997.  
38 Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr., The Analects of Confucius: a 
Philosophical Translation. 
39 D. C. Lau, Confucius: the Analects, New York: Penguin Books, 1979.   
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worry about underpopulation, but worry about the people being 
unevenly distributed; do not worry about poverty, but worry about 
discontent. (Analects, 16.1)40 
 In the above examples, there are reasons to translate guo jia as the 
combination of two political institutions, where the meaning of jia goes beyond 
what we would usually assign to family. It is not argued here that the above 
translations are wrong or that they are inadequate to convey the thoughts 
suggested in these texts, but that they do indicate the difficulties of equating jia in 
early Confucianism with family in English language. It is not suggested here that 
the exact counterpart of the term “family” cannot be located in early 
Confucianism, or that such attempts are unnecessary for the studies of early 
Confucianism. The simple aim here is to avoid the claim that jia at the time of 
early Confucianism is the exact counterpart of family as a modern institution 
understood in Western social theory in general or in both communitarianism and 
care ethics in particular. Such claim may endanger the whole thesis by defending, 
or more precisely lacking the defense of, one unnecessary position, since the 
concept of family-related partiality in this thesis focuses on the family 
relationships that can be identified across different cultures, instead of family as a 
social institution.   
Although all three early Confucian texts do not give a specific definition of 
jia, discussion can be found regarding the relationships between parents and 
children, between husband and wife, between brothers--all of which can be 
                                                        
40 Raymond Dawson, Confucius: the Analects, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008.  
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classified within the relationships concerning the issue of family-related partiality 
in this thesis.  
The second reason is related to the discussion of partiality in 
communitarianism. Unlike early Confucianism, the discussion of family-related 
partiality in communitarianism would not face problems of translation. But as it 
will be shown in the second chapter, the distinction between family as an 
institution and its members or that between community and its members makes a 
difference for the discussion of partiality in communitarianism. Accordingly, the 
adoption of family-related partiality is not simply an arbitrary choice of terms but 
affects substantial views when dealing with the issue of partiality in 
communitarianism.  
The third reason is connected with care ethics. Like communitarianism, care 
ethics does not need to worry about translation. But as it will be shown in the third 
chapter, the dependent relationships in general and the mother-child relationship 
in particular are at the center of care ethics, both of which do not emphasize the 
importance of family as an institution.  
  
Communitarianism, Care Ethics, and Early Confucianism 
 
After briefly introducing the concept of family-related partiality, it is 
necessary to lay down the theoretical scope in this thesis. This part will specify the 
kind of communitarianism, care ethics, and early Confucianism that this thesis 
  22
will examine in addressing the issue of family-related partiality. The discussion of 
communitarianism in this thesis is limited to the so-called “modern-day 
communitarianism” mainly started by Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer, Michael 
Sandel, and Alasdair MacIntyre, all of whom are in one way or another 
responding to liberal emphasis on individualism in general and John Rawls’ A 
Theory of Justice in particular. Although some argue that communitarian ideas can 
be traced all the way back to Aristotle, it is generally agreed that 
communitarianism only established itself in academic discussion in the 1980s.41 
If we consider the issue of partiality in general and family-related partiality in 
particular, it is obvious that among the common threads for communitarians, the 
issue of partiality is not taken to be one of them. For example, Allen E. Buchanan 
claims that the common positions for communitarians include the emphasis on the 
“fundamental and irreplaceable” status of community in the pursuit of the good 
life, the importance of “full participation in the political community,” and 
involuntary responsibilities and commitments, the adherence to the social nature 
of self, and community as among the highest virtues.42 Stephen Mulhall and 
                                                        
41 Donald M. Borchert, ed., Encyclopedia of philosophy, Vol. 2, Detroit: Thomson 
Gale, 2006, p. 368; Donald M. Borchert, ed., Encyclopedia of philosophy, Vol. 9, p. 
74; John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig and Anne Phillips, "Introduction," in The 
Oxford Handbook of Political Theory, edited by John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig 
and Anne Phillips, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 18-19; Arthur 
Ripstein, "Political philosophy," in Routledge History of Philosophy Volume X, 
edited by John V. Canfield, London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 201-202; Richard 
Dagger, "Communitarianism and Republicanism," in Handbook of Political 
Theory, edited by Gerald F. Gaus and Chandran Kukathas, London: Sage 
Publications, 2004, p. 167. 
42 Allen E. Buchanan, "Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism," 
Ethics, Vol. 99, No. 4, 1989, pp. 852-853.  
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Adam Swift make an assertion concerning the common ground of communitarians, 
based solely on the works of Sandel, MacIntyre, Taylor and Walzer, that they “are 
united around a conception of human beings as integrally related to the 
communities of culture and language that they create, maintain and inhabit.”43 
Daniel A. Bell claims that what unite communitarians, MacIntyre, Sandel, Taylor 
and Walzer in his analysis, is the view that “the importance of community for 
personal identity, moral and political thinking, and judgements about our 
well-being in the contemporary world” should be taken more seriously.44  
Of course, this fact simply suggests the focus of contemporary 
communitarianism, which would not prevent us from articulating communitarian 
attitudes toward partiality in general and family-related partiality in particular. 
Moreover, attempts should be made to propose the relations between 
communitarianism and the idea of partiality as it could provide a unique 
perspective to understand the special features of communitarianism and its 
similarities with other moral and political theories, which will further the effort to 
adequately address the issue of partiality. In this thesis, two elements in 
communitarianism will be investigated in relation to partiality in general and 
family-related partiality in particular, that is, the communitarian self and the 
concept of community. The communitarian self will be investigated in relation to 
the general version of family-related partiality and the concept of community in 
                                                        
43 Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1992, p. 162. 
44 Daniel A. Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1993, p. 4. 
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relation to the particular version of family-related partiality. The investigation of 
the conception of self in relation to the general version of family-related partiality 
will be conducted in care ethics and early Confucianism as well, which will reveal 
the similarities and the differences between conceptions of self in these three 
theories, especially their relevance to the general version of family-related 
partiality. For the particular version of family-related partiality in 
communitarianism, the focus will be placed on the concept of community and its 
relevance to family. Although family is seldom treated as a kind of community in 
communtiarianism, it will be argued that such interpretation of community will 
not only link communitarianism with family-related partiality closely but also 
provide restrictions for how far such partiality can go in communitarianism.   
Care ethics has attracted much academic attention since Carol Gilligan’s In A 
Different Voice and Nel Noddings’ Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and 
Moral Education, which are also commonly considered as the founding works on 
care ethics.45 Attempts have also been made to expand care ethics to larger 
domains, from personal to political affairs. Since 1980s, it has developed into a 
moral and political theory which presents proposals to address problems in 
different areas. 
One may wonder what characteristics care ethics has that serve to 
differentiate it from other western theories. One of the answers claims that there 
                                                        
45 Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s 
Development, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982; Nel Noddings, Caring: 
A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, second edition, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003. 
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are “four major features…partiality, which construes ethics as differentiating 
between individuals, rather than addressing a standard subject; anti-principlism, 
which construes ethics as reasoning from particulars, rather than from 
universalizable principles; emotionalism, which construes ethics as advocating 
compassionate emotions, rather than rule-guided conduct; and relationism, which 
construes ethics as referring to relations between individuals as its basic unit of 
analysis, rather than to each individual strictly.”46 Regarding partiality, Noddings’ 
own elaboration on, and especially limitation of, the scope of caring clearly 
indicate that she uphold partiality in care ethics, especially partiality toward those 
near and dear.47 Therefore we can conclude that the problem of partiality in 
general and perhaps family-related partiality in particular must be more prominent 
in care ethics, compared with communitarianism.  
Unlike communitarianism, care ethics does differentiate different 
relationships within family-related partiality. The relationship between parents and 
children, or more specifically that between mother and child, is the prototype for 
care ethics as it represents the absolute vulnerability in the relationship between 
the cared-for and the one-caring. Such emphasis on this specific relationship will 
lead to different strategies toward family-related partiality despite care ethics’ 
similarities with communitarianism. For the discussion of family-related partiality 
in care ethics, two elements, that is, the concept of relational self and the idea of 
                                                        
46 Abraham Rudnick, "A Meta-Ethical Critique of Care Ethics," Theoretical 
Medicine, Vol. 22, 2001, p. 506. 
47 Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, p. 
112. 
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caring, will be investigated. For the general version of family-related partiality, the 
conception of relational self in care ethics will be examined, during which 
comparison between communitarian self and relational self in care ethics will 
provide evidence to assess the (different) strength of the general version of 
family-related partiality in communitarianism and in care ethics respectively. Just 
as in communitarianism, the investigation of family-related partiality in care 
ethics cannot be limited to the general version of family-related partiality as well 
as the concept of self. In order to better understand the attitudes toward 
family-related partiality in care ethics, it is necessary to carry forward the 
investigation of the particular version of family-related partiality which focuses on 
the concept of caring. 
Early Confucianism in this thesis refers to the works of Confucius, Mencius 
and Xunzi, or rather three major texts, The Analects of Confucius, Mengzi, and 
Xunzi. Reconstruction is always needed in an attempt to investigate early 
Confucianism partly because of the nature of these works. Throughout these 
works, the various relationships within family-those between parents and children, 
between brothers and sisters-are widely discussed in the texts. 
Early Confucianism in particular and Confucianism in general are (in)famous 
for the emphasis on family in moral and political thinking. It is not adequate at 
this stage to claim that early Confucianism will definitely produce positive effects 
for contemporary world but such possibility should be left open. Attempts will be 
made in this thesis to investigate early Confucianism’s implications for 
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family-related partiality. Two concepts in early Confucianism, that is, a 
reconstructed Confucian concept of self and the concept of filial piety (xiao) will 
be addressed in relation to the general version and the particular version of 
family-related partiality respectively. Unlike both communitarianism and care 
ethics, early Confucian interpretation of self is not explicitly discussed in the texts. 
Reconstruction is therefore necessary for the investigation of early Confucian self, 
which also paves the way for the investigation of the similarities and differences 
between Confucian conception of self, communitarian self, and relational self in 
care ethics as well as their relevance for the possible different strength of the 
general version of family-related partiality in three theories. Just as in both 
communitarianism and care ethics, the attempt to investigate family-related 
partiality in early Confucianism should not be limited to the examination of 
Confucian conception of self. The particular version of family-related partiality in 
early Confucianism will be examined in relation to one crucial concept, filial 
piety.  
 
Self, Identity-Holding, and General Version of Family-related Partiality 
 
The examination of the conception of self will provide a common ground for 
all three theories for the discussion of family-related partiality in its general 
version. In order to construct a general version of family-related partiality based 
on the concept of self in communitarianism, care ethics, and early Confucianism, 
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attempts will be made to examine the conception of self in each theory as well as 
their similarities and differences and their relevance to family-related partiality 
through the idea of identity-holding. This concept which deals with the relation 
and interaction between self and other with regard to the formation of identity 
provides a way of justifying family-related partiality.  
In her “Holding One Another (Well, Wrongly, Clumsily) In a Time of 
Dementia,” Lindemann introduces the idea of identity-holding while arguing for 
identity as an interpersonal achievement.48 Here the assumption is that one’s 
identity is defined as the representation of self, which suggests that the kind of 
identity relevant here is what one usually calls personal identity. According to 
Lindemann, the notion of identity-holding is mostly narrative, which suggests that 
it is the stories provided by both the agent and others that constitute one’s identity. 
Moreover, it is not only moral agents who can contribute to the identity-holding. 
Objects, things, etc. “can and do help us to maintain our sense of self.”49 
Clearly, Lindemann rejects the idea that one’s identity depends only on those 
internal aspects of her existence and has nothing to do with others. She also claims 
                                                        
48 Hilde Lindemann, “Holding One Another (Well, Wrongly, Clumsily) In a Time 
of Dementia,” Metaphilosophy, Vol. 40, Nos. 3-4, 2009, pp. 416-424. Of course, 
Lindemann is not the only person who believes in the interpersonal nature of 
personal identity. For example, Estelle Ferrarese argues that “for Charles Taylor, 
Jürgen Habermas, Ernst Tugendhat and Axel Honneth among others, individuality 
is constituted both through intersubjective recognition and through one’s 
self-understanding as mediated by intersubjectivity.” Estelle Ferrarese, 
“‘Gabba-Gabba, We Accept You, One of Us’: Vulnerability and Power in the 
Relationship of Recognition,” Constellations, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2009, p. 604. 
49 Hilde Lindemann, “Holding One Another (Well, Wrongly, Clumsily) In a Time 
of Dementia,” p. 419. 
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that identity-holding has both a backward-looking and a forward-looking 
perspective. Such claims indicate that the idea of identity-holding is based on 
certain theoretical stances, one of which is usually called extrinsic relational views 
in contrast with the intrinsic relational views, the former of which suggests that 
what matter for one’s identity are not just her own physical or/and psychological 
elements , but also how she is related to other people.50 Another one assumes a 
four-dimensional view of identity, which adds the dimension of time to the 
traditional three dimensions (length, width, and depth) of identity, which does not 
consider the element of time and hence the (dis)continuation of self and identity. 
Accordingly, identity should be viewed as the whole of identity in each stage 
throughout the lifetime.51 Moreover, the idea of identity-holding rests on the 
assumption and appreciation of the continuity as well as the unity of self as it has 
both a backward-looking and a forward-looking perspective.  
Kukla further differentiates between two kinds of identity-holding, holding 
somebody as a person, and holding somebody in her particular identity.52 Kukla 
suggests that although the distinctions should be made for conceptual clarity, we 
would not encounter any practical difficulties or cause real harm if we fail to do so, 
because in real cases these two kinds of identity-holding are inseparable. One 
cannot be this person without being a person and one cannot be a person without 
                                                        
50 Raymond Martin, “Fission Rejuvenation,” in Personal Identity, edited by 
Raymond Martin and John Barresi, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, p. 216. 
51 Raymond Martin, “Fission Rejuvenation,” p. 216. 
52  Rebecca Kukla, ‘‘Holding the Body of Another,’’ Symposium: Canadian 
Journal of Continental Philosophy, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2007, p. 398. 
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being this person. But as it will be shown in the following section, this distinction 
between two kinds of identity-holding actually matters, when it appeals to the 
distinction between two conceptions of self both of which can accommodate the 
idea of identity-holding.   
Lindemann believes that compared with others, family members are in a 
unique or advantageous position to contribute to the formation of one’s identity 
and that family members have special responsibilities to one another’s 
identity-holding. Although Lindemann does not pay much attention to the 
distinction between identity-holding as persons and identity-holding as a 
particular person, it is safe to conclude that family members more significantly 
contribute to the formation of identity as a particular person. Of course, it does not 
suggest that family members’ contribution is excluded from the formation of 
identity as human beings generally since, as it is emphasized above, it is 
practically impossible to hold somebody in her particular identity without 
necessarily also holding her as a human being. Although these two kinds of 
holding, holding somebody as a person, and holding somebody in her particular 
identity, are closely connected, the distinction would prove to be of significance to 
assess the different kinds of conceptions of self, in this thesis, the conceptions of 
self in communitarianism, care ethics, and early Confucianism, in relation to   
partiality in general and that toward family members in particular through the idea 
of identity-holding.  
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Since Lindemann’s essay focuses on the situation of people who suffer from 
dementia, it does not consider the question the other way around, that is, whether 
one has special responsibilities to those who contribute to the formation of her 
identity. If we admit that family members make special contributions to the 
construction of one’s identity and the formation of identity is morally important, 
as Lindemann does, it should follow that one is also obligated, or at least allowed, 
to pay special attention to her family members, since, first, she is in turn in a 
better position to form the identity of her family members, and second, compared 
with non-family members, she has significantly benefited from her family 
members or will benefit from them in the future, or both. This is what I would call 
the support for the general version of family-related partiality. As there are two 
kinds of identity-holding, identity-holding as a person and identity-holding as 
particular person, family members are relevant for both kinds and especially 
relevant for the second, while even complete strangers, or at least those who are 
not so close to us, can contribute to our identity-holding in the first kind. It 
follows that such general version of family-related partiality would not lead to the 
exclusive concerns for family members since other people also make their 
contribution to our identity-holding. How far the general version of family-related 
partiality in each theory, communitarianism, or care ethics, or early Confucianism, 
would go depends on the similarities and differences of the conception of self in 
each theory and how they would accommodate the idea of identity-holding, 
especially its different kinds.     
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It can be argued that such partiality in relation to identity-holding is a kind of 
reciprocity since we are making a return for the good we received.53 It should be 
noted that others’ contribution to our identity-holding may not be completed and 
that we are actually returning some favor we have not received yet. By 
introducing the concept of reciprocity, however, it has become clear that one 
characteristic of establishing the connection between the conception of self and 
partiality through identity-holding is to signify the contribution of others to 
oneself and therefore to render it closer to the idea of reciprocity.   
It should be emphasized that for the idea of identity-holding here as well as 
the investigation of self in this thesis, the focus on self and identity is primarily 
placed on the metaphysical dimension, the constitution of the self for example, 
instead of the ethical dimension, such as what moral character one possesses. Here 
the metaphysical dimension of self and identity excludes the discussion of the 
moral assessment of self, such as whether certain views should be praised or 
blamed, whether certain morally evaluative characters should be supported or 
rejected. It does not assume any standard concerning the continuity of identity, 
whether physical, psychological, or certain combination of them. It is the ethical 
dimension of self and identity that may provide stronger support for partiality, 
although the emphasis on the ethical dimension may encounter serious difficulties, 
especially for both communitarianism and care ethics. Two arguments can be 
proposed to connect the ethical dimension of self and identity with the issue of 
                                                        
53 Lawrence C. Becker, “Reciprocity, Justice, and Disability,” Ethics, Vol. 116, 
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partiality. The first one is to argue that being partial to certain people is a character 
trait that should be valued, which belongs to the more general discussion of 
partiality that will not be investigated here. The second one would be more 
relevant for the idea of identity-holding, which argues for the value of certain 
morally evaluative characters of self and hence the importance of others’ 
contribution to our identity. From this perspective, we should appreciate other 
people’s contribution to the identity-holding because these people help to develop 
and/or maintain certain desirable morally evaluative characters. The problem with 
this kind of argument is that we cannot expect only valuable morally evaluative 
characters to be formed and held, no matter what standards are given. It would 
indeed be more persuasive to connect the importance of identity-holding with the 
value of certain morally evaluative characters and aspects of self, but those 
characters and aspects of self could function negatively and therefore damage the 
effort to value the idea of identity-holding.54 
It should be emphasized that, even from the perspective of metaphysical 
dimension, the connection between self, identity and partiality can be investigated 
from various perspectives other than the idea of identity-holding. For example, 
different positions concerning the separation of selves may offer different 
implications for the issue of partiality in general. If we question the distinction 
between different selves and between the same self in different space and time as 
                                                        
54 For an argument against valuing certain morally evaluative characters and 
aspects of self, see Diane Jeske, Rationality and Moral Theory: How Intimacy 
Generates Reasons, New York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 136-140. 
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well as the ordinary conviction that there are important differences between these 
two kinds of distinctions, we may cast doubt on the plausibility that we would 
treat different persons differently.55 Except for the issue of partiality, certain 
stance on the separateness of selves may also have implications for substantial 
moral and political views.56 
Two objections, however, can be raised against linking identity-holding with 
partiality for family members. First, since there are good and bad identity-holding, 
it seems that it is possible that the more family members contribute to the 
identity-holding process, the greater harm they will do to that agent. Second, since 
one’s self and identity will change over time, why should we value those who 
contribute to my identity-holding as it is? 
For the first objection, we should first of all clarify what morally good and 
bad holding means for identity-holding here. Lindemann introduces the distinction 
between morally good and bad holding in terms of three criteria.57 First, whether 
those identity-generating stories, either provided by others or the agent herself, 
correspond to true events that happened; second, whether the identity is 
constituted appropriately by those stories; and third, whether those stories would 
prevent one’s identity from continuously moving forward. However, Lindemann 
                                                        
55 For such an investigation, see Daniel Kolak, I Am You: The Metaphysical 
Foundations for Global Ethics, Dordrecht: Springer, 2004, p. 15.  
56 For example, Matt Zwolinski argues that positive views on the separateness of 
selves play important roles in both John Rawls and Robert Nozick’s theories. Matt 
Zwolinski, “The Separateness of Persons and Liberal Theory,” Journal of Value 
Inquiry, Vol. 42, 2008, pp. 147-148. 
57 Hilde Lindemann, “Holding One Another (Well, Wrongly, Clumsily) In a Time 
of Dementia,” pp. 419-420. 
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offers no example where the identity itself is morally undesirable and therefore the 
evaluation of holding this kind of identity is problematic in such circumstances. 
Her distinction between morally good and bad holding focuses on the aspect of 
holding, not identity. Since family members are always better equipped to help 
form one’s identity, Lindemann’s distinction of and emphasis on morally good 
and bad holding will only further increase the importance of family members and 
hence the appreciation of family-related partiality. Although Lindemann’s 
distinction between morally good and bad holding can be readily accommodated 
by family-related partiality, there is another kind of distinction between morally 
good and bad identity-holding that would challenge the status of family members, 
that is, the distinction which focuses on the part of identity, not holding. This 
question concerning morally evaluative characters, however, falls in the ethical 
dimension of the identity, which goes beyond the investigation of partiality here.  
It must be recognized that the ethical dimension of others’ contribution to our 
identity is very relevant to the issue of partiality. If we ignore this side, we may 
reach the conclusion that even if some people contribute to the negative side of 
one’s identity, for example, turning her into a thief because it is a “family 
business,” or abusing her so that she is psychologically damaged, such partiality 
should still be granted. Although this is a hard problem we have to face in arguing 
for the general version of family-related partiality through the idea of 
identity-holding, we may consider the alternative. If we turn to the ethical 
dimension of others’ contribution to identity-holding, we would be confronted 
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with the challenge that what really matter are those ethical ideals which may be 
generally desirable or not.  
For the second objection, that is, since one’s identity and self will change over 
time, perhaps we should not overemphasize the importance of family members’ 
contribution to identity-holding.  If we consider the backward-looking and the 
forward-looking aspect of identity-holding, from the forward-looking perspective, 
family members present more significance to the identity-holding because of their 
usual physical and emotional closeness. And from the backward-looking 
perspective, if we deem it problematic to emphasize the importance of family 
members’ contribution to identity-holding, we have to depreciate the importance 
of everyone else’s contribution to the formation of one’s identity from the 
backward-looking perspective. To accomplish this goal, we need to emphasize the 
accidental nature of the identity-holding from the backward-looking perspective, 
which would prove to be applicable to all partiality theses, not just to the thesis of 
family-related partiality in connection with identity-holding, since all partiality 
theses have to pay special attention to some aspects of the moral agent which are 
accidental or depend on luck.58 For example, our situation in the real world, our 
relationships with other people, directly or indirectly, are to some extent 
accidental no matter how much we emphasize the contribution of our voluntary 
actions. Moreover, if we consider two kinds of holding separately, it becomes 
                                                        
58 For an argument against partiality based on the idea of accidental nature of our 
situation in the real world, see Anita M. Superson, “Moral Luck and Partialist 
Theories,” Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 30, 1996, pp. 213-227. 
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clear that one’s identity as a particular person may indeed change over time but 
that one’s identity as a human being may not. For example, if we consider our 
general identity as “an animal that needs to live in a community,”59 or “as a being 
with desires, interests, and inclinations,”60 it is hardly possible that it will change 
very soon. The concern for the changing nature of identity may prove to be more 
relevant for identity-holding as a particular person although such changes should 
not be overemphasized for identity-holding. Such worries is founded on the stance 
of taking self as multiple episodes in different times without affirming the 
continuity and unity of these episodes as belonging to one self.   
It must be noted that we cannot establish the connection between conception 
of self and partiality simply because a general theory, communitarianism for 
example, fulfills the following two criteria. First, the conception of self is an 
essential part of this theory. Second, this theory supports or at least lean toward 
partiality. Regarding communitarianism for example, there are other factors, other 
than conception of self, which we should examine concerning the issue of 
partiality. Some of these factors may play more important roles in dealing with 
partiality, for example, the idea of community for communitarianism, which will 
be investigated as providing support for a particular version of family-related 
partiality in communitarianism.     
                                                        
59  Christine Korsgaard, "The Authority of Reflection," in The Sources of 
Normativity, edited by Onora O'Neill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996, p. 119. 
60 Young-Ran Roh, “An Extended Conception of Rationality and Moral Actions,” 
Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 37, 2003, p. 41. 
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It should also be noted that many versions of self, not just the conception of 
self in communitarianism, care ethics, and early Confucianism, can accommodate 
the identity-holding and hence provide basis for the kind of general version of 
partiality proposed in this thesis, for example, the social self suggested in 
American Pragmatism and the cultural historical school in Russia in early 20th 
century. 61  One may even argue that J.S. Mill’s conception of self can 
accommodate the identity-holding and hence the general version of partiality, if 
we agree with Andrew Gustafson that Mill’s “view of self is social” and “radically 
affected by their social surroundings.”62   
 
 
 It is the plan of this thesis to show clearly that these three theories, though 
not the dominant ones in contemporary English-speaking world, can each provide 
valuable insights on the issue of partiality in general and family-related partiality 
in particular. Moreover, although these three theories come from different 
backgrounds, they can be connected through one unique perspective, that is, their 
implications for family-related partiality, especially the general version of 
family-related partiality which is connected with the conception of self.  
 
                                                        
61See Tan Sor Hoon, Confucian Democracy: A Deweyan Reconstruction, New 
York: State University of New York Press, 2004, pp. 25-29; Ian Burkitt, Social 
Selves: Theories of Self and Society, London: Sage Publications, 2008, pp. 31-55. 
62 Andrew Gustafson, “J. S. Mill’s Communal Utilitarian Self: A Critique of Gray, 
Anschutz, and Woolf’s Radically Individualistic Interpretations,” International 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2009, pp. 174, 184. 
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 Chapter Two 
Communitarianism and Family-related Partiality 
 
 In this chapter, I will investigate two versions of family-related partiality for 
communitarianism in sequence, the general version based on the concept of 
communitarian self and the particular version based on the concept of community. 
The adoption of this structure is meant to accommodate the analysis of family-related 
partiality for communitarianism on the one hand, and the (possible) comparative 
studies between communitarianism, care ethics, and early Confucianism concerning 
the issue of family-related partiality on the other. For both care ethics and early 
Confucianism, two versions of family-related partiality, that is, the general one and 
the particular one, will also be constructed to accommodate comparative studies，
focusing especially on the similarities and differences regarding the general version in 
each theory. For the investigation of family-related partiality for communitarianism in 
this chapter, it will be argued that communitarian support for family-related partiality 
is both indirect and weaker, compared with both care ethics and early Confucianism. 
It is weaker in the sense that for the general version of family-related partiality, the 
communitarian conception of self does not provide sufficient support through 
identity-holding, especially identity-holding as a particular person. It is indirect in the 
sense that for the particular version of family-related partiality, communitarian 
support depends on the analysis of the conception of community, in which the support 
for family-related partiality is derived from family being a kind of community. One 
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important note needs to be made at the beginning. The aim of this chapter is to 
investigate the issue of family-related partiality in communitarianism, not to argue for 
the absolute priority of partiality toward family members. The investigation of 
family-related partiality in communitarianism does not by itself suggest the distinctive 
or excessive partiality toward family members. 
In the first part of this chapter, I will engage in the discussion of the conception of 
self in communtiarianism in an attempt to argue for the general version of 
family-related partiality. The investigation of communitarian self will be limited in 
this chapter to the works of Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, 
especially Sandel’s Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, MacIntyre’s After Virtue: A 
Study of Moral Theory, Taylor’s Sources of the Self, as well as Daniel A. Bell’s 
Communitarianism and Its Critics, which is constructed largely on Sandel’s, Taylor’s 
and MacIntyre’s works and openly advocates communitarianism.63 The interest in the 
conception of self can partly explain this choice since all these scholars either pay 
special attention to or can be understood as elaborating on the concept of self while 
engaging in the debates concerning communitarianism.64 It will be argued that 
according to the concept of identity-holding as well as the differentiation of two kinds 
of identity-holding, as a person and as a particular person, the communitarian 
conception of self does support the general version of family-related partiality, 
                                                        
63 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 
third edition, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007; Charles Taylor, 
Sources of the Self, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
64  Neera K. Badhwar, “Moral Agency, Commitment, and Impartiality,” Social 
Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 13, 1996, p. 2n.2. 
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especially by appealing to identity-holding as a person. However, communitarian self 
does not adequately accommodate identity-holding as a particular person. Moreover, 
even for the identity-holding as a person, communitarian self does not emphasize the 
status of family or family members, both of which limit the strength of the general 
version of family-related partiality for communitarianism. 
In the second part of this chapter, attempts will then be made to articulate the 
particular version of family-related partiality based on the conception of community 
for communitarianism. This particular version of family-related partiality would 
suggest that family members should be given special concerns based on the concept 
of community, that is, because they are our fellow members in the same community. 
The following issues therefore need to be addressed. First, the investigation of 
partiality based on the concept of community. Second, whether family is a kind of 
community for communitarianism. It will become clear that these two issues depend 
on the analysis of the conception of community as well as the scope of community for 
communitarianism. It will be argued that communitarianism can accommodate the 
particular version of family-related partiality by treating family as a kind of 
community. In the meantime, it will be shown that although the attempt to investigate 
the scope of community is intended to serve the particular version of family-related 
partiality, it also reveals the limits of partiality toward family members as there are 
many communities for communitarianism in terms of their scope, for example, 
national community, global community, and the particular version of family-related 
partiality must therefore recognize the partial considerations for these kinds of 
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community as well.   
Unlike the lack of discussion of the relations between partiality and the 
conception of self, the correlation between partiality and community has been 
discussed in communitarianism. Michael Walzer’s Doctrine of Supreme Emergency 
(DSE) will be examined as an argument for communitarian partiality based on 
community. Walzer’s communitarian partiality reveals some theoretical ambiguities in 
communitarianism in general, in this case, the lack of specification of the concept of 
political community. The argument for or against DSE per se or as a version of 
communitarian partiality necessitates the elaboration on the concept of political 
community which is not explicitly put forward or argued for in DES.   
Along with the examination of the concept of community, steps will also be taken 
to discuss the scope of community in order to accommodate family-related partiality 
in light of Walzer’s construction of communitarian partiality based on the concept of 
community. Following the method of DSE, if we want to argue for family-related 
partiality, we need to provide an argument that family can be treated as a kind of 
community as political community is treated in communitarianism. In the course of 
the examination of the scope of community, the issue whether there is a global 
community will be raised and how it will be addressed will also affect the strength of 
the particular version of family-related partiality for communitarianism.  
 
Communitarian Self and the General Version of Family-related Partiality  
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In order to argue for the general version of family-related partiality for 
communitarianism based on the idea of communitarian self, we need to accomplish it 
in two steps. First, we need to investigate communitarian construction of self and 
attempt to reach a conclusion which may be acceptable for communitarianism in 
general. Despite their different opinions of communitarian discourse, Sandel, Taylor, 
MacIntyre as well as Bell’s views on self will be examined in relation to 
communitarian self, which will lead to the conclusion that communitarian self is 
generally considered to be socially constituted. 
Second, we need to identify the connections between family-related partiality 
and communitarian conception of self in light of the idea of identity-holding, and 
moreover, how far the communitarian self can adequately accommodate two kinds of 
identity-holding, that is, holding somebody as a person and holding somebody as a 
particular person. It will become clear that in accordance with the status of family or 
family members for the communitarian self, the strength of the general version of 
family-related partiality for communitarianism is rather weak, especially compared 
with that in care ethics and early Confucianism which will be discussed in the 
following chapters.  
Before presenting his own idea of self, Michael Sandel describes the target of 
his criticism, which is labeled as the "unencumbered self" or "deontological self." The 
unencumbered self is supposed to be “prior to and independent of purposes and 
ends”.65 And in order "to be a deontological self, I must be a subject whose identity is 
                                                        
65  Michael Sandel, "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self", in 
Communitarianism and Individualism, edited by Shlomo Avineri and Avner De-Shalit, 
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given independently of the things I have, independently, that is, of my interests and 
ends and my relations with others."66 This kind of self suggests that "the subject, 
however heavily conditioned by his surroundings, is always, irreducibly, prior to his 
values and ends, and never fully constituted by them."67 For this kind of self, the 
relationship with others and the membership within a certain community do not make 
much significant difference to its identity. All these belong to the category of 
individual choice, things that would not influence our fundamental understandings of 
the moral subject, as "we are distinct individuals first, and then (circumstances 
permitting) we form relationships and engage in co-operative arrangements with 
others."68  
In response to this kind of self, Sandel proposes two conceptions of self, the 
intrasubjective conception of self and the intersubjective conception of self.69 The 
intrasubjective conceptions of self suggest that the moral subject will change all the 
time in response to surroundings that exercise significant power on it. The self is not 
something that is formed and will stay that way. As its commitment, membership, 
loyalty, dependency, or other elements change, it will also experience constant 
changes. Here Sandel does not explain the criterion for determining whether a self 
after significant changes can be still treated as the same one. But it seems that he 
employs the simple criterion of physical continuity. Significant psychological changes, 
                                                                                                                                                               
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 18. 
66 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 55. 
67 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 22. 
68 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 53. 
69 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 63. 
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such as “religious conversion”, would not hurt the individuality of a certain self but 
the question whether psychological continuity matters to identity is still left 
unexplored.  
 While intrasubjective conceptions of self can be understood to be in favor of the 
continuity of the moral subject, intersubjective conceptions of self refer to the 
attachments of self to others: 
To imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments such as these is 
not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person 
wholly without character, without moral depth.70 
In discussing intersubjective conception of self, Sandel explicitly talks about the 
relationships between the moral subject and other social groups, such as family, 
community, or nation and emphasizes the importance of such memberships for the 
constitution of self.71 
 In his description of the desirable conception of self, MacIntyre turns to the 
ancient Greek understanding of the moral subject or rather his interpretation of the 
moral subject in ancient Greece, where “it is through his or her membership in a 
variety of social groups that the individual identifies himself or herself and is 
identified by others.”72 The adequate conception of self must be connected with its 
                                                        
70 Michael Sandel, "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self", p. 23. 
71 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, pp. 62-63. 
72 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, p.33. Although MacIntyre presents his conception 
of self based on his critique of some modern self which is contrasted with his 
description of self in the ancient time, it should be emphasized that his conception of 
self does not depend on whether his description of lives in ancient time is adequate or 
not in anthropological term. Whether one agrees with the veracity of his description of 
the ancient self should not be linked with her attitudes toward MacIntyre’s proposal of 
the self. For the investigation concerning the veracity of MacIntyre’s presentation of 
traditional self, see David Burchell, "Civic Personae: MacIntyre, Cicero and Moral 
Personality," History of Political Thought, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1998, pp. 101-118. 
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social roles and memberships but it does not follow that it is just the sum of these 
roles for "the self, as distinct from its roles, has a history and a social history."73 To 
emphasize the inseparable connection between the morally evaluative characters and 
aspects of self with the social groups that it is a member of, MacIntyre introduces the 
concept of setting.74 A setting refers to, 
[A]n institution, it may be what I have called a practice, or it may be a 
milieu of some other human kind. But it is central to the notion of a 
setting as I am going to understand it that a setting has a history, a history 
within which the histories of individual agents not only are, but have to be, 
situated, just because without the setting and its changes through time the 
history of the individual agent and his changes through time will be 
unintelligible.75 
MacIntyre’s views of self can also be understood as supporting the continuity of 
personal identity through his discussion of the unity of human life. The unity of a 
human life refers to, on the one hand, the connection between the moral subject and 
its roles, and on the other hand, the connection between selves in different periods. 
The continuity of self cannot be understood without social groups, such as 
neighborhood, nation, etc., which form its setting.76 MacIntyre indeed emphasizes 
that it is simply a fact that “the self has to find its moral identity in and through its 
membership in communities such as those of the family, the neighborhood, the city 
and the tribe.”77 
While MacIntyre proposes the concept of setting to stress the connection between 
the morally evaluative characters of self and social groups it belongs to, Charles 
                                                        
73 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 31. 
74 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 221. 
75 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, pp. 206-207. 
76 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 206. 
77 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 221. 
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Taylor introduces the concept of framework before articulating his concept of self. 
Frameworks are inevitable for everybody as they “provide the background, explicit or 
implicit, for our moral judgments, intuitions, or reactions in any of the three 
dimensions” and therefore it is impossible “to conceive a person or even a culture 
which might so understand this predicament as to do altogether without frameworks, 
that is, without these qualitative discriminations of the incomparably higher.”78 
Even if it is established that no one can escape the frameworks, it does not mean 
that the interpretation of these frameworks is unitary. More importantly, the same 
framework for different agents does not suggest the same attitudes toward it, for 
example, acceptance or denial of it to some extent. It is possible for people to step 
outside the frameworks which they are born into, but it does not follow that they 
could just get rid of all frameworks.   
Taylor places enormous emphasis on the importance of language for the moral 
subject. For him, “to study persons is to study beings who only exist in, or are partly 
constituted by, a certain language.”79 It is through the shared language that the moral 
subject can connect with others. A language obviously cannot be maintained by a 
single self, which also indicates the status of self as one among others.80   
Besides Sandel, MacIntyre, Taylor, who either explicitly reject the label of 
communitarian or do not explicitly identify himself with it, we may consider Daniel 
Bell, who clearly identifies himself as a communitarian and pays attention to the 
                                                        
78 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 26. 
79 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, pp. 34-35. 
80 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 35. 
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problem of self.81 For Bell, human beings are "first and mostly, social beings, 
embodied agents." 82  This social, embodied self presents its characters -- not 
necessarily morally evaluative characters -- more clearly in the unreflective activities 
which constitute most parts of the everyday life.83 The overwhelming presence of this 
kind of unreflective activities stand in sharp opposition to the idea that we are agents 
who voluntarily decide what to do and how to act.84  
Sometimes the “ordinary way of coping with things” would prove “to be 
insufficient”, that is when the reflective way of thinking comes in.85 We have to make 
decisions, sometimes very important ones, in a reflective way. But just like 
unreflective activities, which are controlled by the social world where we reside, 
reflective decision-making cannot ignore the social world either:  
[O]ne's social world...also sets the authoritative moral horizons within 
which we determine, as you said, 'what's worth doing, achieving, or being'. 
We cannot make sense of our moral experience unless we situate 
ourselves within this 'given' moral space.86 
In sum, it seems that we can conclude from the above presentation of 
communitarian discussions of self that communitarians assert that self is enormously 
influenced, or even limited, by the social groups to which it belongs. In a more 
communitarian way, we may say that self is socially constituted.  
                                                        
81 Bell points out that MacIntyre rejects the label of communitarian, while Taylor and 
Sandel lean toward communitarianism without explicitly including themselves in it. 
Daniel A. Bell, Communitariansim and Its Critics, p. 17n.14. See also Stephen 
Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, p. xv. 
82 Daniel A. Bell, Communitariansim and Its Critics, p. 31. 
83 Daniel A. Bell, Communitariansim and Its Critics, pp. 32-33. 
84 Daniel A. Bell, Communitariansim and Its Critics, p. 39. 
85 Daniel A. Bell, Communitariansim and Its Critics, p. 39. 
86 Daniel A. Bell, Communitariansim and Its Critics, p. 37. 
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Such a conclusion regarding the social constitution of communitarian self can be 
further differentiated as two related claims. One claim is that communitarian self 
emphasizes that morally evaluative characters and aspects of self are socially 
constituted and the other is that self is socially constituted with no emphasis on the 
content of its morally evaluative characters and aspects. Although it seems that the 
two claims overlap, that is, the recognition of the social constitution of self being 
necessary for the recognition of the social constitution of the morally evaluative 
characters and aspects of self, and the recognition of the social constitution of the 
morally evaluative characters and aspects of self being sufficient for the recognition 
of the social constitution of self, the first claim might lead to the conclusion that 
communitarian evaluation of self is derived from the assessment of these morally 
evaluative characters and aspects and hence the burden of defending these morally 
evaluative characters and aspects for communitarianism. Although such defense, if 
successful and persuasive, would be beneficial for the evaluation of self and identity 
and hence the support for partiality through identity-holding, it may not always 
succeed since there are bound to be some morally evaluative characters and aspects of 
some people that cannot be defended. The failure of such defense would damage the 
effort to argue for a general version of family-related partiality based on the concept 
of self. In the meantime, it suffices for communitarian self to maintain the second 
claim, that is, the social constitution of self without any emphasis on the morally 
evaluative characters and aspects, in order to accommodate the general version of 
family-related partiality through identity-holding.   
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It should be pointed out that for communitarian self, the emphasis may be 
seemingly on the morally evaluative characters and aspects of self which can be most 
straightforwardly supported by Taylor’s attempts to link identity with his idea of 
strong evaluation, that is, “discriminations of right or wrong, better or worse, higher 
or lower” in the moral domain.87 However, the interpretation of communitarian self 
without affirming relevant morally evaluative characters and aspects can be supported 
in communitarian discourse on self. For example, Bell explicitly talks about 
communitarian self without referring to its morally evaluative characters:   
Take the following example-when riding a bicycle, you wouldn’t think of 
yourself as a self-sufficient subject who has the experience of riding a 
bicycle and thereby causing the bicycle-riding; you just do what’s 
appropriate as prescribed by the structure of the situation. The same is true, 
I venture, when you walk, dress, play games, and so on.88 
Now let us turn to the examination of the connection between communitarian self 
and partiality toward family members through the idea of identity-holding. The 
recognition of the social constitution of self is compatible with the idea of 
identity-holding which suggests the importance of others to one’s identity. Since 
communitarian self recognizes family members’ contribution to one’s identity-holding 
as it emphasizes the social constitution of self, we may conclude that it also suggests 
partiality toward family members. However, such recognition does not endow the 
family or family members with special status regarding the social constitution of self, 
since non family members could also contribute to our identity-holding. This lack of 
special status of family members differentiates communitarianism from care ethics 
                                                        
87 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 4. 
88 Daniel A. Bell, Communitariansim and Its Critics, p. 32. 
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and early Confucianism regarding the general version of family-related partiality 
based on the concept of self.  
If we consider the status of family members in relation to communitarian self, it 
becomes clear that they are not emphasized compared with other contributors, 
especially considering the emphasis in communitarian discourse on factors such as 
settings, frameworks, language, etc., all of which go beyond the range of family or 
family members. If we further take into consideration two kinds of holding, that is, 
holding somebody as a person and holding somebody as a particular person, it seems 
that the communitarian self provides less support for holding somebody as a particular 
person compared with holding somebody as a person, because of its emphasis on 
ideas such as setting, history, framework, language, etc., from the perspective of 
communities. It therefore suggests that the general version of family-related partiality 
for communitarianism is relatively weaker, compared with conceptions of self in care 
ethics and early Confucianism as it will be shown in the following chapters. It should 
be emphasized that the above view does not entail that communitarian self cannot 
address holding somebody as a particular person, as objections can be raised that 
everyone has her particular settings, history, framework which make her unique. 
However, such uniqueness is still relatively limited since those factors may only 
identity a person to the extent as a member of a particular community (or members of 
communities as it will be shown that there are many kinds of communities) and such 
particularity therefore pays less attention to family.  
Therefore, even if we recognize the general version of family-related partiality 
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for communitarianism based on the concept of self, this kind of family-related 
partiality is not necessarily strong enough to override other broader considerations 
since the basis for this general version of family-related partiality, that is, the concept 
of communitarian self, may suggest that partiality toward family members should be 
extremely limited, or at least compared with that in care ethics and early 
Confucianism.  
Although the general version of family-related partiality for communitarianism 
does not extend too much concern for family members, we cannot right now form our 
opinions concerning family-related partiality regarding communitarianism. We need 
to consider the concept of community for communitarianism which will form a 
particular version of family-related partiality. The conclusions concerning 
family-related partiality for communitarianism must consider both the general version 
of family-related partiality and the particular version of family-related partiality.    
In the following part of this chapter, efforts will be made to investigate the 
particular version of family-related partiality for communitarianism based on the 
concept of community. Unlike the lack of explicit discussion of the connection 
between self and partiality in communitarianism, there are proposals concerning the 
relation between community and partiality in communitarianism which will be 
examined. First, Walzer’s Doctrine of Supreme Emergency (DSE) will be examined 
as a proposal for partiality based on the concept of community. It will become clear 
that such a proposal depends on the adequate conception of political community. 
Second, for the particular version of family-related partiality, attempts need to be 
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made to investigate the scope of community as well as its relevance to family. It will 
be argued that the scope of community should be extended down to the family and up 
to the global community, which will on the one hand support partiality toward family 
members, and on the other, limit the extent of this kind of partiality.  
 
Walzer’s DSE as a Version of Communitarian Partiality 
 
Michael Walzer’s DSE can be examined as a proposal for the connection between 
partiality and communitarianism, or rather the concept of community. I will present 
Walzer’s construction of DSE in accordance with his claim that DSE is a 
communitarian principle. 89  Then, efforts will be made to investigate whether 
Walzer’s claim can withstand scrutiny, especially his emphasis on the value of 
political community. Instead of focusing only on the value of political community, 
efforts must be made to further identify the three different entities at stake, the 
political community, the set of its members, and the ideals cherished in the political 
community. In the end, it will be pointed out that Walzer’s communitarian partiality is 
unsatisfactory and it cannot achieve Walzer’s goal even after revision.  
DSE is used by Michael Walzer to explain British bombing of German cities in 
1940 and 1941.90 During those months, Nazi Germany occupied vast areas from 
Poland to the Atlantic Ocean. After her defeat in France, the British army would face 
                                                        
89 Michael Walzer, Arguing about War, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005, p. 
45. 
90 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, New York: Basic Books, 1992, pp. 
251-268. 
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great difficulty in defending the island if German troops had landed. In those days, 
Nazi bombing was fierce and innocent civilians died almost every day. Disgusted by 
Nazi policies, especially her breach of the ideal of democracy, British government 
declared no negotiation with Nazi Germany. That is taken by Walzer as the situation 
called Supreme Emergency which exists “when deepest values and collective survival 
are in imminent danger.”91 British government made the decision to bomb German 
cities without the aim to destroy any specific military targets. The aim was to impair 
the Germans’ will to continue the war by killing innocent German civilians. DSE is 
constructed to explain and defend British government’s decision.  
DSE is easily taken as “an argument from consequences: if we do not engage in 
terror-bombing, the consequences will be, as Walzer put it above, ‘immeasurably 
awful’... the end, so it might be said, of Western civilization.”92 But if we are to 
understand DSE as a communitarian principle as well as an extreme case of 
communitarian partiality, the essence of DSE, on the surface, is to assign special value 
to political community, which propels us to override some basic moral principles 
while maintaining that these moral principles should still be honored in normal 
circumstances. If we want to question the tenability of DSE, we need to examine these 
two parts of DSE, that is, the special value of political community in its particularity 
and the endorsement of these moral principles.  
Even if we agree with Walzer’s views on political community, it does not mean 
                                                        
91 Michael Walzer, Arguing about War, p. 33. 
92  Christopher Toner, "Just War and the Supreme Emergency Exemption," 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 221, 2005, p. 549. 
  55
that his DSE can be justified solely on this ground. For the sake of argument, I will 
only present what we usually call non-combatant immunity as one of the moral 
principles which should be both honored and overridden in DSE. While Walzer claims 
that soldiers are justified targets to kill during the war, he believes that 
non-combatants cannot be taken as deliberate targets.93 Non-combatant immunity is 
important to DSE because there is no need for DSE if non-combatant immunity is 
thrown away. The omission of the discussion of non-combatant immunity also 
explains why another way to defend British bombing is not discussed here, that is, by 
appealing to self-defense. Arguments can be made that the British were acting on 
self-defense since those German civilians made their contribution to Nazi invasion. 
However, this kind of self-defense argument is founded on the rejection of 
non-combatant immunity, or rather the distinction between soldiers and civilians, 
which as stated above will not be investigated here. 
Although Walzer is simply talking about political community in DES, we need to 
recognize the differences between the political community, the set of its members, and 
the ideals cherished in the political community in order to understand the foundation 
of his version of communitarian partiality. First, I will try to differentiate political 
community from the set of its members. Then I will try to ascertain the distinction 
between the ideals cherished in the political community and the other two elements. It 
will become clear that how to address the relationship between political community 
and its ideals is connected with the definition of political community in particular and 
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community in general.  
If we separate political community from its members, we need to ask the question: 
what is the relation between a political community and its members? It must be 
emphasized that this question is different from the one about the relationships 
between the self and the communities it belongs to in communitarian discourse, which 
usually assumes the existence of this self as a member of certain communities.94 But 
for DSE, it is a real possibility that some members of the political community, even 
the agent herself, may cease to exist, for example, to be killed during the war. It 
sounds bizarre, but for the purpose of examining Walzer’s version of communitarian 
partiality, we need to consider the possibility that the self may cease to exist in order 
to clarify what is actually at stake in DSE. 
                                                        
94 This kind of relationships between the self and the communities it belongs to, with 
the usual assumption of the existence of the self, will be discussed later in this chapter. 
One of the proposals for this question is offered by Amitai Etzioni, which is clearly 
very different from the following discussion of the relation between political 
community and its members here. It states that the relationship between the self and 
the communities it belongs to refers to “a deep-seated, unexpungeable, often 
productive tension,” which “is the result of the tendencies of  at least some 
individuals to seek to expand their realm of unprescribed behavior and to change the 
community to reflect more fully their values and interests while the community 
attempts to extend its social/moral prescriptions and to reformulate the individual 
members in line with its values and genuine or perceived needs.” Amitai Etzioni, “A 
Moderate Communitarian Proposal,” Political Theory, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1996, p. 157. 
This distinction between different kinds of questions concerning the relations between 
the community and its members does not attract much attention in communitarian 
articulation. For example, Henry Tam claims that “[p]hilosophical discussions of the 
relationships between individuals and communities have not been of much help in 
clarifying this matter as they have remained at generally an abstract level.” Henry 
Tam, Communitarianism: A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship, New York: 
New York University Press, 1998, p.219. Obviously, such statement does not consider 
the situation like Walzer’s DSE which renders an abstract discussion necessary as it 
will be presented here.  
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If we consider separately a political community and its members, clearly those 
members of British political community during the Second World War are not the 
same people who are the members of British political community now and we can 
rightly claim that the British political community then is not the same as the British 
political community now. But does it follow that Nazi Germany actually succeeded or 
that the political community at the center of the example in Walzer’s communitarian 
partiality was destroyed? Obviously, no one would accept such seemingly absurd 
conclusions. The relation between the British political community and its members 
can be said to be similar to the relation between a group and its members where the 
group is “constituted by members, but… allow[s] for fluctuation in members.”95 
Daniel Stateman, in his discussion of supreme emergency, poses similar ideas, where 
he uses the term “collective” instead of “group”:  
[T]hough collectives are made up of individuals, they are not identical to 
any list of the individuals that constitute them.96 
The British political community can accordingly survive the change of its 
members and it is not identical to the set of its members. What identify the British 
political community and differentiate it from other political communities include 
other elements besides its members, such as the social and economic structures, 
political institutions, literature and art, etc., which would propel us to turn to the 
distinction between political community and the ideals cherished in it. Although I 
would not make an exhaustive list of elements that represent the value of political 
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community, I will in this section choose some elements pertaining to the analysis of 
this communitarian version of partiality, that is, the ideals cherished in the political 
community. In Walzer’s application of the DSE, there are two relevant ideals, that is, 
democracy and waging a war with just cause. We will also find out later in the 
discussion of the concept of community that the distinction between the political 
community and the ideals upheld in this community, or the lack of these ideals, is 
closely related to the definition of political community in particular and community in 
general.  
For the case used by Walzer to put forward his version of communitarian 
partiality, if we consider from the side of the Germans instead of the British, we may 
arrive at a conclusion that would be rejected by Walzer. During the last year of the 
Second World War, Nazi Germany was on the edge of collapse. We may argue that 
this political community was endangered. Their way of life was threatened. Can Nazi 
Germany exercise Walzer’s communitarian partiality in general and its extreme 
application as DSE? Can Germans show their partiality for their political community 
as the British do to their political community as endorsed by Walzer?  
I seriously doubt that Walzer would agree that Germans can use DSE or show 
their partiality to their political community to defend their actions if they want to 
deliberately kill innocent people, for example, to launch mass terrorist attacks in the 
US and Britain or to sink merchant ships even though they know that there are only 
civilian passengers on board, in order to defend their political community.  
In order to better understand what Walzer really values in his communitarian 
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partiality, we need to consider the case of terrorism and his critique of it. It seems that 
terrorism, during some historical periods and in some places, did have popular support. 
Can they appeal to the values of their political community? Can these terrorists claim 
that ideals upheld in their political community, are in immediate danger? What if “the 
terrorist group is part of a given collective and is conceived by the members of that 
collective as acting for the sake of their collective goals?”97 
Walzer’s attitude toward terrorism, however, is very different from his position 
represented in DSE. Walzer objects to any attempts to find excuses for terrorism and 
he claims that terrorism is never “a politics dependent on mass support,” but only “a 
politics of an elite.”98 So what allows Walzer to support communitarian partiality in 
general and DSE in particular on the one hand, and to reject terrorism on the other?99 
Perhaps there are mainly two reasons for Walzer to defend British bombing 
German cities during 1940 and 1941, that is, Britain is a political community that can 
be called a democracy and Britain has a just cause for the war.100 Such answers 
would support the previous claim that Walzer’s communitarian partiality fails to 
identify the distinction between the ideals cherished in a political community and both 
                                                        
97 Daniel Statman, "Supreme Emergencies Revisited," p. 78. 
98 Michael Walzer, Arguing about War, p. 61.  
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this political community and its members. It is not just the survival of any political 
community or its members which justifies the DSE; the ideals of democracy and just 
cause for war, which distinguish the British political community from Nazi German 
political community, allow the former but not the latter to invoke the DSE. 
Walzer’s appreciation of democracy can explain his seemingly contradictory 
views on terrorism. As it is pointed out above, sometimes it seems clear that terrorists 
can claim that they are fighting to defend their political community. But according to 
Walzer, “other strategies are available if you are opposing liberal and democratic 
states and that terrorism never works against totalitarian states.”101 So if the enemies 
do embrace the ideal of democracy, there is no need for terrorism. If the enemies do 
not, there are still not enough reasons to turn to terrorism as it would not work. One 
would wonder, in the British bombing case, how killing German citizens could 
accomplish any goals since Nazi Germany is a totalitarian state immune to popular 
pressure.  
If both the case of bombing German cities in Second World War and the case of 
terrorism support the claim that Walzer’s communitarian partiality is justified only for 
democratic communities, the case of bombing German cities alone would support the 
claim that the ideal of waging a war with a just cause is also at the center of Walzer’s 
communitarian partiality. Perhaps there is another reason for Walzer to defend Britain 
while criticizing Nazi Germany for the similar actions, that is, Britain had a just cause 
for the war. But it seems that Walzer would not want to admit it, for he believes that 
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the Jus ad Bellum should be separated from Jus in Bello.102  
If we fail to differentiate the ideals cherished in a political community from this 
political community, we may reach the conclusion that the destruction of a political 
community means the destruction of those ideals, as Per Sandin does:  
[O]ur deepest values are always at risk when our collective survival, 
understood as the survival of our community, is at stake. This goes with 
Walzer’s explicit communitarianism.103 
Sandin is wrong to claim that the destruction of a political community means the 
destruction of the ideals cherished in this political community unless he believes that 
these ideals only exist in this political community. A political community can be 
annihilated while the ideals cherished in this political community need not be. Other 
communities may also cherish the same ideals.   
But what if not just one political community is at stake? What if an ideal will 
perish as all political communities which uphold it are in danger? In the case of 
British bombing in the Second World War, perhaps we can argue that Nazi Germany 
posed the threat to the whole world, not just the British political community, which 
would lead to the destruction of all political communities which embrace these ideals: 
[W]ith a stretch of the imagination, Churchill’s actions could be presented 
as aimed at the protection of the entire world from the Nazis, not just at 
the defense of Britain.104 
As the importance of emphasizing the distinction between the ideals cherished in 
a political community and this political community is appreciated in the above 
discussion, to further understand Walzer’s communitarian partiality in general and 
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DSE in particular, we need to differentiate between the destruction of the ideals 
cherished in a political community and the establishment of some abhorrent ideals. In 
the British bombing case, what concerns Walzer is not just the preservation of the 
ideal of democracy, but the establishment of an “evil” ideal that “at once stuns, 
cripples, horrifies, and completely overwhelms the imagination.”105  
Another question concerning the British bombing case is whether the Nazi’s 
conquest means the failure of democracy forever. Perhaps some idle speculation is 
required in order to assess the question whether the destruction of all political 
communities which uphold an ideal means the irreversible extinction of that ideal. 
These two issues, the distinction between the destruction of a desirable ideal and the 
establishment of an abhorrent ideal and whether the defeat of all political 
communities which uphold an ideal equals the irreversible extinction of that ideal, 
need further discussion to better understand and assess DSE. What matters, however, 
for DSE in relation to partiality and communitarianism, is whether communitarian 
concept of community should incorporate specific ideals in it.   
In review, DSE fails to distinguish three relevant elements: the political 
community, the set of its members, and the ideals cherished in the political 
community. It would also pose the question whether DSE can be interpreted as a kind 
of communitarian partiality as Walzer claims since it seems that the ultimate elements 
that matter are some ideals a political community happens to hold. For Walzer, 
perhaps one way of avoiding such critique is to adopt an evaluative, normative 
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conception of political community, instead of a nonevaluative, descriptive conception 
of it, for example, building democracy into the concept of political community. 
However, as it will be presented later in the discussion of community, Walzer himself 
simply offers a descriptive, nonevaluative conception of community, or an evaluative, 
normative conception of community that is agent-neutrally good at best. It will also 
become clear in the later discussion of concept of community that building democracy 
into the concept of political community, or more generally, defining community with 
certain moral or political ideals, may not work well for communitarianism.  
It must be emphasized here that another very important reason why Walzer’s 
communitarian partiality is difficult to defend is perhaps that it simply goes too far 
and sets too high a goal, which is to override some crucial moral principles, in this 
case, not deliberately killing civilians. Moreover, the defense of this principle may 
very well receive some support from the particular version of family-related partiality 
itself if we can better interpret the scope of community. For example, if the concept of 
community can be extended into global community which includes all human beings, 
the particular version of family-related partiality must recognize the moral demand of 
this community as well and it suggests that we cannot defend killing an innocent 
person just to save our family member since that person would be a fellow member of 
the global community.  
The above investigation of partiality in relation to community leads to 
examination of the concept of community for communitarianism. Moreover, if we 
want to argue for family-related partiality based on community, we need to argue that 
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family can be treated as a type of community for communitarianism, which also 
requires the examination of the concept as well as the scope of community. In the 
following part, attempts will be made to investigate the distinction between 
nonevaluative, descriptive and evaluative, normative conceptions of community as 
well as different types of communities, especially focusing on the scope of community. 
These questions are not only important to understand Walzer’s communitarian 
partiality, as what has been demonstrated above, but also crucial to any attempt to 
articulate the particular version of family-related partiality based on the concept of 
community in communitarianism.   
Three issues will be addressed in the following discussion of community for 
communitarianism. First, the distinction between nonevaluative, descriptive and 
evaluative, normative conceptions of community. After the brief presentation of 
different proposed answers to this issue, it will be argued that it is better to adopt a 
kind of evaluative, normative conception of community. Second, whether family can 
be treated as a kind of community regarding the scope of community. The attempt to 
construct a particular version of family-related partiality based on the concept of 
community for communitarianism depends on viewing family as a type of community, 
which would also suggest that such a particular version of family-related partiality 
would be indirect. Third, as we examine the scope of community, we need to consider 
another issue. If the scope of community can be extended to family, can it be extended 
in the other direction, that is, can we take the whole world as a type of community? 
The answer to this question will affect the strength of the particular version of 
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family-related partiality for communitarianism. However, it may not be bad news. The 
recognition of global community could not further significantly limit the strength of 
partiality toward family members, or harm the particular version of family-related 
partiality if we admit that other kinds of community, national community for example, 
are recognized in communitarianism, which already limit the partiality toward one 
kind of community. However, if one intends to provide a relatively more defensible 
proposal of family-related partiality for communitarianism, the recognition of global 
community would further ease certain anxieties in this regard, for example, the 
accommodation of wider concerns within communitarianism itself and hence be a 
small price to pay. No matter how minor an influence it may exercise, the recognition 
of global community would indeed further reduce the importance of family. If so, the 
particular version of family-related partiality may face the challenge that such 
partiality may become as limited as those that are proposed in other theories, 
liberalism for example. However, even if the proposals are similar, the process leading 
to such proposal in communitarianism is different from others.  
If the particular version of family-related partiality recognizes that both family 
and the whole world should be taken as a type of community, it seems that this kind of 
family-related partiality only supports limited partial concerns for family members as 
it must recognize concerns for members in other communities, the national 
community and the global community for example.  
 
The Concept of Community 
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What is community? Which kind of social groups can qualify as communities? 
Robert Booth Fowler suggests that “the concept of community invariably invokes the 
notion of commonality, of sharing in common, being and experiencing together. This 
is the root concept implied in most uses of the word.”106 A. P. Cohen claims that the 
term “community” should be interpreted from its ordinary usage. The term 
“community” seems to, 
imply two related suggestions: that the members of a group of people (a) 
have something in common with each other, which (b) distinguishes them 
in a significant way from the members of other putative groups. 
‘Community’ thus seems to imply simultaneously both similarity and 
difference. The word thus expresses a relational idea: the opposition of 
one community to others or to other social entities. Indeed, it will be 
argued that the use of the word is only occasioned by the desire or need to 
express such a distinction.107 
Although it seems that we can find something in common for different 
conceptions of community, such as commonality, for the question about what 
community is, we may simply have some unsatisfying answers, such as the one found 
by Colin Bell and Howard Newby: “[I]t will be seen that over ninety definitions of 
community have been analyzed and that the one common element in them all was 
man!”108 But the fact that we may have numerous definitions of community would 
not render it incomprehensible. Like many other “essentially contested concepts”, 
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such as justice, equality, the importance of community would not be endangered by 
the fact that it is difficult for us to reach an agreement on its definition.109 In fact, the 
right question for this thesis may not be “what is community”, but “what is 
community in relation to communitarianism” although communitarianism seldom 
engages in the systematic discussion of it.110 In review of the previous presentation of 
communitarian self, community for communitarianism can be simply defined as any 
kind of social group in which members have something in common and which 
contributes to its members’ identity. This broad and vague definition leaves room for 
various kinds of conceptions of community and perhaps provides no practical 
guidance to judge whether a group is a community or not. However, it is not the 
purpose of this chapter to achieve such a goal. In accordance with this broad 
understanding of community, more specific conceptions of community can be divided 
into two general kinds, the descriptive, nonevaluative and the normative, evaluative. 
The descriptive, nonevaluative conception of community does not presuppose that it 
is desirable or not, good or bad. The normative, evaluative conception of community 
presupposes that (genuine) community is both good and desirable.  
For the second kind of conception, that is, the evaluative, normative conception 
of community, it can be further divided into two kinds, being agent-neutrally good, 
desirable and being agent-relatively good, desirable. A particular community being 
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agent-neutrally good and desirable is closely connected with the ideals cherished in 
this community. When the judgment is made that a particular community is 
agent-neutrally good and desirable, certain good, desirable ideals can usually be 
located. For example, when we claim that children benefit from growing up in this 
neighborhood community which is both good and desirable, we usually say that it is 
because children can learn how to care for others, to treat others equally, to help those 
in need, to share their possessions with others, etc. Perhaps what are really good and 
desirable are the ideal of altruism, generosity, caring, equality, etc. This particular 
community being good and desirable is because this community embraces these ideals. 
The problem for upholding such an agent-neutrally good and desirable conception of 
community is that the evaluation of community for communitarianism would depend 
on the assessment of these ideals. It is detrimental to the particular version of 
family-related partiality since such partiality would depend on whether families can 
support some ideals.   
What does being agent-relatively good and desirable mean? The answers to this 
question differentiate communitarians from others who also use the concept of 
community in their moral and political discourse. According to Haig Khatchadourian, 
contemporary communitarians “tend to employ the term [community] as an honorific 
term; as shorthand for ‘good or desirable (perhaps also, moral) community.”111 I 
agree with him that contemporary communitarians reject “purely descriptive, 
nonevaluative” conception of community which does “not include the idea of 
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goodness or desirability,” but I will suggest that communitarianism should only adopt 
the normative, evaluative conception of community which is agent-relatively good 
and desirable. That communities are agent-relatively good and desirable means that 
they provide the circumstances where people become human, learn all the social rules 
and conventions, interact with each other, etc., or rather in a more communitarian way, 
that they are constitutive for its members’ identity.  
For the purpose of investigating family-related partiality, we also need to examine 
the scope of community, specifically whether family can be treated as a kind of 
community. Clearly, there are many kinds of communities available for discussion for 
contemporary communitarianism in relation to their scope. In this thesis, four types of 
communities will be selected according to their scope, that is, family, neighborhood 
community, national community and global community. It does not follow that there 
are only these kinds of communities for communitarianism. However, the 
examination of these four types of communities is critical to investigate the issue of 
family-related partiality.  
A neighborhood community may qualify as a political community in ancient 
times, for example, the Greek polis where there are less than a few thousand citizens. 
National community is usually considered closest to political community in 
contemporary world. For neighborhood community, since it is usually 
uncontroversially accepted as a kind of community in relation to its scope for either 
communitarianism or moral and political theory in general, it will not be paid much 
attention in the following discussion. For national community, it is assumed that one 
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significant character of contemporary communitarianism is the recognition of national 
community in relation to the scope of community.112 The idea of national community 
will also serve in many cases as the premise of arguing for global community as they 
both face the difficulties of accommodating the lack of close interactions among 
members and the accusation of over expansion of community. The idea of global 
community is important to the discussion of family-related partiality in 
communitarianism as it may help us to more adequately respond to following critique 
of partiality in general:  
At best, some partialists do acknowledge some moral responsibilities to 
distant others and strangers, sometimes linking these responsibilities to 
the duties which define certain positions of public office. At worst, 
partialists simply neglect to mention any such responsibilities, 
concentrating their attention entirely on what should or can be done for 
those who are close.113 
It is my intention to argue that communitarianism can accommodate this kind of 
critique by suggesting that it can and should consider wider moral concerns which go 
beyond what we usually consider the scope of community. There are many 
communities, including family and global community among others, which suggests 
that a particular version of family-related partiality based on the concept of 
community for communitarianism can address multiple moral concerns by itself. It 
follows that there will be conflicts among concerns generated by different 
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more specific critique of communitarianism concerning the boundaries of 
communities in the same line. See Kenneth J. Gergen, Relational Being: Beyond Self 
and Community, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. xxiv 
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communities to which one belongs. Instead of proposing practical solutions to such 
conflicts, the modest objective of this chapter simply attempts to more adequately 
present such conflicts in light of family-related partiality. Anyway, before we can 
propose any solution to address or simply more clearly illustrate such conflicts, we 
must first of all seek clarification on the conception of community in communitarian 
discourse.   
As it is suggested in the discussion of DSE, in response to the distinction between 
political community and the ideals cherished in it, Walzer can introduce a conception 
of political community which is embedded with the ideal of democracy. This kind of 
political community would be both agent-neutrally good and agent-relatively good. 
But does Walzer offer such a definition of political community in particular or 
community in general? Although Walzer does not provide a relevant definition of 
political community in discussing DSE, he does elsewhere offer a definition, 
according to which, a political community is,  
[A] bounded world within which distributions takes place: a group of 
people committed to dividing, exchanging, and sharing social goods, first 
of all among themselves…[its] members distribute power to one another 
and avoid, if they possibly can, sharing it with anyone else.114 
It seems, however, that such definition of political community does not provide 
grounds to label political community being agent-neutrally good and desirable unless 
more specific elaboration is given regarding how such distributions are structured. 
Doubts can be even raised that such a definition as it is presented is just a descriptive, 
nonevaluative conception without any explicit reference to the constitution of 
                                                        
114 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, New York: Basic Books, 1983, p. 31. 
  72
community members’ identity, although one can still argue that providing such an 
environment for distributions, given its enormous influence on community members’ 
life, is bound to contribute to the constitution of identity.    
As for the scope of community, although Walzer’s political community goes 
beyond local or face-to-face community, he rejects the idea of global community. A 
global community that includes “all men and women everywhere” does not exist.115 
Two reasons can be proposed to support his conclusion.116 One of the reasons is that 
a global community does not have boundaries and hence no outsiders. The other one 
is that there is no such thing like common meanings for a global community.117 
According to Walzer,  
[T]he political community is probably the closest we can come to a world 
of common meanings. Language, history, and culture come together 
(come more closely together here than anywhere else) to produce a 
collective consciousness. National character, conceived as a fixed and 
permanent mental set, is obviously a myth; but the sharing of sensibilities 
and intuitions among the members of a historical community is a fact of 
life.118 
It should be pointed out that the “sharing of sensibilities and intuitions” may not 
always refer to positive attitudes or emotions, all of which are unavoidable results of 
the long-term common political structures of any political community. As we will see 
later, unlike MacIntyre who believes that modern political society cannot be a 
community as it cannot express the common values, Walzer is more optimistic 
                                                        
115 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, p. 29. 
116 Walzer raises more reasons, such as the lack of a global government, as he is 
concerned with the distribution of goods as well as its enforcement. Michael Walzer, 
Spheres of Justice, p. 30. 
117 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, p. 30. 
118 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, pp. 28-29. 
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although he also admits that there are enormous conflicts within any political 
community.119  
Let us consider the two possible reasons why Walzer rejects the idea of a global 
community. For the first reason, there are boundaries for a global community and 
outsiders do exist. Animals and plants are not counted as members of a global 
community. If it is against the background of outsiders that a community can establish 
itself, a global community would not have difficulties in doing so. For the second 
reason, even if there are no such things like common meanings for a global 
community right now, it does not follow that there will not be common meanings one 
day in the future, especially if we consider what the rapid development of 
communication technologies could offer, the interaction on the Internet, for example. 
Walzer admits that “few of us have any direct experience of what a country is or of 
what it means to be a member…we have only dim perception of it…it is…invisible; 
we actually see only its symbols, offices, and representatives.”120 If the gap between 
the contacts with the concrete symbols of a national community and the conclusion 
that there are common meanings in this community can be bridged, we should not be 
too pessimistic about the prospect of the common meanings in a global community.   
If we apply the above two criteria, that is, the recognition of outsiders and the 
existence of common meanings, to family, it seems that family has no problem to 
qualify as community in Walzer’s sense. For the first one, obviously there are many 
who are outsiders for family. For the second one, it is true that family lacks the 
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context to generate common meanings if they are limited to language and culture, 
both of which are social products that go way beyond the scope of a single family. But 
this refers to the origins of these common meanings, not whether they exist in the 
family or not. Besides, Walzer also admits one common feature for both national 
community and family, that is, “states are like families rather than clubs, for it is a 
feature of families that their members are morally connected to people they have not 
chosen, who live outside the household.”121 Although this involuntary feature of both 
political community and family is not adopted as a defining character of community, 
it does suggest one important resemblance between political community and family 
and therefore reinforce the above conclusion.122  
Among the three conceptions of community offered by Sandel, which are 
instrumental, sentimental, and constitutive conception, the appropriate conception of 
community, according to Sandel, is the constitutive conception, which refers to "a 
community describing the subject and not just the objects of shared aspirations."123 
Unlike both instrumental and sentimental conceptions of community which assume a 
highly independent, autonomous, individualistic self, this constitutive conception of 
community reject such characterization of self and "could penetrate the self more 
profoundly” compared with the former two conceptions. 124  But how can we 
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determine whether a certain social group is a community in this sense or not? For 
example, for Sandel, is family a constitutive community?   
Based on Sandel’s explanation of constitutive conception, the following criteria 
are proposed here to judge whether a social group, or rather a society, is a constitutive 
community. First, it must be represented in its members’ identity. Second, there exist 
certain sentiments, such as “fraternal sentiments and fellow-feeling.”125 Third, its 
institutional arrangements must be organized for the distribution of resources in 
certain ways to reflect the above two characters for a social group or a society to be 
qualified as a constitutive community.  
Family, or at least what we usually call families, can pass the first two criteria 
with flying colors. If a person’s identity can be penetrated to such an extent by a 
particular society where she lives, obviously we cannot deny the possibility that her 
identity can be penetrated to more or less the same extent by her family in which she 
grows up. For example, a Chinese who grew up in modern China cannot define 
herself disregarding the historical background and the popular discourse in China, 
whether she accepts or rejects them. A young American who claims to make her own 
choice and take her own stance may still fall in the traditional discourse of leaving 
home as a mark of adult independence, as Taylor suggests:  
Each young person may take up a stance which is authentically his or her 
own; but the very possibility of this is enframed in a social understanding 
of great temporal depth.126 
Although we cannot determine that the contribution of the family to one’s identity, 
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in light of the above examples, is more significant, there is no doubt that such 
contribution of the family exist to significant extent. For the second criterion, there is 
probably intuitional consensus that such sentiments can be more readily found in the 
family, which is recognized by Sandel.127 
The third criterion seems to be circular as well as unclear, but Sandel believes 
that it should not prevent us from locating one crucial character of a particular society 
which qualifies it as a community, that is, the requirement for the organizational 
arrangement of that society.128 Although Sandel does not explain explicitly the 
meanings of “institutional arrangements” or “basic structure”, he clearly implies that 
he borrows these terms from Rawls, who adopts them to refer to the fundamental 
ways how political, economic powers and resources are allocated. 129  Such 
institutional arrangements are clearly beyond the domain of family as what we would 
usually understand, but the failure to pass this criterion only reaffirms that Sandel’s 
conception of community is limited to larger social groups. In review, family can 
(even better) accommodate the two criteria of constitutive community and as long as 
we do not predetermine the scope of constitutive community, we must recognize such 
correlation between family and Sandel’s constitutive community.  
Now let us turn to the idea of global community. How about the possibility of 
global community as a kind of constitutive community? Although Sandel does not set 
any standards about the scope of constitutive community, we may argue that he 
                                                        
127 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, pp. 30-31. 
128 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, pp. 173-174. 
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probably would agree that at present whether there is such a global community as a 
constitutive community, pretty much depend on whether it satisfies the third criterion.  
For the first criterion, it may be arguably acceptable to claim that global 
community should also be considered an essential part of one’s identity, although 
perhaps not every member would realize it. Perhaps there are difficulties in accepting 
that there can be, not just should be, a global community which contributes to its 
members’ identity. Indeed, it would be difficult to accept the scope of community all 
the way from the default scope of community, that is, the neighborhood community, 
to global community. Such an endeavor may not seem to be unacceptably 
overreaching if we start with the assumption of national community, which is not 
unacceptable for communitarianism. Perhaps objections would be raised that when we 
are asked the question “who are you,” we would likely answer “I am Singaporean,” “I 
am Chinese,” not “I am a human being.” But this may be attributed to who we assume 
asks the question. If you are asked the same question by your dog or an extraterrestrial 
life, “I am a human being” seems to be an adequate answer which signifies an 
essential part of your identity. As for the second criterion regarding sentiments, it 
would be understandable that one would include family while excluding a global 
community since the differences between these two kinds of groups, such as the 
intimate interactions among family members and the lack thereof in global 
community, would be obvious. However, if one assumes that political community 
could satisfy this criterion, it would be difficult to deny global community the benefit 
of the doubt.   
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It seems, however, that from the perspective of the thrid criterion, the global 
community lacks such basic structure and institutional arrangements. There is perhaps 
consensus that there are no such institutional arrangements in the whole world, 
comparable with those in a particular society, but there is no reason why a global 
community should have the same institutional arrangements as those in a state, 
especially since not all states have the same kind of institutional arrangements 
regarding the allocation of resources. The point is that there is no objection for the 
development of such institutional arrangements for the global community. A 
constitutive global community may not exist right now, but it could in the future. 
When such arrangements (or the lack thereof) do not reflect the first two criteria, 
perhaps instead of denying the possibility of fulfilling these two criteria as well as 
global community, we should push for such institutional arrangements.  
For MacIntyre, it may not be surprising that his appreciation of self in the ancient 
periods would lead to his rejection of modern states as (genuine) communities 
although he talks about a whole kingdom as a community in the ancient time.130 His 
characterization of modern states may offer some possible criteria according to which 
a certain group can be labeled as community. Compared with states in the past, 
modern states are characterized with, first, greater “heterogeneous technological and 
social resources and powers,” second, “competing economic and social interests,” and, 
third, complex “administrative rules and regulations” which ordinary members lack 
the expertise to fully comprehend, all of which “make it impossible for states to give 
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expression to genuinely communal values, except in their official rhetoric.”131 It 
seems that according to MacIntyre, a community or a genuine community must have 
very few conflicts of interests, or even homogeneous interests, which is accompanied 
by genuine common values.  
If there is no such thing as a national community in contemporary world, it is 
reasonable to argue that he would also claim that there is no such thing as a global 
community since all the characteristics of a modern state which hinder its prospect as 
a genuine community would be more prominent when we are talking about the whole 
world.   
For the first characteristic of a modern state, there is no such thing like a global 
government who can allocate and redistribute the resources in the whole world 
although the resources in the whole world are obviously more than those in any 
modern state. Any real or supposed attempt to allocate these resources globally would 
require no less, if not more, diverse technologies.  
For the second characteristic, the conflicts of interests in the whole world are of 
course staggering compared with those within a modern state. Although compromises 
must be made to handle these conflicts of interests, the dissatisfaction and resentment 
during and after these processes are presumably much greater than those in a single 
state.  
For the third, as there is no such thing like a global government, there are no 
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agencies acting on its behalf but the complexity of global rules and regulations, even 
if we only consider those usually being respected and enforced, is clearly beyond that 
in traditional communities, whether it is more or less than that in a modern state. Just 
consider the enormous conflicts of interests and how they are and how they can be 
addressed, there will not be such thing like values for the global society and it 
therefore cannot be a community. 
But how about modern family? Can we conclude that there are homogeneous 
interests and genuine common values in modern family? It is more likely for a family 
(compared with a national state or perhaps a neighborhood community) to reach 
agreement regarding common values, especially if it avoids the above-mentioned 
structural obstacles produced in the modern societies, or heterogeneous interests. But 
it is also plausible for a family to have as little common values as a modern state. We 
will not be surprised to find many families in which members may have different, 
even contradicting, views concerning important issues while they can easily find 
people with similar views outside the family. However, we may give family a better 
chance if we consider how common values are generated.   
According to MacIntyre, for members of a community, common values can be 
arrived “by shared enquiry into the nature of their common good, enquiry in which 
each member of the community is accountable to each of the others both for the 
quality of her or his argument and for the discharge of her or his responsibilities in 
effecting that good.”132 This obviously is a very high standard and, however, a 
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standard easier to meet in smaller communities where members have greater 
opportunities to interact with each other, such as families.  
Clearly, MacIntyre’s conception of community is agent-relatively good and 
desirable. But is it agent-neutrally good and desirable? It seems that the method to 
construct common values may suggest the importance of accountability and voluntary 
actions. If we accept such judgment, we may conclude that MacIntyre’s conception of 
community is both agent-relatively and agent-neutrally good and desirable, which is 
furthered confirmed by his critique of oppressive social groups.133 
Different from above-mentioned scholars who do not directly deal with the 
problem of the different types of community, Bell puts forward his conception of 
community explicitly, which can be divided into three kinds, communities of place, 
communities of memory, and psychological communities, which should be of close 
relevance to the discussion of different kinds of communities here. Communities of 
place refer to “‘my neighbourhood’, the place where I live, have friends, go shopping, 
join clubs, and so on. Community of place, then, refers to the place we call home, the 
place where we’re born and bred and often the place where we’d like to end our days 
even if home is left for some time as an adult.”134 Communities of memory is 
characteristic of “a shared history going back several generations” and “a moral 
tradition that helps to provide the narrative unity of…[the members’] lives, which 
entails an obligation to sustain and promote the ideals and aspirations embedded in 
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their history through memory and hope.” 135  Psychological community is 
characterized by “face to face interaction” and hence “a psychological sense of 
‘togetherness’.”136 
Bell’s conception of community is comparatively more favorable for 
family-related partiality for two reasons. First, it explicitly characterizes family as 
community. Although family is considered as a kind of psychological community, it is 
not differentiated from other communities such as church groups, work units, which 
may lead to the conclusion that family-related partiality based on the idea of 
community would not give special weight to family or family members compared 
with other kinds of communities or their members to which the agent belongs. Second, 
it also explicitly enlarges the domain of community to the scale of a country, which 
further limits the extent to which the agent can practice family-related partiality. 
However, Bell’s communities stop before the idea of a global community without any 
reason being offered. What could possibly be Bell’s reasons? 
[M]y view is that the only real test of commitment to a community is the 
willingness to sacrifice one's interests on its behalf. This may require 
sacrificing one's life (in war), but more typically it requires such things as 
paying taxes, doing voluntary work, helping to care for children and 
elderly people, etc.137 
It seems that this is a very high standard to judge the possibility of communities 
to which we belong. Besides, it would be counterfactual that we refuse to make any 
sacrifice for the global world or for foreigners.   
According to Bell, the three types of communities are all constitutive 
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communities. 138  Like Sandel, Bell also emphasizes the importance of 
self-identification in the conception of constitutive communities, but he further 
clarifies that “constitutive communities provide a large background way of 
meaningful thinking, acting, and judging, a way of being in the world which is much 
deeper and more many-sided than any possible articulation of it.” 139  Bell’s 
communities, or rather constitutive communities, are agent-relatively good and 
desirable, but obviously not agent-neutrally good and desirable as he emphasizes that 
“valuing a community doesn’t mean that you have a special obligation to endorse 
every strong belief or deed of that community.”140 This implies that a community is 
not defined by or valued for its ideals. 
In sum, there are different conceptions of community regarding whether 
community is both agent-neutrally and agent-relatively good and desirable, or simply 
agent-relatively good and desirable as well as whether community can be extended 
to family and the whole world in terms of its scope. For the first issue, conceptions 
of community which are only agent-relatively good and desirable would better 
accommodate the particular version of family-related partiality based on the concept 
of community. On the contrary, conceptions of community which are agent-neutrally 
good and desirable may lead to the suggestion that the particular version of 
family-related partiality relies on not only the value of community, but also the value 
of certain ideals. It would require separate justification of these specific ideals, which 
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may be difficult to accomplish depending on what these ideals are.  
 For the second issue regarding the scope of community, the particular version of 
family-related partiality is not only indirect as it relies on the concept of community 
and family being a kind of community, but also limited regarding how far such 
partiality would go. The attempt to investigate whether family can be considered as a 
kind of community also reveals another possibility of the scope of community, that is, 
the global community. The fact that there are many communities including family, 
national community, global community makes the particular version of 
family-related partiality admit partial concerns for other people in the same 
community beyond family, for example, our fellow countrymen or our fellow human 
beings. However, this may not be a bad thing for the particular version of 
family-related partiality as it can also accommodate wider concerns.  
   
 Both the particular version and general version of partiality for 
communitarianism support family-related partiality, but they are both limited. For the 
particular version of family-related partiality, it is indirect as it is derives its strength 
from the concept of community and family being one among other kinds of 
communities. Despite the vague nature of the concept of community for 
communitarianism, we can still reach the conclusion that the particular version of 
family-related partiality can be better served by conceptions of community which are 
only agent-relatively good and desirable. As we move on to the examination of the 
scope of community in order to establish whether family can be treated as a kind of 
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community or not, it becomes clear that the scope of community can be extended not 
only to family but also to the whole world. This also reveals the restriction of this 
particular version of family-related partiality as it must recognize concerns for 
members in the same community, national community, global community, for 
example, on similar grounds.   
 For the general version, communitarian self can support family-related partiality 
through the idea of identity-holding, but it does not entail that family members should 
be given priority over fellow members of other communities to which the 
communitarian self belongs, as this communitarian self, in light of identity-holding, 
need not be influenced by family members more than others, which may be different 




Care Ethics and Family-related Partiality  
 
 In chapter two where family-related partiality has been investigated in the 
context of communitarianism, attempts have been made to construct a general version 
of family-related partiality based on the idea of communitarian self as well as a 
particular version based on the idea of community. Along the same line, efforts will be 
made in this chapter to construct two versions of family-related partiality, among 
which the general version is also based on the concept of self in care ethics. Like 
communitarianism, the investigation of family-related partiality for care ethics will 
not be limited to this general version based on the concept of self. In order to have a 
better understanding of family-related partiality for care ethics, we should also 
consider a particular version of family-related partiality based on the concept of 
caring for care ethics. Regarding the issue of partiality, however, care ethics is 
different from communitarianism in one aspect. Unlike the communitarian discourse, 
the discussion of partiality is an essential part of the care ethics discourse and care 
ethics is usually assumed to support partiality, which perhaps renders the investigation 
of family-related partiality more relevant and necessary.141 
In the first section of this chapter, I will examine the concept of relational self in 
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care ethics as well as its bearing on the general version of family-related partiality in 
care ethics. As in communitarianism, there is also a consensus on the concept of self 
in care ethics, which can be utilized as the common foundation of a general version of 
family-related partiality through identity-holding. Efforts will be made to examine the 
similarities, but more importantly, the differences, between the interpretation of self in 
care ethics and in communitarianism, which would not only further support the 
plausibility of a general version of family-related partiality in care ethics but also 
reveal the possible differences concerning the general version of family-related 
partiality based on the concept of self through the idea of identity-holding in 
communitarianism and care ethics. This will be taken further in the next chapter, 
where the connection between the concept of self and partiality in light of 
identity-holding will be tested in early Confucianism where, similar to what is done 
for both communitarianism and care ethics, a concept of Confucian self can be 
constructed and examined. After presenting the concept of relational self in care ethics, 
it will be shown that as far as family-related partiality is concerned, the main 
difference between communitarianism and care ethics concerning the concept of self 
is the latter’s emphasis on particularity and dependency, both of which support 
relatively stronger partial concerns for family members. Moreover, it will become 
clear that although both particularity and dependency pertain to the issue of 
family-related partiality, particularity for relational self is more relevant through the 
idea of identity-holding.  
In the second section, the particular version of partiality based on the idea of 
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caring will be examined. As the term “care ethics” suggests, the concept of care or 
caring is perhaps the most central one for it.142 Attempts will be made to investigate 
the link between caring and family-related partiality. If differences between the 
concept of self may lead to different conclusions concerning family-related partiality 
in communitarianism and care ethics, the emphasis on caring on the side of care ethics 
would further enlarge these differences in terms of the extent partiality toward family 
members would go. Despite its numerous definitions, conceptions of caring will be 
divided into two kinds in terms of its ranges of application, that is, whether caring 
should be limited only to close encounters or not. Different interpretations of caring in 
terms of its range will lead to different partial concerns of the particular version of 
family-related partiality for family members since the opportunities for close 
encounters with family members are usually significantly higher than those with other 
people. However, even if caring should not be limited only in close encounters, it may 
not follow that the particular version of family-related partiality would be weaker 
regarding its partial concerns for family members, because the emotional or 
psychological element which is crucial for caring, whether it goes beyond close 
encounters or not, would still be better accommodated by the circumstance of family 
members. 
 
Relational Self and the General Version of Family-related Partiality 
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In order to establish the connection between the concept of self in care ethics and 
family-related partiality, just as a similar attempt has been made in communitarianism, 
we need to examine the concept of self in care ethics as well as the similarities and 
differences between the two concepts of self in relation to partiality toward family 
members.  
First, the idea of relational self will be examined in care ethics. It will become 
clear that the discourse of self in care ethics may vary among three different positions, 
the conception of a relational self, self being a relation, and rejection of the term 
“self” in favor of a focus on relationship, all of which can be considered arguing for 
the importance of relationships for the concept of self and hence the idea of relational 
self.  
Second, it will be pointed out that one important difference between 
communitarianism and care ethics refers to the idea of particularity. Communitarian 
self also emphasizes the importance of the relationships between the moral subject 
and others in terms of the appreciation of memberships in different communities, but 
communitarian self does not pay attention to the same kind of particularity as it is 
done in relational self. This emphasis on particularity can be better addressed by 
relationships among family members, which suggests that the general version of 
family-related partiality for care ethics would support stronger concerns for family 
members compared with that for communitarianism.  
Third, another crucial element of the concept of self in care ethics, that is, the 
idea of dependency, will be examined. The kind of dependency emphasized here can 
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be called human dependency as against the mere material dependency which refers to 
the situation that one’s biological body’s functioning is dependent on something that 
may or may not involve human beings. It will become clear that this difference 
between care ethics and communitarianism regarding the concept of self, that is, the 
idea of dependency, would provide stronger support in care ethics for partiality 
toward family-members, though perhaps not in terms of the general version of 
family-related partiality through identity-holding.  
Let us first turn to the discourse on self in care ethics. Generally speaking, the 
idea of relational self is widely accepted by the advocates of care ethics. In her 
elaboration of two distinct kinds of moral views, Gilligan describes one of them as 
centering on relationships. This alternative moral orientation sees “a world comprised 
of relationships rather than of people standing alone.”143 The connection between self 
and relationships, or rather a relational definition of self, according to this kind of 
moral views, is most explicitly represented in the way one would describe herself:  
In response to the request to describe themselves, all of the women 
describe a relationship, depicting their identity in the connection of future 
mother, present wife, adopted child, or past lover.144 
If Gilligan simply describes relational self as contributing to an adequate 
understanding of self along with other kinds of interpretations of self, others who 
show such interests in relational self may go further to declare it an appropriate and 
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self-sufficient understanding of the moral agent. 145  Although it is generally 
recognized that Gilligan first introduces the contemporary background for the 
discussion of care ethics through her psychological studies, Noddings expands it 
further to the field of philosophical investigation.146 In her view, care ethics is “built 
on a relational ontology.” 147  This relational self suggests that “our selves are 
constructed through encounters with other bodies, objects, selves, conditions, ideas, 
and reflective moments with our own previous selves.”148 
As the investigations of care ethics move forward, the idea of relational self is 
simply taken for granted. In review of the characteristics of care ethics, Virginia Held 
claims that,  
It is characteristic of the ethics of care to view persons as relational…The 
ethics of care…conceptualizes persons as deeply affected by, and involved 
in, relations with others; to many care theorists persons are at least partly 
constituted by their social ties.149 
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Despite the central place of relational self in care ethics, care ethics discourse 
itself may cast doubt on the very idea of self. Regarding the idea of relatedness, the 
mounting emphasis on relationships concerning the concept of self in care ethics leads 
to the claim that it is not appropriate to use the term “self” in care ethics. Perhaps 
instead, we should simply talk about relationships. If self is just a relation, as 
Noddings suggests, it may sound rather extreme as it may form an obstacle to locate 
the subject of actions and the boundary between people.150 However, this is not the 
end of the story. One step further ahead, we will arrive at the position where the issue 
of self seemingly disappears. It becomes not necessary or appropriate to examine the 
concept of self in care ethics, since our fundamental concern should be placed on the 
relationships, which leads to the conclusion that care ethics “construes ethics as 
referring to relations between individuals as its basic unit of analysis, rather than to 
each individual strictly.”151 Therefore, it would not be surprising that care ethicists 
may claim that the term “relational self” is misleading as care ethics should focus on 
relationships and the term “relational self” may carry with it the sense of 
individualistic self which is perhaps unavoidably embedded in the concept of self. 
The same problem is observed elsewhere outside care ethics discourse. For example, 
Kenneth J. Gergen claims that,  
[T]he term “self” carries with it strong traces of the individualist tradition. 
It suggests again a bounded unit, one that interacts with other distinct 
units.152  
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As we will see in the next chapter, the concept of Confucian self also encounters 
similar objection that the very term “Confucian self” is misleading. We should of 
course always observe the nuanced position with regard to the concept of self in all 
three theories, communitarianism, care ethics, and early Confucianism, but it should 
not prevent us from adopting the term “self” in investigating these three theories, 
since the (minimal) moral agent would not be totally denied in any of them if it refers 
to, as Diana Tietjens Meyers defines, “an individual who is capable of choosing and 
acting in accordance with judgments about what is right, wrong, good, bad, worthy, or 
unworthy.”153 For example, despite her doubt about self in care ethics, Noddings 
admits that one cannot totally ignore her own existence distinguished from others: 
[I]t is…harder to extricate individual selves from the relations in which 
they are formed. But we do have individual bodies that move about, grow 
old, suffer pain, are recognized by others, and become associated with 
particular occupations and recreations.154 
From the perspective of moral agency, the legitimacy of relational self discourse 
can be further supported by the insistence of (perhaps another kind of) autonomy, 
more or less, of the moral agent in care ethics. If self referring to individual, 
autonomous self is not taken for granted and self can broadly refer to the moral 
subject, the total denial of discourse on self would require the absolute denial of moral 
agency, which is not supported in care ethics. On the contrary, partly because of the 
emphasis on relationships in care ethics, efforts have been made to emphasize the 
existence of moral agency. For example, Held claims that there is a consensus 
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regarding the relational self, which insists that it “must still allow the person 
enmeshed in relationships to change her situation: to break free of patriarchal 
communities and to alter oppressive social ties.”155 This is not to deny that care ethics 
is under attack from the perspective of autonomy. In fact, “a central contemporary 
criticism of care ethics is exactly that it may do wrong to subjects by paternalistically 
emphasizing caring at the expense of other important issues such as autonomy.”156 
However, from the perspective of relational self, no matter what relationships she find 
herself in, voluntary or otherwise, she always has capacities to manage her own action 
to certain degree.157 The main point here is that care ethics does not deny autonomy 
altogether. Instead, it simply has its own interpretation of autonomy, which can still 
ground the basis for the discussion of moral agent and self.  
This concept of relational self can also serve as a distinctive character that 
differentiates care ethics from other moral and political theories which may have 
similar views on other matters, such as similar discussion of caring that should not be 
considered as care ethics discourse. For example, Maureen Sander-Staudt suggests 
that despite some similarities with virtue ethics in emphasizing “the goodness of care 
as a motive and end, and the importance of relationships to a virtuous and flourishing 
life,” one important difference refers to care ethics’ “relational ontology” which 
constructs “the entire self as constituted, known, and maintained through 
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relationship.”158 For the same reason, although Jeffrey Blustein devotes large parts of 
his Care and Commitment: Taking the Personal Point of View to the discussion of 
caring, its nature, its scope, its object, its motivational factors, etc., we may still 
exclude such studies as part of care ethics discourse since he implicitly suggest a 
conception of self in contrast with relational self.159   
On the other hand, the idea of relational self is not unique to care ethics. For 
example, T. L. Zutlevics summarizes relational self mainly based on Gilligan’s view, 
suggesting that “personal relationships are crucial for the construction of self identity 
or, more strongly, are constitutive of the self.” 160  According to this kind of 
explanation, relational self seems to be very similar to the communitarian self 
discussed in chapter two which also emphasizes the social constitution of 
communitarian self.   
More relevant to the discussion in the next chapter, Chinese philosophy in general 
and Confucianism in particular are also believed to uphold the idea of relational 
self.161 It is claimed that the idea of relational self is at the core of Confucianism.162 
For example, David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames’ explication of Confucius’s 
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philosophy devotes substantial length to the idea of relational self.163 In arguing for 
the importance of the Confucian conception of self for education, Xinyan Jiang also 
uses the term “relational self”, according to whom relational self suggests that “a 
person is mainly identified by his or her social roles and relationships to others, that is, 
to regard one’s social roles and relationships as a major constitutive part of one’s 
personal identity.”164 
It should be pointed out that all these discussions of relational self elsewhere 
emphasize the idea of relatedness, not characteristics such as particularity or 
dependency, which are treated as essential elements of the relational self in care ethics. 
However, it also needs to be pointed out that the emphasis on what we may call 
relatedness is not always accompanied with other characters of relational self, such as 
dependency and particularity, in care ethics discourse. For example, Margaret A. 
McLaren suggests that the “relational self in care ethics provides an account of the 
self that emphasizes the importance of social roles and relationships.”165 Although it 
seems that it does not emphasize either particularity or dependency, it does not follow 
that it would deny those characteristics of relational self in care ethics which will be 
discussed later. It may simply be the case that, in elaborating on the idea of relational 
self in care ethics, some scholars are perhaps doing the task of investigating the 
concept of self against the background that does not make such specification 
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necessary. For example, Samantha Brennan suggests that the lack of examination of 
differences between relational self and other kinds of self, communitarian self for 
example, which may produce the significance of these characteristics, is due to “a 
tendency to run these two accounts together, to focus on their similarities, since both 
are opposed to the mainstream tradition.”166 For the examination of relational self in 
comparison with communitarian self and Confucian self, however, such elaboration 
and emphasis are necessary.  
It is widely recognized in care ethics that the relationships concerning self are 
described as being concrete, particular. The alternative moral orientation described by 
Gilligan emphasizes particular relationships. 167  Noddings also emphasizes the 
importance of particularity of self which is expressed more vividly in the encounters 
with others: 
A self cannot be captured in terms of its time, culture, profession, or roles. 
If we are interested in the development of caring persons, we need to 
know about the particular encounters that support or undermine caring, 
the kinds of encounters that induce people to harm others, and the patterns 
that mark sensitivity and insensitivity.168 
This is where Noddings attempts to differentiate her understanding of self from 
communitarian self. Contemporary communitarians also emphasize the importance of 
relations for moral subjects, which is are captured in the memberships in various 
communities they belong to, but the communitarian self, according to Noddings, still 
misses the particularity of the moral subject which is crucial for care ethics:  
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The descriptions offered by MacIntyre and Taylor are as yet too 
abstract…we are still dealing with idea-like selves…When MacIntyre 
says that these characteristics do not “belong to human beings 
accidentally,” we have to agree at a high level of abstraction: all people, 
real selves, are selves in virtue of their relationships…A self cannot be 
described in terms of mere rationality or choice, but neither can it be 
wholly described in terms of its time and culture. I am not just a modern 
or postmodern self, one of a set, all of whom are shaped in general by 
relationships. I have been shaped by particular relationships.169  
Although Communitarian self also emphasizes the particularities of the historical, 
social, cultural circumstances, it does not go so far to attend to the particular 
relationships between self and particular others, or fail to treat them seriously 
especially considering the emphasis on community which by definition can only 
accommodate such particularities to a less extent. As Held claims, however, relational 
self in care ethics is not concerned with relationships in general, but relations between 
the subject and “particular others.” 170 
 Another feature of relational self in relation to family-related partiality is its 
emphasis on dependency. It is the simple fact that we human beings enter the world in 
the state of absolute dependency. We need others’ direct help to meet our basic 
physical needs, not to mention psychological ones in the early stage of our life. 
Sometimes in the last period of our life, we may once again find ourselves in the state 
of dependency. During our adult life between the early stage and the last period of our 
life, we may occasionally lean upon others due to disease, injury, etc.  
It is not difficult to find out that we are talking about dependency on humans, not 
any kind of dependency. 171  The mere “dependency on something to remain 
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biologically alive” cannot differentiate human beings from nonhuman animals.172 For 
the purpose of differentiating relational self in care ethics from other interpretations of 
self, it is necessary to differentiate dependency from interdependency or mutual 
dependency, which may not be as easily ascertained as the separation of one or both 
of them from independence since dependency and interdependency are usually 
grouped together against independence. However, independence also provides the 
opportunity to test the differences between dependence and interdependence.  
The idea of independent self is not meant to deny those facts regarding our 
dependency, but to be admired as a goal to achieve. In fact, the idea of independence 
is compatible with the idea of interdependence. Any theory that admits the 
unavoidable social cooperation would recognize the fact and the importance of human 
interdependency. For example, liberalism would not deny that each of us as 
individuals still needs others’ cooperation and thus recognize the unavoidable 
situation of mutual dependency or interdependency.173 But the emphasis is placed on 
the necessity to carry out one’s own plans, in which individuals would be confident 
that such interdependency will eventually contribute to the realization of these 
plans.174 
Noddings seems to contribute to the mixture of dependency and interdependency 
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in elaborating on her interpretation of care ethics. On the one hand, she recognizes the 
unavoidable dependency of human beings: 
The original condition of every human being is utter dependency…real 
babies are totally at the mercy of human caregivers.175  
 On the other hand, she talks a lot about interdependency, instead of dependency, 
in discussing caring relationships, as she emphasizes that “every society is marked by 
the interdependence of its citizens” and that “interdependence is part of the original 
condition.”176 Her idea of interdependence is, however, different from what we 
usually understand as it applies to all the caring relationships, including the 
relationship between parents and children, or even infants. According to Noddings, 
such interdependency must be recognized in those relationships:  
An appreciation of interdependence is central in learning to care, and a 
first step in acquiring this appreciation is to have one’s own contributions 
acknowledged. To say to a child, “It’s so much fun doing this with you,” 
or to a class, “You folks make the effort worthwhile,” is an explicit 
acknowledgement of interdependence.177 
Noddings’ interdependence is therefore connected with her own interpretation of 
response and contribution in the caring relationships in general and parents-children 
relationship in particular. Assuming B as the dependent party and A as the one being 
depended upon, Noddings claims that in such relationships where one party cannot 
reciprocate in the traditional sense, where mutuality does not exist, this dependent 
party still makes its own essential contribution:  
Besides being the site of initial “vibrations,” the cared-for responds in a 
way that shows that A’s efforts at caring have been received. B’s 
consciousness is characterized by the recognition or realization of care, 
and “I am cared for” would be the appropriate verbalization of B’s state of 
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consciousness. Again, B’s state of consciousness doesn’t tell us exactly 
what B will do or should do. It merely suggests some form of response 
that will be detectable by A. Reception of A’s caring by B completes the 
relation.178 
  According to Noddings, this kind of contribution by the dependent party is 
sufficient to render such relationships interdependent, although it clearly does not 
conform to what we usually understand by interdependency which necessarily refers 
to mutuality or reciprocity. Noddings’ adoption of interdependency therefore does not 
contradict the essential status of dependency in care ethics.  
Held also seems to fail to emphasize the importance of dependency. The same as 
many care ethicists, she recognizes the inevitable dependency for human beings: 
The ethics of care recognizes that human beings are dependent for many 
years of their lives... Many persons will become ill and dependent for 
some periods of their later lives, including in frail old age, and some who 
are permanently disabled will need care the whole of their lives.179 
She then moves from being dependent as children to being interdependent as 
members of societies, without further emphasizing dependency as the starting point 
for interdependency.180 At best, such continuity from dependency to interdependency 
is simply taken as an empirical fact. 181  This may explain her claim that 
interdependency “is one of the central aspects of an ethics of care.”182 In her 
conception of person, interdependence, instead of dependence, is singled out in 
connection with the character of relatedness.183 
In his attempt to expand the domain of care ethics, Daniel Engster also mixes 
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dependency with interdependency. On the one hand, he claims that care ethics takes 
dependency to be empirical truth, suggesting that “all human beings require care 
during childhood to survive and develop their capabilities.”184 On the other hand, 
Engster does not emphasize dependency while moving back and forth between 
dependency and interdependency: 
Care theory…begins with individuals already existing in society and 
dependent upon one another for their survival, development, and social 
functioning, and highlights the unchosen obligations we all have toward 
others by virtue of our interdependency.185 
The tendency to mix up dependency and interdependency may also explain why 
it seems necessary to further define dependency as asymmetrical dependency, which 
emphasizes the nature of unilateral, instead of mutual, reliance on others. For example, 
Alisa L. Carse uses the term “asymmetrical dependency relationships”, which refers 
to “asymmetries of vulnerability, need, knowledge or power, in which one party is 
especially dependent on the other for care.”186 
The difference between dependency and interdependency can be more obvious if 
we examine Sigal Ben-Porath’s proposal concerning the application of care ethics in 
international postwar arena. Arguing against the position that international support 
should aim at encouraging the victims of human or natural disasters to gain 
independence, Ben-Porath claims that, 
[D]ependence, as distinct from helplessness, should be structured as an 
acceptable part of international relations, that it is a given aspect of state 
relations that should not only be accepted by realists but also by 
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idealists.187 
Clearly, the above conclusion is derived from the mixture of dependency and 
interdependency, especially since Ben-Porath already points out that interdependence 
should be accepted as “a starting point for international relations,” while insisting that 
the investigation of jus post bellum should not be separated from the expansion of 
care ethics to appreciate the importance of dependency.188 
Just as interdependency is recognized as an empirical fact by (some) supporters 
of independence, it is also accepted by supporters of dependence, which suggests that 
the difference does not lie in the prospect that interdependence will be achieved most 
of the time.189 The special feature in care ethics regarding dependency is not only that 
the empirical fact of dependency is observed but also that it is considered the essential 
and starting point of care ethics despite the fact that the interdependency of human 
beings in the world is widely recognized as the empirical truth as well as the most 
likely outcome.190  The importance of dependency is also revealed through the 
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paradigm of mother-child relationship in care ethics.191 Although such relationship 
between mother and child in care ethics may trigger criticism, such as that concerning 
the gendered nature of care ethics, it exemplifies the essential status of the idea of 
dependency in the concept of self in care ethics.  
In sum, the emphasis on particularity and dependency is what mainly 
differentiates the concept of self in care ethics from that in communitarianism, but it 
does not follow that this is the only difference between care ethics and 
communitarianism.192 The possible difference concerning gender equality may be 
also taken as one main difference between conceptions of self in care ethics and that 
in communitarianism. According to Susan J. Hekman, communitarianism and care 
ethics reach the agreement that it is desirable to have “a concept of the subject as 
connected, rather than unencumbered, and as constituted by the necessary 
relationships that bind us as human beings to those around us.”193 Her criticism of 
communitarianism focuses on the idea of gender inequality, which makes 
communitarianism undesirable,  
The community as it has been conceived in Western thought is 
hierarchical and ascriptive. This community ascribes its members, and the 
status it has traditionally ascribed to women is clearly an inferior one.194 
 Hekman admits that redefinition of community to avoid sexist influence may help 
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communitarianism to dodge such criticism. If we can shield, or attempt to shield, care 
ethics from undesirable influence of certain existing caring practices, it seems 
optimistic to expect that we can do the same thing for communitarianism on the issue 
of gender inequality. Moreover, the issue seems to play no significant part in our 
assessment of the general version of partiality in relation to both communitarianism 
and care ethics, which would primarily focus on the issue of particularity and 
dependency.   
 As the discussion of the general version of family-related partiality based on the 
concept of self through the idea of identity-holding in communitarianism shows, in 
order to accommodate the idea of identity-holding, it only requires that relational self 
recognizes the contribution of family members to the constitution as well as the 
holding of its identity, which can be easily met by the concept of relational self. As it 
has been discussed earlier that communitarian self does not highlight to the same 
extent the importance of family members for identity-holding and therefore the 
general version of family-related partiality does not provide strong support for partial 
concerns for family members, the relational self seems to be different if we focus on 
its emphasis on particularity and dependency, both of which would provide stronger 
support for partial concerns for family members.  
 Regarding the differences in particularity in the concept of self, it seems that 
compared with communitarian self which does not emphasize the special status of 
family or family members in identity-holding, the relational self in care ethics would 
suggest that family members contribute more to one’s identity-holding, since such 
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particularity in relational self can be more readily identified in close interpersonal 
contacts such as those among family members. Moreover, if we consider two kinds of 
identity-holding, that is, holding somebody as a person and holding somebody as a 
particular person, compared with communitarian self, the relational self can better 
accommodate holding somebody as a particular person because of its relatively 
stronger kind of particularity, which further makes relational self relatively better 
accommodate holding somebody as a person since holding somebody as a particular 
person is sufficient for holding somebody as a person.  
As for the issue of dependency, it does make a difference between care ethics and 
communitarianism concerning family-related partiality. The paradigm of dependency 
in care ethics refers to the mother-child or parent-child relationship, which falls within 
the domain of family. The recognition of and emphasis on dependency exemplify the 
importance of family members as such dependency, in terms of mother-child 
relationship being the paradigm in care ethics, can be most readily observed in family 
context. Moreover, under most circumstances, family members are also among the 
best candidates to accommodate such dependency because of the long-term contact 
among family members. If relational self in care ethics gives dependency relatively 
greater emphasis, it seems that it would also support relatively more concerns for 
family members and thus stronger support for family-related partiality. However, such 
stronger support is not related to the idea of identity-holding as the idea of 
identity-holding plays no part in the above argument.  
Now that we have examined the general version of family-related partiality in 
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care ethics based on the concept of relational self, it has become clear that care ethics 
is differentiated from communitarianism in this area since the emphasis on 
particularity and dependency in relational self would suggest that relatively more 
partial concerns could be extended to family members compared with those outside 
the family. But this is not the end of the story. We need to further investigate the 
particular version of partiality for care ethics before we can reach any conclusion 
concerning partial treatment toward family members. In the following section, 
attempts will be made to examine the particular version of partiality in care ethics 
based on the idea of caring as well as the emotional or psychological element 
pertaining to it.   
 
Caring and The Particular Version of Family-related Partiality 
 
In this section, after the introduction of different kinds of conceptions of caring, it 
will become clear that although the controversies over the definition of caring is of 
great importance for care ethics in general, a precise definition is not necessary (or 
perhaps impossible to achieve) for investigating family-related partiality, or at least 
we can proceed safely to the issue of partiality in care ethics even without a consensus 
on the definition of caring.  
What matters for family-related partiality is the contestable range of caring. From 
the perspective of range, there are two possible views in care ethics regarding caring, 
that is, whether caring or perhaps genuine caring can be extended beyond close 
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encounters or not. Different views concerning this issue will lead to different answers 
toward the strength of the particular version of family-related partiality which 
suggests that family members should be given more concerns in care ethics because 
caring can be more easily provided among family members. If caring must be limited 
to close human encounters, the particular version of family-related partiality would 
provide stronger support for partial concerns toward family members and if caring can 
be extended beyond close encounters, such extension would by itself limit the extent 
of family-related partiality based on caring.  
It is obvious that care ethics focuses on the concept of caring. So what is caring? 
In our everyday language, we usually speak of “I don’t care”, “I care”, “why do you 
care”, but the general understanding of these expressions does not fulfill the 
requirement of care ethics which intends to provide a complementary, if not 
alternative, method to deal with moral and political issues. One way of dealing with 
the concept of caring is to dismiss the necessity of such endeavors to reach any 
specific definition, since either it is not practical or it is not desirable in relation to 
care ethics. For example, after affirming the ethical importance of caring, Peta 
Bowden quickly devotes her attention to the practices where caring is more or less 
manifested so as not to lose the insight into the particularities of human situations.195 
Care ethics is indeed also known for its doubt of principles as well as the commitment 
to and application of principles, but care ethics discourse cannot be conducted without 
concepts.196 Attention, however, should always be paid to the limitations of concepts, 
                                                        
195 Peta Bowden, Caring Gender-sensitive Ethics, London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 1, 2. 
196 Abraham Rudnick, "A Meta-Ethical Critique of Care Ethics," p. 506. 
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which is observed in the following discussion of caring, where the investigation will 
focus on caring as a relation pertaining to the purpose of discussing the range of 
caring.197 This of course does not imply that it is inappropriate to talk about caring as 
a disposition or virtue, or a practice, or a relation, or all of the above. In fact, Held 
insists that caring should be able to refer to “work, motive, value, and perhaps more 
than these.”198  
Even if caring is limited to a practice or a relation, it will not be possible to 
examine all kinds of such caring that we may encounter. First, for example, non-moral 
caring is put aside since we concentrate on moral caring in this investigation, although 
in everyday language, we often use such expressions such as “care about the 
weather,” “care about whether the room is clean,” etc., all of which do not concern 
morality. Second, the relevant moral objects of caring under examination here refer to 
human beings, which exclude things such as ideas. Because of the similarities 
between non-human animals and human beings, especially certain human beings in 
certain situations, and the main concern of this investigation, that is, the issue of 
family-related partiality, whether non-human animals can be or even should be 
considered as the parties in caring will be examined in relation to partiality.  
Regarding the range of caring, Noddings can be seen to advocate caring or 
genuine caring being limited to close encounters. Noddings claims that genuine caring 
can only be established in caring-for, “the face-to-face occasions in which one person, 
                                                        
197 It is also for the same reason that I adopt the term “caring” instead of “care”, since 
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Allmark, "Can there be an ethics of care?" p. 21. 
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as carer, cares directly for another, the cared-for,” not in caring-about, which goes 
beyond face-to-face encounters.199 According to Noddings, it is possible that we can 
literally care about anyone in the world, even thousands of miles away from us: 
I can “care about” the starving children of Cambodia, send five dollars to 
hunger relief, and feel somewhat satisfied. I do not even know if my 
money went for food, or guns, or a new Cadillac for some politician. This 
is a poor second cousin to caring. “Caring about” always involves a 
certain benign neglect. One is attentive just so far. One assents with just so 
much enthusiasm. One acknowledges. One affirms. One contributes five 
dollars and goes on to other things.200 
Why is such caring-about excluded from (genuine) caring? One reason may lie in 
Noddings’ emphasis on both parties in caring. For Noddings, caring must include at 
least two parties, the care-giver who provides caring, in her term, the “one-caring”, 
and the care-recipient who receives it, in her term, the “cared-for”. Caring would not 
be fully established without either party, which needs to fulfill certain requirements to 
accomplish its role. For the care-giver, her internal state should manifest attention and 
motivational displacement, which lead to certain actions and for the care-recipient, 
she must receive and recognize being cared for in response.201 Attention suggests that 
the care-giver would perceive the particular situation of the care-recipient, her specific 
needs, etc., through the perspectives of both the care-giver and the care-recipient.202 
Motivational displacement suggests that the care-giver’s “motive energy begins to 
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flow toward” the cared-for and her projects at the expense of the care-giver’s own 
projects.203 Moreover, the care-giver is supposed to act in certain ways to accomplish 
her role in caring. All these requirements for the care-giver may lead to the 
establishment of limits of caring in terms of its range, which will be further supported 
by the stated requirements for the care-recipient. For the care-recipient, although in 
many cases such as the paradigm of mother-child relationship, reciprocity from the 
care-recipient is not obvious in the traditional sense, the care-recipient is still required 
to respond to the care-giver in order to accomplish caring. Such response from the 
care-recipient, in terms of “the recognition or realization of care,” may be presented in 
different forms, such as a simple “I am cared for.”204 One thing in common, however, 
for such response, is that it must be manifested in such a way so as to be able to be 
detected by the care-giver.205 In review, if Noddings’ requirements for the care-giver, 
such as attention and motivational displacement, are suspected of rendering caring 
limited, her requirements concerning the care-recipient, that is, the response from the 
care-recipient being able to be detected by the care-giver, clearly explain her 
interpretation of caring-for as occurring only within close encounters.  
If we consider Noddings’ construction of caring-for in terms of her requirements 
for both the care-giver and the care-recipient, we may find a big gap between 
caring-for and caring-about, especially considering the necessary closeness for 
attention and motivational displacement which may significantly limit the range of 
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caring-for. This may explain Noddings’ further distinction between two kinds of 
caring-for, that is, natural caring and ethical caring, which may help to expand the 
range of necessary emotional or psychological state, that is, attention and motivational 
displacement on the part of the care-giver, especially through the construction of 
ethical caring. For natural caring, it refers to relations “in which we respond as 
one-caring out of love or natural inclination.”206 What is significant about natural 
caring is that it refers to the unreflective response of the care-giver, without 
“mediating ethical-logical deliberation.”207 In contrast to natural caring, ethical caring 
involves reflection and deliberation. It is driven by our desire in pursuit of the ethical 
ideal manifested more vividly in natural caring. Unlike natural caring where 
emotional or psychological state can be relatively more readily satisfied, more efforts 
are needed for ethical caring where spontaneous response from the care-giver is not 
expected and may even be difficult: 
On such occasions we respond as carers because we want to uphold our 
ideal of ourselves as carers. We overcome our own resistance by asking 
ourselves, “How would I respond if I really cared? If I were at my best as 
a carer, what would I do?”208 
Although ethical caring goes through a more complicated process compared with 
natural caring, it is still rather limited in terms of the possible range. Faced with the 
limits of caring-for, either natural caring or ethical caring, Noddings adopts the term 
“caring-about” to refer to circumstances resembling caring in wider areas, for 
example, in circumstances some people are truly concerned about the well-being of 
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some other people.209 
For caring-about beyond close encounters, it is clear that it cannot satisfy 
Noddings’ requirements for the care-recipient who responds to the care-giver in ways 
for the care-giver to recognize the receipt and acceptance of the caring-for. But it is 
more complicated regarding the requirements for the care-giver in caring-about, that 
is, certain emotional or psychological state and actions followed by it. It is 
understandable that the care-giver may not do anything direct for the care-recipient in 
caring-about, but we may hesitate to reach the conclusion that her emotional or 
psychological state cannot be achieved as it is in caring-for, since the construction of 
ethical caring already admits the possibility that the attainment of such emotional or 
psychological state can be cultivated, at least to some extent. Such possibility may 
lead to the attempt to cultivate such emotional or psychological state in wider areas, 
which may explain the views that caring should be considered as going beyond close 
encounters.  
Noddings’ elaboration and emphasis on the care-giver and the care-recipient 
signifies the unique understanding of caring for care ethics, which is also recognized 
in care ethics discourse as what can be used to differentiate caring in care ethics from 
everyday usage of caring. For example, Amy Mullin maintains that caring “requires 
both parties to be aware of each other as a particular (not interchangeable) person, to 
be aware of being in relation, and it requires some reciprocity.”210 This requirement 
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for the awareness of the particularities of each party would also limit the distance 
between the care-giver and the care-recipient.  
However, the emphasis on both the care-giver and the care-recipient may not 
necessarily lead to defining caring within close encounters. For example, although 
Joan Tronto defines caring as “an ongoing process,” with “caring about,” “taking care 
of,” and “care-giving” referring to the side of the care-giver and “care-receiving” to 
the side of the care-recipient, her interpretation of caring is not limited to close 
encounters.211 In fact, Tronto’s interpretation of caring goes beyond the range of close 
encounters to the extent that it “consumes much of human activities.”212 In order to 
understand Tronto’s view concerning the range of caring, we need to examine her 
interpretations of both parties in caring.  
For the care-giver, she is supposed to notice the needs of others, in terms of 
“caring about”, which can refer to the needs of distant people, such as starving 
children thousands of miles away.213 The care-giver is supposed to act in direct 
contact with the care-recipient, in terms of “care-giving”, such as “the nurse 
administering medication, the repair person fixing the broken thing, the mother 
talking with her child about the day’s events, the neighbor helping her friend to set her 
hair.”214 Obviously, such direct contact refers to unmediated fulfilling the needs of 
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the care-recipients. In this way, giving money to the needy should not be considered 
as caring as it works indirectly. Although the emphasis on direct contact may be 
suspected of limiting caring to close encounters, such a conclusion is avoided perhaps 
because the care-giver can always reach out to people far away and perform direct 
actions toward those people. For example, volunteers not only donate money to some 
humanitarian missions but also come to the place and personally perform the caring 
activities. Moreover, regarding the care-giver, Tronto also discusses the example of 
giving money as Noddings does. Unlike Noddings who concentrates on the extent of 
attentiveness manifested in giving money which may not reach the necessary standard 
for caring, Tronto’s doubt about giving money in relation to caring refers to the 
understanding that giving money cannot be equated with fulfilling needs of the 
care-recipient and thus not a kind of performing caring actions.215 Although giving 
money may not qualify as caring, it does show the willingness to help, in terms of 
“caring about.”  
For the care-recipient, Tronto refers to, in terms of “care-receiving,” situations 
such as “the patient feels better, or the starving children seem healthier after being 
fed.”216 The focus, however, is placed on whether needs of the care-recipient have 
been met, not the possible obstacles for the care-recipient to respond to the care-giver, 
which may lead to the conclusion that as long as the situation of the care-recipient can 
be observed, the necessary response from the care-recipient can be considered 
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The interpretations of caring do not always emphasize both the care-giver and the 
care-recipient. In many cases, only the care-giver is focused on, which obviously 
reduces the requirements for caring, but it does not follow that all such interpretations 
will lean toward caring beyond close encounters, for even if the emphasis is only 
placed on the side of the care-giver, whether caring is assumed to be limited to close 
encounters or not still depends on more detailed descriptions of the care-giver.  
 Held, among others, seems to emphasize only the care-giver while advocating 
caring beyond close encounters to include the society or even the whole world.217 
Caring between distant people is considered weaker, but not differentiated 
qualitatively from caring between people who are close to each other, such as family 
members.218 This is related to Held’s interpretations of caring, as either a value or a 
practice, which is characterized with “attentiveness, responsiveness to needs, and 
understanding situations from the points of view of others.”219 Although the issue of 
perspective may be related to the care-recipient, the above characterization of caring 
seems to emphasize only one party in caring, that is, the care-giver. The attitudes of 
the care-giver to the care-recipient, in terms of attentiveness and responsiveness, are 
not influenced by the distance between the care-giver and the care-recipient. Or at 
most such influence, in terms of distance, is a matter of degree. We can always 
(genuinely) care for others, despite the distance between us, only in different degree. 
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Moreover, the care-giver is not defined as acting directly toward the care-recipient, 
which also leaves ample room for relevant activities between the care-giver and the 
care-recipient disregarding the possible distance.  
Although the above characterization only refers to the care-giver, the 
care-recipient is mentioned in caring, who is supposed to respond to the care-giver. 
Such response is also different from reciprocity since the former may simply refer to 
“the look of satisfaction in the child, the smile of the patient.”220 However, such 
response is not always necessary since, according to Held, the care-giver can by 
herself accomplish caring when any kind of response is not possible, such as patients 
who are in coma and cannot respond in any way.221 Allowing for the absence or 
impossibility of the care-recipient response removes the obstacle to extending caring 
to the society and perhaps even the whole world.  
Along with Tronto and Held, Daniel Engster also argues for caring in wider areas 
after providing a definition of caring which intends to encompass most, if not all, 
circumstances where it happens. According to such a definition, caring refers to 
“everything we do directly to help others to meet their vital biological needs, develop 
or maintain their innate capabilities, and alleviate unnecessary pain and suffering in an 
attentive, responsive, and respectful manner.”222 It can be argued that such an 
interpretation of caring only focuses on the care-giver, but its emphasis on 
attentiveness, responsiveness, and respect may also involve the care-recipient in some 
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aspects, such as the necessary assessment of needs through interactions between the 
care-giver and the care-recipient. But according to Engster, the “emphasis on 
attentiveness, responsiveness, and respect nonetheless need not limit the scope of 
caring” and the care-giver “can still care for people across the world.”223 
In sum, there are different views of the range of caring, that is, whether caring is 
limited to close encounters or not and which one of them is adopted will determine 
the strength of the particular version of family-related partiality based on caring. 
Clearly, if we deem it proper to limit caring to close encounters, it follows that we 
would agree that such caring as well as the particular version of family-related 
partiality would require stronger partial consideration for family members as they are  
more likely to be party to such close encounters.  
If we accept that caring can go beyond close encounters, however, it does not 
follow that caring as well as the particular version of family-related partiality would 
definitely not support partial concerns for family members, but it does suggest that 
family members would not be given very special place since caring is not necessarily 
better accommodated by family members. This stance seems to better shield the 
particular family-related partiality from critique that it would prevent concerns in 
wider areas.  
However, it should be recognized that in the real world, many family members 
are separated in physical distance and if caring is limited to close encounters, it may 
follow that many family members are also excluded. On the contrary, if caring goes 
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beyond close encounters, we can feel relieved that caring can still extend to family 
members despite the distance between us. But in this situation, family members are 
not emphasized in caring and the particular version of family-related partiality in care 
ethics seems to fail to provide any special support for partial concerns for family 
members.  
As it will become clear in the following section, however, the distance between 
these two different views concerning the range of caring as well as the particular 
version of family-related partiality can be reduced. On the one hand, for the adoption 
of caring within close encounters, it does not follow that we cannot extend our 
concerns for other people outside such close encounters, or beyond the domain of 
family since the emotional or psychological element for caring can be cultivated in 
wider areas. On the other hand, for the adoption of caring beyond close encounters, it 
does not follow that family members would not be given special consideration, since 
the examination of emotional or psychological element for caring would also suggest 
that family members could still provide better circumstance for such emotional or 
psychological element. I shall argue that the psychological elements in caring, 
whether it happens in close encounters or over longer distances, favor partiality to 
family members. 
 
Caring, Empathy, and Sympathy 
 
In review of the above two kinds of views concerning the range of caring, that is, 
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whether caring is limited to close encounters or not, we may conclude that the 
strength of the particular version of family-related partiality depends on how we 
define caring in relation to its range. It may not be so if we consider the emotional or 
psychological element in caring, which also serves in many cases as the defining 
standard in relation to the care-giver to determine whether caring is limited or not.  
Empathy and sympathy, among others, have been the most competitive 
candidates for emotional involvement in caring regarding either explanation or 
motivation or both. The assumption is that care ethics generally upholds the 
importance of emotional elements regarding either justification or motivation, which 
translates into the arguments for or against empathy or sympathy. Despite their 
differences, they both lead to the same position which may support stronger partiality 
toward family members as those emotional or psychological elements can be 
relatively better located within family members, although they can be arguably 
extended to wider areas.   
It should be pointed out that the interests in empathy and sympathy in moral and 
political theories go far beyond the scope of care ethics and it is not the plan here to 
conduct a thorough investigation of empathy or sympathy, nor a validation of 
empathy or sympathy from the perspective of care ethics.224 There are many different 
definitions of both empathy and sympathy. Empathy is said to refer to “feeling an 
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emotion with someone,”225 or imagining “how others feel, what they fear or hope for, 
and how they understand themselves and their circumstances,”226 or to experience 
“emotions homologous to someone else’s emotions and experience them for that other 
person,”227 or “taking…other person's perspective and imagining…[her] feelings” 
while recognizing her “as a separate, autonomous agent.”228 Sympathy is taken as 
referring to sharing others’ “hopes, fears, joys and sorrows” on behalf of these 
people,229 or the “immediate and unthinking response to the suffering of another,”230 
or experiencing “concern (compassion, pity, warm-heartedness) in response to 
negative impacts on others’ wellbeing.”231 
It is important to emphasize that the elaboration on both empathy and sympathy 
will be analyzed in relation to care ethics and the investigation here is not intended to 
provide any all-purpose definition of either empathy or sympathy. In fact, empathy 
and sympathy are sometimes used interchangeably in moral theory.232 For care ethics, 
on the one hand, empathy and sympathy are also sometimes indiscriminately adopted 
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to refer to the emotional element.233 On the other hand, the adoption of one of them is 
usually accompanied with the rejection of the other. Such controversies partly explain 
why I will not present any definition of either empathy or sympathy at the beginning 
or even at the end, since it will become clear that what matters in care ethics regarding 
empathy and sympathy is not the choice of terms, but the ways we approach others’ 
experience, feelings, perspective, etc., which may help to defend care ethics from 
criticism regarding care-giver and care-recipient facing the danger of being dominated 
or exploited, for example.  
 However, for the purpose of examining such emotional or psychological 
element in caring as well as its relevance to family members and hence the particular 
version of family-related partiality, we should pay more attention to the attainment of 
such emotional or psychological state in relation to family members, that is, whether 
one or both of them suggest that it can be better formed among family members.  
Let us first consider the advocacy of empathy. Meyers and Michael Slote, among 
others, argue for the adoption of empathy in addressing the emotional or 
psychological element in caring. Meyers differentiates empathy from both “shrewdly 
sizing people up” and “sympathetic fusing with people.” 234  If we construct a 
continuum, sympathy and “sizing up” lie at two ends of this continuum and empathy 
lies in the middle. For “sizing up”, it is directed toward people whom we may or may 
not feel connected, whom we may or may not bear ill will. Of course, there is nothing 
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in principle that may prevent “sizing up” from being followed by good will and 
emotional attachment, but those are not essential elements of it. We may establish 
some connection, even a causal one, between “sizing up” and good will, emotional 
attachment toward those people, since the latter may be founded on the outcome of 
the former. However, ill will, resentment, or hatred may be also established on the 
outcome of “sizing up.” Moreover, there is a third possibility that we may not form 
any kind of emotions toward the objects of “sizing up.” It is not necessary that “sizing 
up” would be followed with any kind of feelings.235 
For sympathy, according to Meyers, it indicates the direct sharing of other 
people’s feelings as well as their intentions, or experiencing such feelings. More 
importantly, it also suggests that we approve those feelings and intentions as well as 
the undertaken projects and we want to establish, maintain a relationship between us 
and those people.236 Conversely, it suggests the difficulty of sympathy for others 
since we may very well find many people whose projects we do not approve.  
For empathy, according to Meyers, it lies between “sizing up” and sympathy 
regarding the distance between us and the objects of empathy. There is a tendency in 
empathy that it would be directed toward people whom we bear good will, which 
accordingly differentiates empathy from “sizing up.” Although this good will and 
emotional attachment usually happen, they are not essential elements of empathy, for 
example, there is nothing surprising that we may empathize with people “for whom 
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one feels no affection,” which differentiates empathy from sympathy.237 Unlike 
sympathy which indicates the sharing of and hence feeling others’ emotions, empathy 
refers to the construction of others’ feelings in oneself through imagination. But how 
does this imagination process work? Meyers suggests that we should try to reconstruct 
others’ experience with which those feelings are accompanied. Following warnings 
and suggestions are offered for such reconstruction:  
To empathize well, it is often necessary…to mobilize one's powers of 
attentive receptivity and analytic discernment. Particularly when the 
other's background or circumstances are very different from one's own, 
empathy may require protracted observation and painstaking imaginative 
reconstruction of the minutiae of the other's viewpoint.238 
Whether such suggestions are adequate or helpful to trigger concerns for other, 
accurately experiencing such feelings while maintaining one’s own stance and 
judgment, needs examination under different circumstances, but they do imply that 
such efforts may be better accommodated by close contacts.  
Michael Slote also takes empathy as the essential element for caring and claims 
that the “differences in strength or force of empathy make a difference to how much 
we care about the fate of others in various different situations.”239 Although Slote 
also adopts empathy as the basic and fundamental emotion for caring, his 
interpretation of empathy is not the same as Meyers’s interpretation. Unlike Meyers, 
Slote takes empathy as “having the feelings of another (involuntarily) aroused in 
ourselves, as when we see another person in pain.”240 
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On the other hand, according to Slote, sympathy suggests that we “feel sorry for, 
bad for, the person who is in pain and positively wish them well” even if “we aren’t 
feeling their pain.”241 For example, one may feel “bad for someone who was being 
humiliated, but in no way felt humiliated oneself.”242 Here what is presented is only 
sympathy, not empathy. Slote gives an example as how empathy is aroused when we 
see that someone is drowning in a lake: 
In drowning examples, someone’s danger or plight has a salience, 
conspicuousness, vividness, and immediacy that engages normal human 
empathy (and consequently arouses sympathy and caring concern) in a 
way that similar dangers we merely know about-dangers, we might say, 
that we know only by description-do not.243 
Clearly, such immediacy required for the empathy can be better fulfilled by 
emphasizing the particular, concrete contacts, which can be more readily observed 
among people with close relationships. Since Slote claims that he is against Noddings’ 
suggestion that caring is limited to close encounters, he is bound to suggest that 
empathy can be extended beyond such encounters, which leads to his proposal about a 
new kind of empathy that can accommodate people far away.244 This empathy for 
distant people is connected with the economic, technological development in the 
modern world which makes it possible to communicate with, exercise influence on, 
people who are far away.245 Other measures can be taken to help people develop such 
empathetic concerns for distant people.246 Still, the fact that all these measures are 
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necessary to develop such empathetic concerns seems to suggest that empathy of all 
kinds, according to Slote’s own understanding, can clearly be better accommodated 
by family members (as well as other people near and dear) compared with people far 
away or we do not know.   
In contrast with empathy, some care ethicists adopt sympathy to refer to the 
emotional or psychological element in caring. For example, although Noddings uses 
the term “engrossment” to refer to natural caring where “revulsion and motivational 
displacement” are brought about, she later adopts the term “sympathy” to address the 
emotional or psychological state in caring.247 According to Noddings, sympathy 
refers to encounters where,   
I receive the other person and feel what he or she is feeling even if I am 
quite sure intellectually that I would not myself feel that way in the given 
situation.248 
As it has been pointed out, Noddings defines caring within close encounters, 
which is related to her emphasis on the emotional or psychological state of the 
care-giver. Her interpretation of sympathy is therefore deemed to favor the 
circumstance of family. However, the adoption of sympathy is not always followed 
with caring being limited to close encounters. For example, although Engster supports 
caring beyond close encounters, he also chooses sympathy to refer to emotional or 
psychological element for care ethics.249 For him,  
[S]ympathy…connote a ‘feeling with’ others that respects their difference 
and leads to good caring while empathy involves ‘putting oneself in 
another’s place’ in a manner that can be distorting, controlling, 
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presumptuous, and paternalistic.250 
According to Engster, sympathy would be relatively easily located within close 
encounters, such as among family members, although cultivation can help to extend it 
to wider areas, which is perhaps why he still support caring beyond close 
encounters.251 
Whether empathy or sympathy, which empathy or sympathy, can best represent 
the emotional or psychological element in caring is of significant importance for care 
ethics to establish itself as a viable theory while responding to criticism regarding the 
danger of domination, exploitation, dissolution of the care-giver and the care-recipient, 
but without reaching any conclusion about that issue, it suffices to say, in view of 
above different ideas about empathy and sympathy, they all privilege close contacts. 
However, just as it is pointed out in discussing the range of caring, in fact, we do not 
always spend more time and have more close contacts with our family members, 
except perhaps during the very early stage of our life. The emotional or psychological 
element in caring, in terms of either empathy or sympathy, may not always be better 
accommodated by family members, but in many cases, it does and it follows that the 
emphasis on this element in caring may also suggest that family members should be 
given special consideration.  
In review, whether empathy or sympathy should be the appropriate model for 
caring is of mounting importance for care ethics, especially when care ethics is 
confronted with the challenge to address the relationship between the care-giver and 
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the care-recipient to avoid domination, exploitation of either side, but if the concern is 
partiality for family members, it is clear that both of them would favor partiality 
toward family members, although in some cases efforts can always be made to 
cultivate and extend both empathy and sympathy to people outside the family.  
       
For care ethics, although the general version of family-related partiality is also 
grounded on the concept of self as it is in communitarianism, the differences between 
communitarian self and relational self in care ethics, especially the latter’s emphasis 
on a stronger particularity and on dependency, suggest that the latter’s general version 
of family-related partiality is more strongly partial toward family members.  
As for the particular version of family-related partiality based on the concept of 
caring in care ethics, to which extent it supports partial treatment toward family 
members in relation to other wider moral concerns depends on the different 
conception of caring, that is, whether caring can be extended beyond close encounters. 
If caring is deemed to be limited within close encounters, the particular version of 
family-related partiality would probably support stronger partial concerns toward 
family members. If caring is deemed proper to be extended beyond close encounters, 
it may not follow that the particular version of family-related partiality would lose its 
relatively stronger concerns for family members, because the emotional or 
psychological element which is crucial for caring, be it empathy or sympathy, would 
always be better accommodated by the circumstance of family members. In sum, care 





Early Confucianism and Family-related Partiality 
 
Similar to the strategy adopted in previous two chapters, in this chapter the 
investigation of family-related partiality in early Confucianism will also be 
divided into two parts, the general version of family-related partiality based on the 
concept of self in early Confucianism and the particular version of family-related 
partiality based on the concept of filial piety. For the general version of 
family-related partiality, attempts will be made to establish it on the basis of 
conception of self in early Confucianism as it has been done for 
communitarianism and care ethics. The differences between Confucian self, 
communitarian self, and relational self will be examined in relation to 
family-related partiality through identity-holding. Unlike both communitarianism 
and care ethics in English-speaking moral and political theories, the concept of 
self cannot be found in the philosophical vocabulary of early Confucianism in 
traditional Chinese and all discussions of a philosophical conception of Confucian 
self therefore require reconstruction from the original texts, in which the discourse 
of self, whatever form it takes, is more mixed with discourse of other issues in 
early Confucianism, the idea of filial piety, for example. The claim that self is not 
among the philosophical vocabulary of early Confucianism does not deny the fact 
that the individual subject is mentioned in the first person in early Confucian texts. 
Instead, it suggests that the self is not philosophically prominent as it is in 
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communitarianism and care ethics. Since such reconstruction of Confucian self 
cannot be clearly separated from other issues, filial piety, for example, the general 
version of family-related partiality is more closely connected with the particular 
version of family-related partiality based on the idea of filial piety in early 
Confucianism. For the particular version of family-related partiality based on filial 
piety, the investigation will be limited to filial piety itself. Moreover, filial piety 
here is interpreted in its narrow sense, which refers directly only to the 
relationship between parents and children.  
In the first section of this chapter, the concept of self in relation to 
identity-holding will be examined in early Confucianism. Different from both 
communitarianism and care ethics in which the discourse of self is an inherent 
part of those theories, the investigation of self in early Confucianism is confronted 
with two related difficulties from the beginning. First, whether we can find the 
counterpart of Western philosophical concept of self in the texts of early 
Confucianism. Second, whether it is appropriate to apply the concept of self in the 
studies of early Confucianism.  
For the discussion of self in early Confucianism, there is the problem of 
translation, which is related to whether it is appropriate to include self in the 
philosophical vocabulary of early Confucianism. Various Chinese terms are 
identified in early Confucian texts as the counterparts of self, which include wo, 
我, shen, 身, ji, 己, zi, 自, wu, 吾, among others.252 It is important to figure out 
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which Chinese term can better accommodate the meaning of self as moral subject 
in English language as well as the philosophical implications of each term, since 
the nuanced differences among these Chinese terms may suggest different 
interpretations of Confucian self in terms of its contents, characteristics, and 
emphasis. However, the reconstruction of self in early Confucianism draws from 
various essential ideas that are put forward, discussed, defended, and debated in 
early Confucian texts and the selection of the appropriate Chinese term is 
therefore interwoven with these essential ideas. It is not the intention here to offer 
a stance and the defense thereof regarding the adequate relation between the 
investigation of various essential ideas pertaining to the moral subject and the 
appropriate Chinese term for self. The focus here is simply placed on the former.  
For the second difficulty, that is, whether it is appropriate to apply the concept of 
self in the studies of early Confucianism, early Confucianism as well as 
communitarianism and care ethics would face this same problem as long as the 
concept of self is predetermined as a specific version, the liberal individual self for 
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example. However, if we abandon such conviction regarding the embedded 
content of self, there is no contradiction in examining other kinds of self, such as 
Confucian self.  
After the examination of Confucian self in some of the original early 
Confucian texts, it will be pointed out that Confucian self can support partiality 
toward family members through its recognition of others’ contribution, including 
family members’, to ones’ identity-holding. Moreover, there are two 
characteristics of Confucian self which would further family members’ status in 
identity-holding and hence relatively stronger support for partiality toward family 
members. First, Confucian self directly emphasizes the special status of family 
members in relation to self. Second, Confucian conception of self emphasizes its 
particularity.  
In the second section, efforts will be made to construct a particular version of 
family-related partiality based on the concept of filial piety in early Confucianism. 
It is well-known that early Confucianism in particular and Confucianism in 
general are (in)famous for the emphasis on family in moral and political thinking, 
which is closely connected with filial piety that has been long regarded as one of 
the most important ideas, if not the most important idea, in early Confucianism.253 
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It needs to be emphasized that the investigation of filial piety as well as the 
particular version of family-related partiality is based on two related assumptions 
about filial piety. First, the concept of filial piety here applies directly only to the 
domain of family. Second, filial piety is treated as a fundamental idea in early 
Confucianism.  
The first assumption refers to different interpretations of filial piety in terms 
of its direct application, that is, whether it applies to the domain of family or goes 
beyond it. The broad interpretation suggests that filial piety applies in broad areas 
of human affairs, even including relations between humans and nonhumans, 
which can be supported by evidence from Confucian texts. For example, in the  
Xiaojing[The Classics of Filial Piety] it states: 
Master Zeng replied, “Incredible—the profundity of family 
reverence!” The Master continued, “Indeed, family reverence is the 
constancy of the heavenly cycles, the appropriate responsiveness (yi) 
of the earth, and the proper conduct of the people.254 
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Partly based on the interpretation of Zhongyong[Centrality and Commonality], 
another Confucian text, Tu Wei-ming suggests that filial piety directly appeals to 
the whole cosmos, which may also support the broad interpretation of filial piety: 
Filial piety and reverence are parallel principles in the Confucian 
anthropocosmic worldview…They are, in our contemporary 
terminology, ecological principles humanly designed but heavenly 
inspired for the primary purpose of bringing peace and harmony to the 
universe. Filial piety and reverence…attempt to establish a pattern of 
mutual dependence and organismic unity between Heaven and 
humankind.255 
Jung Hwa Yol also explicitly claims that the “ethics of filial piety not only 
governs filial and familial relationships but also extends to human moral conduct 
toward nonhuman living beings and nonliving things as well.”256 However, all 
these arguments refer to other Confucian texts and it has been emphasized that the 
early Confucianism discussed here relies on Analects of Confucius, Mengzi, and 
Xunzi. Of course, it does not mean that early Confucianism excludes the 
possibility of the broad interpretation of filial piety since, among the various 
discussions of filial piety in early Confucianism, textual evidence can be found to 
support the broad interpretation of filial piety. For example, in Analects, it says: 
The gentleman applies himself to the roots. ‘Once the roots are firmly 
established, the Way will grow.’ Might we not say that filial piety and 
respect for elders constitute the root of Goodness?” (Analects, 1.2, 
Slingerland)257 
The broad interpretation of filial piety can be further distinguished into two 
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kinds. First, certain actions outside the bounds of family are counted directly as 
filial piety, which is expressed in Xiaojing. In this sense, the domain of filial piety 
includes all (human) areas. Second, certain actions outside the bounds of family 
are also overwhelmingly, if not solely, ordered according to filial piety, although 
filial piety is understood as referring firstly to matters within family, which can be 
relatively better accommodated by early Confucian texts. It suggests that wider 
actions outside the family context should be ordered as it is within family 
according to filial piety. Moreover, filial piety serves as the sole guidance for 
matters outside family. The second broad interpretation is similar to the first broad 
interpretation in terms of providing guidance outside the family and it is similar to 
the narrow interpretation in terms of referring firstly to the family domain.   
However, for the narrow interpretation, although it refers only directly to the 
relationship between parents and children and does not address concerns in wider 
areas, it does not theoretically deny the possibility that how matters outside family 
may be ordered can learn something from how those within family. Moreover, 
even if matters outside the family context may be conducted similar to those 
within family, according to the narrow interpretation of filial piety, it does not 
suggest that filial piety can be treated as the only source for such guidance. 
Therefore, one crucial difference between the second broad interpretation and the 
narrow interpretation is that the latter does not insist that filial piety is the only 
ultimate factor to which matters outside the family appeal, although it is possible 
that matters outside the family may be conducted in a similar way as matters 
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within the family.   
The second assumption refers to the fundamental status of filial piety in early 
Confucianism. This assumption is actually closely connected with the first one. If 
filial piety is viewed as a fundamental idea, we tend to extend the scope of filial 
piety to wider areas. Conversely, we can pretty much determine that if one holds 
the broad interpretation of filial piety, she obviously supports the fundamental 
status of filial piety in early Confucianism. However, even if we assume the 
narrow interpretation of filial piety which only directly applies to the domain of 
the family, it does not follow that filial piety is denied its fundamental status. 
Whether filial piety is deemed fundamental or not depends partly on the 
relationships between filial piety and other essential ideas in early Confucianism. 
For example, different views concerning the relationship between filial piety and 
ren [benevolence, humanity] suggest different stances regarding the fundamental 
status of filial piety. If filial piety is believed to be the origin of ren, it casts no 
doubt on the fundamental status of filial piety. If ren is believed to be the origin of 
filial piety, it would suggest that compared with filial piety, ren is more 
fundamental and filial piety is perhaps a subset or partial presentation of ren. If 
filial piety and ren are considered as parallel ideas, that is, neither of them derives 
its status from the other, exactly how they are related would be irrelevant for the 
fundamental status of filial piety. All these views can find evidence in early 
Confucian texts and it has long been debated regarding the adequacy of these 
views. For the purpose of investigating the particular version of family-related 
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partiality based on filial piety, it is assumed that filial piety is not derived from ren 
and it follows that different conclusions may be reached if such assumption is 
denied, which is however beyond the scope of this chapter.  
Based on the early Confucian texts, a brief interpretation of what filial piety 
refers to will be provided, which will clearly suggest that one should be partial to 
family members, which is therefore considered the particular version of 
family-related partiality in early Confucianism. The examination of filial piety 
itself will show that although such particular version of family-related partiality is 
not overwhelming to the extent that wider concerns are totally denied, it does 
support relatively strong partial concerns for family members since the idea of 
filial piety itself cannot provide any internal constraint, like the idea of community 
and caring both do. Again, this is partly due to the fact that filial piety is 
understood narrowly and hence the lack of restraint on partiality toward family 
members which may be provided by other early Confucian ideas. It explains why 
we cannot assume the early Confucian stance for family-related partiality by 
simply examining the general and the particular version of family-related 
partiality as there are other essential ideas in early Confucianism which may pull 
in other directions. For example, the strength of such partial concerns may be 
curtailed by other early Confucian concerns, such as ren.   
 
Confucian Self and the General Version of Family-related Partiality 
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It has been argued that it is not appropriate to talk about self in Confucianism 
in general or early Confucianism in particular, which is perhaps why the term 
“person”, instead of “self”, is sometimes adopted in relevant discussion. For 
example, Kwong-loi Shun claims that “some have observed that Confucians do 
not have a notion of self.”258 To support this claim, Shun quotes several works, 
including Herbert Fingarette’s“The Problem of the Self in the Analects.”259 In this 
article, after carefully examining the possible counterparts of self in Analects, 
Fingarette concludes that,  
We can now in this context identify with more precision the negative 
aspects, the respects in which Confucius teaches, as central to his Way, 
that we must have no self.260 
But he admits that the above conclusion concerning the absence of the 
concept of self in early Confucianism is established on the assumption of certain 
embedded implications in the concept of self.261 Putting aside this strictly limited 
conception of self, he recognizes that in the Analects, we can find references to the 
“self as a self-observing and self-regulating individual, a self sharply distinct from 
Others.”262 Therefore as long as we do not insist on any restricted definition of 
self, either the specific one discussed by Fingarette or the “self in the Western 
tradition” summarized by Hall and Ames, the replacement of self by other terms, 
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such as person, does not render discourse on self unnecessary.263 
If we do not restrict the concept of self to any specific definition and treat self 
as one among a cluster of concepts, such as person, individual, agent, we can 
reach an uncontroversial consensus on Confucian self, which emphasizes its 
relatedness to others. For example, advocating a role-based interpretation of 
Confucianism, Henry Rosemont Jr. characterizes Confucian self in terms of its 
multiple roles:  
Confucian self…is to be seen relationally: I am a son, husband, father, 
grandfather, teacher, student, friend, colleague, neighbor, and more. I 
live, rather than “play” these roles, and when all of them have been 
specified, and their interrelationships made manifest, then I have been 
fairly thoroughly individuated.264 
And,  
From our beginning roles as children—and as siblings, playmates, and 
pupils—we mature to become parents ourselves, and become as well 
spouses or lovers, neighbors, subjects, colleagues, friends, and 
more...the manifold roles we live define us as persons. And the ways 
in which we live these relational roles are the means whereby we 
achieve dignity, satisfaction, and meaning in life.265 
Tu Wei-Ming defines Confucian self as referring to “a center of relationships, 
a communal quality which was never conceived of as an isolated or isolable 
entity.”266 Using a model of focus-field, Hall and Ames also connect Confucian 
self with its roles and relationships:  
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The locus of the self as a field of social relations constituting and 
constituted by the person is fundamental to our understanding of 
Chinese conceptions of selfhood…The focus-field model results from 
understanding one's relation to the world to be constituted by acts of 
contextualization.267 
In fact, the way the Analects is organized is a vivid manifestation of such 
ideas of Confucian self. Just as the Analects is comprised of many vivid portraits 
of Confucius from different persons’ perspectives as well as the interaction 
between Confucius and one or more of his disciples, which all contribute to the 
image and model of Confucius, Confucian self is also the combination of many 
particular relationships with others in concrete circumstances.268 
Such views of Confucian self is not limited to early Confucianism or 
Confucianism in general. It is also believed that other early Chinese theories 
uphold the similar views of self. For example, Chris Fraser puts Mohists together 
with Confucians on this matter,  
Like the Confucians, the Mohists see individuals as largely constituted 
by the…relational, social roles they occupy, such as ruler or subject, 
father or son, elder or younger brother, male or female, elder or youth, 
and member of a clan or community.269 
Karyn Lai goes further to claim that such views of Confucian self can 
adequately apply to all Chinese philosophical thoughts, in which “an individual is 
essentially a relationally constituted and situated self.”270 
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 Ames pushes even harder to maintain that such assessment is not limited to 
traditional philosophical thoughts. Using an example of everyday sentence in 
English and contrasting it with its counterpart in modern Chinese language, Ames 
further claims that selves should be understood as “situated, relational…who grow 
and realize themselves as distinctive persons through a sustained commitment to 
their always collaborative, transactional roles within the nexus of family and 
community.”271 
Evidence is claimed to be located in early Confucian texts where such views 
of Confucian self can be supported. For example, Karyn Lai claims that the 
Confucian self can be interpreted “as a social being whose life is deeply integrated 
with the lives of others” and such “interactions and relationships” are fundamental 
to Confucian self.272 During such argument, she quotes, in addition to others, 
following passage in Analects: 
The Master said, ‘Zeng, my friend! My way is bound together with 
one continuous strand.’ Master Zeng replied, ‘Indeed.’ When the 
Master had left, the disciples asked, ‘What was he referring to?’ 
Master Zeng said, ‘The way of the Master is doing one’s utmost 
(zhong) and putting oneself in the other’s place (shu), nothing more.’ 
(Analects, 4.15, Ames and Rosemont)273 
However, based on such texts themselves, it is difficult to push for the idea of 
Confucian self being fundamentally defined in terms of its relationship with others. 
The passage by itself simply emphasizes the importance of zhong [doing one’s 
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utmost] and shu [putting oneself in the other’s place]. Since there are 
controversies over the adequate interpretation of zhong and it is not the intention 
here to engage in a detailed discussion of it, I will focus on shu in relation to 
Confucian self in this passage.274 Unlike zhong, shu is generally accepted as 
referring to a version of Golden Rule, “that my behavior or attitude affecting 
another person should in some sense be the kind of thing that I would find 
acceptable if I were the person affected.”275 However, it is very rare, if any, that 
Golden Rule arguments are connected with a conception of self which is defined 
in terms of its relationships with others. In fact, John C. Harsanyi argues that 
Golden Rule is closely connected with Kant’s moral theory.276 Of course, shu as 
the Confucian version of Golden Rule cannot be assumed to be the same as those 
in western moral and political theories.277 The emphasis is simply that the above 
quotation by itself does not establish a Confucian self that is generally accepted by 
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In fact, if we want to find specific and precise textual evidence to support a 
Confucian conception of self, it is easier to find it in other Confucian texts, such 
as Zhongyong and Great Learning, not Analects, Mengzi, or Xunzi.278 More 
generally speaking, it may not be accidental that the discussion of Confucian self 
is seldom directly connected with specific passages in early Confucian texts. 
Instead, many other crucial ideas in early Confucianism are always introduced to 
support the above views on Confucian self, which include the idea of 
self-cultivation, five basic relationships [wu lun], the importance of rituals [li], 
and perhaps more relevant here, the idea of filial piety. What distinguishes the 
Confucian self as a philosophical concept from the concept of self in 
communitarianism and care Ethics is its reconstruction indirectly from essential 
ideas in Confucianism.   
The similarities between Confucian self, communitarian self and relational 
self in care ethics can be easily identified. All three of them define self in terms of 
its relationships with others. For communitarian self, it is through the 
memberships in different communities. For relational self in care ethics, it is 
through encounters with particular others. For Confucian self, it is through the 
interpretation of some essential ideas in early Confucianism and Confucianism in 
general, including the emphasis on self-cultivation, filial piety, rituals, etc.  
                                                        
278  Robert Cummings Neville, Ritual and Deference: Extending Chinese 
Philosophy in a Comparative Context, New York: State University of New York 
Press, 2008, p. 95; Tan Sor-hoon, Confucian Democracy: A Deweyan 
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Such similarities are more obvious when these conceptions of self are 
confronted with other opposing ideas. For example, regarding both Confucian self 
and communitarian self, Yuli Liu claims that they would stand together, opposing 
“the liberal self” that is devoid of “narrative history,” “character,” and “social 
identity.”279   
Regarding Confucian self and relational self in care ethics, David B. Wong 
and Xinyan Jiang, among others, both use the term “relational self” in discussing 
Confucian self.280 Ranjoo Seodu Herr even uses Confucian self as the background 
to introduce the concept of self in care ethics.281 
Now that it is clear that Confucian self is similar with both communitarian 
self and relational self in care ethics, in terms of recognizing and emphasizing the 
contribution of others’, including family members, to the constitution of one’s 
identity, it therefore can also serve as the foundation for a general version of 
family-related partiality in early Confucianism as communitarian self and 
relational self in care ethics do respectively. In this respect, Confucian self is not 
different from both communitarian self and relational self in care ethics in 
providing support for partiality toward family members through the idea of 
identity-holding. However, Confucian self is also different from both 
                                                        
279 Yuli Liu, "The Self and Li in Confucianism," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 
Vol. 31, No. 3, 2004, p. 374. 
280 David B. Wong, "Identifying with Nature in Early Daoism," Journal of 
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281  Ranjoo Seodu Herr, “Is Confucianism Compatible with Care Ethics? A 
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communitarian self and relational self, which propels us to further identify its own 
characteristics in relation to identity-holding as well as the general version of 
family-related partiality. We should therefore ask, just like the differences between 
communitarian self and relational self in care ethics pertaining to identity-holding 
would provide different strength for partial concerns toward family members, are 
there any differences between Confucian self, communitarian self, and relational 
self in care ethics pertaining to identity-holding and hence partiality toward family 
members?   
 Of course, it should be recognized that although the same term “relational 
self” is adopted in discussions of Confucian self, it does not follow that Confucian 
self is the same as the relational self in care ethics. As it is pointed out in chapter 
three, the emphasis on the concreteness and dependency is the main difference 
between the relational self in care ethics and communitarian self, regarding the 
issue of family-related partiality through the idea of identity-holding. Despite the 
same term “relational self”, are there any differences between Confucian self, 
communitarian self and relational self in care ethics pertaining to the issue of 
family-related partiality? The possible answer concerns the special status of 
family members and the idea of particularity. First, family members are specially 
emphasized in Confucian self. Second, particularity is stressed in Confucian self 
in its own way.  
As Confucian self is fundamentally defined in terms of its relationships with 
others or roles it possesses, family members are always awarded special place 
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within such relationships or roles. For example, Rosemont claims that “at the heart 
of Confucian society is indeed the family” and one’s “first and most basic role, 
one that significantly defines us in part throughout our lives, is as children.”282 
Also interpreting Confucian self in terms of its relations to others, Li-Hsiang Lisa 
Rosenlee puts relationships within family, perhaps especially the relationship 
between parents and children, “as the core of all social relations.”283 Unlike the 
social or relational understanding of Confucian self which is mainly based on the 
interpretation of Confucianism as a whole, if we recognize such characters of 
Confucian self, the importance of family members can find direct textual support 
in early Confucianism. In the Analects, many times family members such as 
parents, brothers are mentioned and elaborated on. For example,  
Thus, in being a filial son and good brother one is already taking part 
in government. (Analects, 2.21, Slingerland) 
And,  
Zilu asked, “Upon learning of something that needs to be done, should 
one immediately take care of it?” The Master replied, “As long as 
one’s father and elder brothers are still alive, how could one possibly 
take care of it immediately?” (Analects, 11.22, Slingerland) 
In Mengzi, it says “the relations of humanity” is manifested through five basic 
relationships, which include that “between father and son,” “between sovereign 
and minister,” “between husband and wife,” “between old and young,” and 
“between friends.” (Mengzi, 3A.4) Three out of these five relationships are located 
within family (“old and young” usually understood to refer to seniority among 
                                                        
282 Henry Rosemont Jr., “Two Loci of Authority: Autonomous Individuals and 
Related,” pp. 11, 12. 
283  Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee, Confucianism and Women: A Philosophical 
Interpretation, New York: State University of New York Press, 2006, pp. 34, 40. 
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siblings.)  
Just as the whole concept of Confucian self is a reconstruction based on 
Confucianism as a whole, the emphasis on family members in Confucian self is 
also derived from more basic ideas in early Confucianism, among which, filial 
piety is the most important. From this perspective, the Confucian self as well as 
the general version of family-related partiality finds one thing in common with the 
following particular version, for they both turn to filial piety while the difference 
is that the former relies on it indirectly through the idea of self and the latter 
directly.  
As for the issue of particularity, we may consider Confucian self in 
comparison with both communitarian self and relational self in care ethics. If 
Confucian self is defined (at least) as the totality of its different roles, such as, 
father, son, husband, friend, etc., we may conclude that it is more particular than 
communitarian self which is limited by the kinds of communities available in this 
regard, but it seems difficult to reach any conclusion regarding the comparison 
between Confucian self and relational self in care ethics. To use the focus-field 
model, Hall and Ames suggest that Confucian self, 
[C]onstitutes and is constituted by the field in which it resides…And 
since the field is always entertained from a particular perspective, the 
self as focus shares the particularity, indeed uniqueness, of the 
particular perspective.284 
 However, it seems that compared with the relational self in care ethics which 
emphasizes the concrete, particular relationships, Confucian self is difficult to be 
                                                        
284 David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and 
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deemed relatively more or less particular. The situation is different from the 
comparison between communitarian self and Confucian self, since communitarian 
self does not emphasize the particularity of relationship with others, or rather 
other members in the same community and it is therefore easy to notice the 
distance between it and both Confucian self and relational self in care ethics 
pertaining to the idea of particularity.  
 Regarding both the emphasis on family members and particularity, we can 
conclude that Confucian self appreciates the importance of family members in the 
constitution of one’s identity more than communitarian self. However, it is 
undetermined whether Confucian self is more particular compared with the 
relational self in care ethics, because although Confucian self directly emphasizes 
family members, it is difficult to determine whether it surpasses or fall behind 
relational self in care ethics in terms of particularity.  
If we recall the comparison between the general versions of family-related 
partiality in communitarianism and care ethics, it is argued that the general version 
in care ethics is stronger than that in communitarianism since in the former, the 
conception of self pays more attention to the idea of particularity, which helps the 
project of identity-holding, especially the identity-holding as a particular person. 
Along the same line, we can therefore conclude at this stage that the general 
version of family-related partiality in early Confucianism is stronger than that in 
communitarianism regarding the partial concerns for family members, since the 
conception of self in early Confucianism also pays more attention to the idea of 
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particularity and moreover, it directly emphasizes the role of family members in 
the identity-holding.  
As for early Confucianism and care ethics, although it is undetermined which 
general version of family-related partiality is stronger, since we cannot reach a 
conclusion regarding particularity in conceptions of self in both theories, if we 
consider both the general and the particular version of family-related partiality, we 
may reach the conclusion that early Confucianism suggests stronger partial 
concerns for family members.  
 
Filial Piety and the Particular Family-related Partiality 
 
 In the following section, attempts will be made to examine a particular 
version of family-related partiality based on the idea of filial piety in early 
Confucianism. First, based on the narrow interpretation of filial piety which refers 
only to the relationship between parents and children, the content of filial piety 
will be provided pertaining to the partial concerns for family members. Second, it 
will be pointed out that although filial piety, within the domain of narrow 
interpretation, refers to the relationship between parents and children, it does not 
pose any inconsistency of concerns for other family members. Third, it will 
recognize the relatively stronger strength of this particular version of 
family-related partiality and suggest that the restriction for such partial concerns 
rests on other essential ideas in early Confucianism.  
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Although early Confucianism does not provide unambiguous definition of the 
concept, there are some available textual resources in early Confucianism from 
which we may grasp an initial understanding of filial piety. According to such 
textual evidence, we can make the following conclusions regarding filial piety in 
relation to partial concerns for family members. First, children should materially 
or financially support their parents, but this alone is inadequate. This requirement 
is so basic and uncontroversial that in early Confucianism discussion quickly 
moves to further elaboration on other relevant requirements, such as proper 
emotions and attitudes. For example, in the Analects, it says, 
Ziyou asked about filial conduct. The Master replied:” Those today 
who are filial are considered so because they are able to provide for 
their parents. But even dogs and horses are given that much care. If 
you do not respect your parents, what is the difference?” (Analects, 2.7, 
Ames and Rosemont) 
In Mengzi, it says, 
The nourishment of parents when living is not sufficient to be 
accounted the great thing. It is only in the performing their obsequies 
when dead that we have what can be considered the great thing. 
(Mengzi, 4B.13) 
Filial piety also further requires such provision of material goods to be 
conducted with proper attitudes, for example, showing respect to one’s parents as 
it is indicated in the above passages. (see also Analects, 2.8) 
Second, filial piety does not entail absolute obedience to the parents’ wishes, 
despite criticism against Confucianism that it demands such obedience. This is 
important for the discussion of family-related partiality, because if filial piety 
requires such absolute obedience, children would be burdened with unlimited 
responsibilities toward parents who initiate such requests. If so, the particular 
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version of family-related partiality based on filial piety would require unlimited 
partial concerns for family members, or rather parents. Although this would be a 
clear and simple conclusion, it does not hold well since filial piety does not 
require such absolute obedience in early Confucianism.   
The idea that filial piety suggests absolute obedience to parents may seem to 
find support in early Confucian texts.  
Meng Yizi asked about filial piety. The Master replied, “Do not 
disobey.” (Analects, 2.5, Slingerland)  
However, it further clarifies that the object of obedience is not parent’s 
commands but the rites: 
The Master replied, “When your parents are alive, serve them in 
accordance with the rites; when they pass away, bury them in 
accordance with the rites and sacrifice to them in accordance with the 
rites.” (Analects, 2.5, Slingerland)  
Elsewhere, it is pointed out that although children may remonstrate with 
parents, if such opposition is rejected, children “should be respectful and not 
oppose them, and follow their lead diligently without resentment.” (Analects, 4.18, 
Slingerland) 
The contradictory textual evidence in Analects would pose less challenge to 
the idea that filial piety does not entail absolute obedience to the parents if we 
interpret Analects not as a systematic work in which specific issues are addressed 
one by one in sequence, but as work of composite nature in which each issue is 
addressed differently to accommodate possible different circumstances, while 
together they may provide a rather coherent view, which is how Karyn Lai 
attempts to accommodate seemingly contradictory presentation and discussion of 
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rituals in Analects. 285  Confronted with seemingly contradictory passages 
regarding rituals in Analects, Lai interprets rituals, or rather the learning, 
mastering of it, in three different stages, in each of which different requirement is 
presented to provide a gradual path to not only understand rituals but also practice 
it appropriately. In this way, Lai downplays the challenge of certain rigid 
discourse of rituals and put it in line with other more complex and delicate 
discourse of rituals.286 
Instead of the above strategy, we can also reject the thesis of absolute 
obedience by looking into what is behind obedience in Analects as Tan 
suggests.287 According to Tan, obedience to parents and obedience in general can 
be distinguished into two kinds, noncoercive obedience based on knowledge and 
excellence as in the authoritative, and the coercive obedience based on strength, 
power, and hierarchy as in the authoritarian; and the obedience in Analects refers 
to the first kind.288 In this way, even if we have to accept the validity of relevant 
claims regarding the absolute obedience to parents in early Confucian texts, we 
can appeal to the rationale behind them and place the emphasis on the evaluation 
of knowledge and excellence. Such strategy is also supported by direct evidence 
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in the Analects:  
Confucius said, “Those who are born understanding it [knowledge] are 
the best; those who come to understand it through learning are second. 
Those who find it difficult to understand and yet persist in their studies 
come next. People who find it difficult to understand but do not even 
try to learn are the worst of all.” (Analects, 16.9, Slingerland) 
How one is ranked among others appeals to the possession of knowledge, 
which suggests that the hierarchy as well as the obedience that follows should be 
ordered accordingly. Even if Analects requires obedience of the inferiors to the 
superiors, who is judged to be the inferiors or superiors depends on their merits, 
not their place in the social or political hierarchy. Although the above passage 
from Analects can be interpreted as pertaining to hierarchy and obedience in 
general, it can also be understood as referring to a specific kind of obedience, that 
is, the obedience of children to parents. In this way, the obedience of children to 
parents depends on the merits on each side. This is also supported by textual 
evidence in the Mengzi:  
Mencius said, 'If a man himself does not walk in the right path, it will 
not be walked in even by his wife and children. If he orders men 
according to what is not the right way, he will not be able to get the 
obedience of even his wife and children.' (Mengzi, 7B.9, see also 4A.7, 
6A.16) 
 What matters for the obedience of children to parents accordingly is not their 
different places in the social hierarchy, but the knowledge of the right path and the 
will to practice it. However, one may indeed insist that being parents by itself is 
enough to require obedience, if being (true) parents is considered not as a simple 
descriptive label, but being loaded with normative content.289 
                                                        
289 See, Analects, 12.11, Xunzi, Book 22. 
  155
In the Xunzi, it is explicitly pointed out that compared with obedience to 
parents, following the way and obeying superiors rank higher than being filial. 
Inside the home to be filial toward one’s parents and outside the home 
to be properly courteous toward one’s elders constitute the minimal 
standard of human conduct. To be obedient to superiors and to be 
reliable in one’s dealing with inferiors constitute a higher standard of 
conduct. To follow the requirement of the Way and morality rather 
than those of one’s lord and father constitute the highest standard of 
conduct. (Xunzi, 29.1, revised) 
If obedience is part of filial conduct towards parents, this implies that such 
obedience would be constrained by higher “standards of conduct,” namely 
obeying superiors and following the way. Furthermore, circumstances in which 
disobedience to parents is suggested are also specified in Xunzi:  
Of filial sons who do not follow the course of action mandated by 
their fathers, there are three types. If following the mandated course 
would bring peril to his family whereas not following it would bring 
security, then the filial son who does not follow his commission still 
acts with true loyalty. If following his mandated course would bring 
disgrace on his family whereas not following it would bring honor, 
then in not following the mandated course he still acts morally. If 
following the mandated course would cause him to act like a savage 
whereas not following it would cultivate and improve him, then in not 
following it he still acts with proper reverence. (Xunzi, 29.2) 
Therefore, the children should always first consider the consequences of 
obeying parents. As long as they act in accordance with the general interests of 
parents as well as the family, they act in accordance with filial piety even if they 
disobey the wishes of parents.  
Third, the subject on the receiving side of filial piety is not restricted to one’s 
parents. It may refer to one’s ancestors or even the tradition which has been 
carried on by one’s ancestors. For example, Lijun Bi and Fred D'Agostino claim 
that filial piety “involves paying due respect, not only to one’s living parents, but 
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also to the deceased and to remote ancestors.”290 A. T. Nuyen also puts forward a 
similar view, which actually emphasizes the importance of ancestors in fulfilling 
filial service: 
The father has his own father and the latter his and so on. Filial piety 
requires the son to defer not to the father pure and simple, but to the 
father who defers to his, and the latter in turn is someone who defers 
to his, and so on. Filial piety is inter-generational. It makes no sense to 
speak of it as something that stops with one’s own father. Thus, the 
father is really a father figure representing a tradition.291 
There is the danger that if filial piety is also directed toward one’s ancestors, 
we may be confronted with the problem that there may be conflicts between 
partiality toward one’s parents and one’s ancestors, which may defeat the efforts to 
establish a particular version of family-related partiality based on filial piety. 
However, such attention to ancestors in filial piety may not be direct. Although 
admitting the importance of ancestors in fulfilling filial piety, Lijun Bi and Fred 
D'Agostino claim that “ancestor worship is merely an extension of paying tribute 
to one’s parents.”292 The relations between treating one’s parents and treating 
one’s ancestors are further described as being nonconflicting.293 In this way, we 
can also argue against the absolute obedience of children to parents, if parents’ 
wishes are themselves considered unfilial toward ancestors. (Mengzi, 4A.26, 
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5A.2) 
There are other aspects of filial piety which have not been discussed because 
they are irrelevant to the issue of family-related partiality. There are controversies 
about filial piety, such as what is the proper psychological status or attitude for 
filial piety, what is the relevant intention for filial piety, what activities of the 
moral agent alone can be considered in favor of the assessment of filial piety, and 
so on. These problems are important issues to fully understand filial piety in early 
Confucianism, but they are not closely connected with the attempt to examine 
family–related partiality, especially in contrast with wider concerns.  
Although there is no doubt that filial piety requires partial concerns for one’s 
parents, we have to consider possible conflicts within the family since, according 
to the narrow interpretation here, filial piety refers to the relationships between 
children and parents. However, if it can be demonstrated that filial piety does not 
directly conflict with concerns for other family members, we can proceed to 
declare that filial piety supports a particular version of family-related partiality. In 
the Mengzi, the relationship between spouses and that between siblings are 
discussed and suggestion is offered regarding the appropriate conduct in these 
matters: 
[B]etween father and son, there should be affection…between husband 
and wife, attention to their separate functions; between old and young, 
a proper order. (Mengzi, 3A.4)  
Whether such suggestion is desirable or not, they do not contradict the 
partial concerns toward one’s parent as it is suggested by filial piety. Moreover, it 
should also be pointed out that filial piety is usually accompanied with di 
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[fraternal responsibility, brotherly love] (Analects, 1.2), during which no internal 
contradiction is ever mentioned. Moreover, it can be argued that di is partly 
derived from filial piety as “brothers share a common family tie with the same 
father” and this kind of argument also include all siblings.294 
Although filial piety refers to the relationship between parents and children, it 
only represents unilateral concerns of children to parents. Does early 
Confucianism offer any characterization of the other side of the relationship 
between parents and children, that is, the unilateral relationship of parents to 
children, which would contradict filial piety in terms of showing partiality toward 
family members? The answer is negative. Although early Confucianism does not 
elaborate on the adequate action of parents to children, it is perhaps because it is 
generally assumed that parents will always support their (underage) children and 
there is no need to emphasize it. But when parents do not fulfill such requirement, 
Confucians did blame such failure. For example, infanticide was practiced in early 
China as Anne Behnke Kinney claims: “Infant abandonment is a recurring theme 
in Han biographical writing, and if we believe that these accounts accurately 
reflect contemporary practices, the disposal of unwanted newborns must have 
been a common feature of Han culture.”295 Of course, the social practices cannot 
represent Confucian teachings. Actually, it is clearly condemned by Confucian 
scholars: 
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The common people were in difficult straits and poor, many of them 
refusing to rear their children. Piao was severe in wielding his 
authority and punished them in the same manner as murderers. [Once], 
south of the city, there were bandits who were robbing and assaulting 
people; in the north there was a certain woman who had killed her 
child. When Chia set out to investigate, his officials all wanted to go 
south. But Piao said angrily,” That bandits should harm people is 
natural; but for mothers to harm their own children is to offend against 
Heaven and to transgress the Way.” They therefore drove their 
carriages north and investigated the crime there.296 
In the end, it seems that filial piety, in terms of its requirement for supporting 
parents, would support partial treatment toward ones’ parents as well as a 
particular version of family-related partiality. Unlike the particular version of 
family-related partiality in communitarianism and care ethics, where arguments 
can be made concerning the scope of community and of caring in order to curtail 
the extent of family-related partiality and to reserve or even facilitate our wider 
moral concerns, the particular version of family-related partiality based on filial 
piety in early Confucianism would suggest relatively stronger partial concerns for 
family members. The following cases in the Analects and Mengzi are usually 
discussed for this matter.  
The case of She: 
The Duke of She said to Confucius, “Among my people there is one 
we call ‘Upright Gong.’ When his father stole a sheep, he reported him 
to the authorities.” Confucius replied, “Among my people, those who 
we consider ‘upright’ are different from this: fathers cover up for their 
sons, and sons cover up for their fathers. ‘Uprightness’ is to be found 
in this.” (Analects, 13.18, Slingerland) 
The case of Shun: 
T'ao Ying asked, saying, 'Shun being sovereign, and Kao-yao chief 
minister of justice, if Kû-sau had murdered a man, what would have 
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been done in the case?' Mencius said, 'Kao-yao would simply have 
apprehended him.' 'But would not Shun have forbidden such a thing?' 
'Indeed, how could Shun have forbidden it? Kao-yao had received the 
law from a proper source.' 'In that case what would Shun have done?' 
'Shun would have regarded abandoning the kingdom as throwing away 
a worn-out sandal. He would privately have taken his father on his 
back, and retired into concealment, living some where along the 
sea-coast. There he would have been all his life, cheerful and happy, 
forgetting the kingdom.' (Mengzi 7A.35)  
Despite their differences, these two cases can both be interpreted as 
circumstances where filial piety conflicts with concerns in wider areas, such as 
public interests, in terms of enforcing the law. In both cases, it is argued that filial 
piety as well as the partial concerns for parents violates one’s responsibilities in 
wider areas. Rosemont and Ames conclude that these cases show that filial piety 
“is central—that is, protect family members at any cost, even when they are 
wrongdoers.”297 Liu Qingping echoes such view by claiming that Analects and 
Mengzi “regard kinship love alone as supreme, insisting that it can trump anything 
else.”298 
However, it is hardly the consensus today that the acts in these two cases 
would be definitely considered morally repugnant. In fact, they may simply 
address some moral difficulties which are “insurmountable in all political 
teachings and constitute a fundamental dilemma of human.”299 In the case of 
Shun, the offender no longer poses any threat to others as he is removed from 
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society and in the case of She, the nature of the offender’s crime is clearly 
recognized and the adequate exercising of filial piety may require certain 
subsequent intervention, for example, remonstrating with parents in order to 
change their moral characters so that such offense will not occur again in the 
future and moreover, perhaps attempts to compensate the victims and restore 
status quo ante.300 Moreover, if we consider the subject of filial piety which goes 
beyond one’s immediate parents as to include ancestors, such intervention to 
prevent future offense is clearly in accordance with filial piety, which requires 
children to protect and defend the reputation of one’s parents and ancestors. 
(Mengzi, 5A.3) 
 Moreover, strictly speaking, the acts in these two cases do not directly help 
to carry out the crimes, theft, manslaughter or murder, and do not suggest that the 
son should do everything he can to “prevent the law from being applied to his 
father.”301 Considering especially the case of Shun, it does not suggest that one is 
entitled to prevent enforcing the law, or it would suggest that Shun, the king, 
should use his political power and status to accomplish this task, which is not 
supported in this case. This also explains why the case of Shun is in fact similar to 
a contemporary example put forward by Bryan W. Van Norden, which may show 
that these ancient cases are not that appalling or rarely observed in the 
contemporary society. According to Van Norden, suppose he finds out that his 
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brother committed a crime, who now leads a decent life as an appreciated member 
of the society, from the Confucian stance, he would attempt to convey the nature 
of such crime to his brother and to be convinced that his brother would never pose 
any threat to others. If such aims are achieved, he would not report his brother to 
the authority.302 One important difference between this case and the case of Shun 
may be that in the latter, Shun’s action takes him away from the throne, which 
deprives the people of a sage ruler and therefore harms their interest. However, if 
the alternative for Shun’s action is to do nothing while his father faces the danger 
of being arrested and punished, Shun may also harm the interest of the people by 
failing to fulfill his filial obligation and setting an inadequate moral example. 
Moreover, Daniel A. Bell even suggests that it perhaps means that “public officials 
should resign from their posts if close family members have committed serious 
crimes (for one thing, they would lose much of their moral authority, and 
governing would be more difficult).”303 
As it is also pointed out by Fan Ruiping, to consider these cases as advocating 
breaking the law would be to claim that “the law immorally requires us all to join 
crime reporters” while these cases only suggest that “one does not report one’s 
father’s crime” and they do “not ask one to aid or abet him in stealing.”304 Fan 
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also gives a contemporary example. If one’s parent steal a watch and it is known 
to the children, the filial children should try to avoid the intervention of judicial 
power by returning the watch to the store.305 
 One can even argue that these cases do not suggest that filial children should 
try everything simply as an ordinary member of the society to prevent the 
application of law to parents who commit crimes. In the case of Shun, it is clear 
that even if Shun does not want to abuse his political power, he can still take other 
more efficient measures to bring his father out of the jurisdiction, for example, 
using horses or a cart, if the only thing that matters to him is just to help his parent 
to get away with his crime.306 In the case of She, if the aim is to serve the parent 
as he wishes, it is not enough to just conceal the crime in order to protect one’s 
father from being arrested. One can obviously do much more, such as 
manufacturing evidence to mislead the authorities. All these suggestions are not 
offered in these two cases.  
Moreover, the claim that these cases suggest that filial piety should be 
considered the supreme principle in Confucianism is based on an assumption 
which is rejected at the beginning of this chapter, that is, the assumption that filial 
piety is solely fundamental in early Confucianism. As Liu claims, these two cases 
in Analects and Mengzi suggest that filial piety is regarded “as the ultimate 
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foundation of all morality and the sole lifeblood of Confucianism.”307 Moreover, 
Liu’s analysis of these cases is also especially suspicious because sometimes Liu 
seems to be more interested in condemning some historical and contemporary 
practices: 
Throughout history, Confucianism always exhorts the Chinese people 
to become the filial children of their “parent-officials”…When the 
commoners complain that they are harmed by these corrupt practices, 
those “parent-officials” will shout to them—unfortunately, often by 
resorting to the Confucian notion of harmony: why do you always 
want to maximize your own interests without considering the 
country’s stability and the society’s harmony, which should override 
anything else?308 
However, it is one thing to evaluate the veracity of above claims regarding the 
political realities in China, quite another to argue that these two cases, that is, the 
case of She and the case of Shun, are to blame for such claims. It is probable that 
in asserting the above claims, Liu is actually targeting a kind of Confucianism 
which is not the focus of investigation here. As Bai Tongdong suspects: 
Liu’s attempt to pin the ills of modern China on Confucianism is 
typical of what many people of the May 4th generation and its 
followers like to do. Their disgust at these ills and their hope for China 
to be revitalized are understandable. However…the two cases…do not 
even come close to the blatant abuse of power, the desperate holding 
onto one’s interests, and the total disregard of the well-being of 
innocent people, which are characteristics of corruption in 
contemporary China and elsewhere.309 
 For the investigation of Confucianism and especially the reflection on early 
Confucian texts, as Sin Yee Chan emphasizes, we should always differentiate 
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philosophical Confucianism from Imperial Confucianism:  
The former refers to the system of ideas as expressed in the Confucian 
philosophical texts. The latter aims at promoting the authority of the 
ruler by emphasizing the virtue of loyalty and obedience to the ruler. 
Its main architect is Dong Zhongshu of the Han Dynasty.310 
Moreover, for these cases, we can also argue that together they may not 
represent early Confucian endeavor to establish some general rules to be followed, 
in this case, the principle that filial piety should always take priority. This strategy 
appeals to the nature of Confucianism, especially its differences with 
principle-based moral and political theories as well as the danger of mixing 
Confucianism with the latter. For example, after his investigation and comparison 
of Christian and Confucian ideas of particular family love and universal humane 
love, Sidney Callahan also reaches the conclusion that Christian theories 
categorically put humane love above family love while Confucianism does exactly 
the opposite, categorically putting moral concerns for family members above 
more general moral concerns. According to Callahan, such Confucian stance is 
clearly manifested in the case of Shun and the case of She, which leads to his 
criticism of Confucianism in relation to filial piety.311 
Such mixing of Confucianism with principle-based theories may also explain 
the assertion that these cases in early Confucian texts suggest that “if there is a 
conflict between the two obligations, filial piety must always take priority.”312 
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However, as Ni Peimin points out, “[u]nlike the Kantian rule-oriented ethic 
that provides universal ethical principles, Confucianism focuses on the process of 
person-making.”313 Fan also supports a similar interpretation of Confucianism, 
claiming that Confucianism does not attempt to construct morality as being 
“constituted in terms of independent universal norms, the violation of any of 
which is essentially wrong.”314 Although emphasizing the particular nature of 
Confucian thinking as well as the doubt about the universal principles may help to 
ease the worry about the absolute priority of filial piety, this strategy may be 
self-defeating in attempts to argue for a particular version of family-related 
partiality, if such endeavor is understood to generate the same kind of principle.   
 In review, although these two cases in the Analects and the Mengzi are often 
quoted to argue that filial piety is overwhelming, the above discussion suggests 
that it does not support unlimited partiality toward family members as the 
examination of these two cases show. It therefore suggests that the particular 
version of family-related partiality based on filial piety does not extend unlimited 
partial concerns, in terms of denying concerns in wider areas, to family members. 
However, filial piety by itself as well as the particular version of family-related 
partiality indeed does not provide any internal restraints for partiality toward 
family members. It is misleading to assume that the combination of the general 
and the particular versions of family-related partiality alone can represent early 
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Confucianism’s proposal toward the issue of partiality toward family members, 
since other essential ideas in early Confucianism must also be considered to form 
more comprehensive views.  
 
Filial Piety, Ren, and Wider Concerns  
 
As it is pointed out, even if it is recognized that filial piety as well as the 
particular version of family-related partiality supports relatively stronger partial 
concerns for family members, it does not follow that early Confucianism would 
support unlimited partial concern for family members since filial piety is just one 
among several essential ideas in early Confucianism. The particular version of 
family-related partiality based on the idea of filial piety has to be reconciled with 
other essential ideas if the aim is to provide a more comprehensive view regarding 
partiality toward family members. Here the idea of ren will be examined in 
relation to filial piety as well as this particular version of family-related partiality.  
Ren is considered a very important concept in early Confucianism and many 
different English terms are used to translate it, for example, benevolence, 
humanity, altruism, love, humanness, goodness, compassion, associated humanity, 
etc., or sometimes it is simply left untranslated.315 Similar to filial piety, ren is 
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also a, perhaps more, competitive candidate to be the fundamental idea in early 
Confucianism. 316  In its broad interpretation, ren is considered as an 
all-encompassing ideal for human beings, which includes all desirable characters 
for Confucians and serves as the sole guidance in Confucianism. In its narrow 
interpretation, ren is considered as one among many desirable Confucian ideals, 
such as filial piety, li [rituals].317 Here the distinction between the broad and the 
narrow interpretation of ren is different from that for filial piety as the former 
refers to whether ren includes all other essential ideas (such as li) in early 
Confucianism and the latter, to whether it applies outside the family.  
Based on the analysis of Analects, Wing-Tsit Chan provides a thorough 
summary of ren which concludes that, 
[r]en connotes the general meaning of moral life at its best. It includes 
filial piety, wisdom, propriety, courage, and loyalty to government…In 
short, [r]en precludes all evil and underlies as well as embraces all 
possible virtues...In other words, a man of [r]en is a perfect man.318 
 According to this broad interpretation, we can probably conclude that 
Confucianism is simply a theory of ren. However, in its narrow interpretation, ren 
can be considered only as a particular desirable moral quality as expressing 
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concerns for all human beings (and perhaps nonhuman beings as well), which is 
also stated in Analects:  
Fan Chi asked about ren. The Master replied, “Concern for others.” 
(Analects, 12.22, Slingerland, revised) 
 
The person of ren loves others. (Mengzi, 4B.28, revised) 
 
The person of ren embraces all in his love. (Mengzi, 7A.46, revised) 
Clearly, whether one chooses the broad or the narrow interpretation of ren 
will make a big difference in assessing ren, especially when ren is compared with 
other concepts. For example, ren in Confucianism is selected to be compared with 
caring in care ethics to provide a comparative perspective from which both 
theories can be examined. In his comparative studies of Confucianism and care 
ethics, Li Chenyang suggests the ethics of ren for Confucianism is similar to care 
ethics in three aspects. First, as the essential idea in both theories, ren and care are 
similar in content.319 Second, both theories are not principle-based.320 Third, both 
theories advocate partiality for those near and dear.321 However, Li seems to 
adopt a broad interpretation of ren, which not only serves as the only fundamental 
idea for Confucianism, but also includes perhaps many desirable ideals in 
Confucianism, such as filial piety.  
For example, in Li’s argument for the second point that both Confucianism 
and care ethics are not principle-based, ren is considered as providing a 
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self-sufficient theory, perhaps being the same as Confucianism.322 In arguing for 
the third point that ren and caring both support partiality toward close relatives, Li 
claims that: 
[r]en demands that one love one's parents first and other people 
second. This is the ideal moral life one should devote oneself to. If a 
man treats his father as he treats a stranger and vice versa, then he is 
neglecting the affectionate tie between him and his father and hence 
fails to be [r]en.323 
It is one thing that whether one agrees with the above statement concerning 
early Confucianism, quite another whether such statement is solely derived from 
the idea of ren. There is no doubt that the above view regarding the partiality 
toward one’s father is manifested in the idea of filial piety and to say that ren 
includes such view is to say that ren is a general idea which encompasses many 
ideas, such as filial piety. However, as it is previously emphasized, in this thesis, 
filial piety is considered as a fundamental idea, which is not included in other 
ideas, and the relationship between filial piety and other essential ideas in early 
Confucianism, such as ren, is treated as a kind of relationship between parallel 
ideas.  
In arguing for the first point that ren and caring are similar to each other, Li 
claims that ren, whether in its broad or narrow interpretation, suggests caring. As 
many English terms are used to translate ren, such as “benevolence, love, altruism, 
kindness, charity, compassion, human-heartedness, and humaneness,” what those 
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terms have in common is caring.324 Li further explains that,  
If a person does not care for others, he or she cannot be described in 
any of these terms. For example, benevolence is the kindly disposition 
to do good and promote the welfare of others. If one does not care for 
others, he or she cannot be benevolent.325 
And,  
What we can conclude from their teachings is that, in Confucian 
philosophy, to be a person of Jen one must care for others. So, even if 
the entire concept of Jen cannot be reduced to "caring," at least we can 
say that "caring" occupies a central place in this concept.326 
However, as it is pointed out in chapter three, in care ethics, caring is not the 
same as we usually understand in ordinary language. It has its own specific 
characterizations of the care-giver and the care-recipient as well as its domain, 
which help to differentiate caring in care ethics from care or caring in ordinary 
language. The above interpretation of ren as suggesting caring is adequate only if 
we understand caring as an ordinary term.   
As it is pointed out earlier that filial piety in this thesis is interpreted in its 
narrow definition, which refers only directly to the relationship between parents 
and children, here ren is interpreted in its narrow sense, that is, not as an 
all-encompassing ideal, but as just one among other desirable ideals. Although ren 
has many different meanings and it may not be easy or even possible to give a 
proper definition, perhaps even for the narrow interpretation, for the purpose here, 
we just need to agree that ren is supposed to be applicable to all human beings. 
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(Analects, 12.22; Mengzi, 4B.28, 7A.46)327 
Such universal character of ren, in terms of concerns for everybody, may 
provide basis for the explicit conclusion later that ren refers to "universal love for 
others."328 It also explains why ren is chosen (together with another Confucian 
idea) to argue that Confucianism can accommodate moral concerns for all human 
beings, or rather the idea of global justice.329 
Ren is also used as to undermine the distinction between different peoples, in 
terms of culture, tradition, or even moral evaluation, since it should not be 
influenced by such distinctions (Analects, 13.19), which is perhaps why it is used 
to defend Confucianism in addressing concerns across boundaries, for example, 
for both insiders and outsiders, people in the same group and strangers.330 
This is why, if we take into consideration the idea of ren in early 
Confucianism, we may hesitate even more to grant unlimited partiality toward 
family members or anyone who is near and dear. More specifically, if ren is 
considered in its broad interpretation which includes other essential ideas in early 
Confucianism, such as filial piety, the possible restraint on the partiality toward 
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family members can be dealt with in relation to ren by itself, similar to the 
previous discussion regarding the scope of community and the range of caring in 
relation to the extent of partial concerns for family members for the particular 
version of family-related partiality in communitarianism and care ethics. If ren is 
considered in its narrow interpretation, the possible restraint that it can provide on 
the partiality toward family members needs to be examined in relation to the 
complex relationship between filial piety and ren, since these two essential ideas 
are both fundamental and not all-encompassing.  
Despite such opinions concerning the universal property of ren, there are 
explicit objections regarding the nature of ren, which may question the role of ren 
in expanding our moral concerns. For example, Lijun Yuan claims that “the 
concept of [r]en for centuries served an ideology of domination and that it is quite 
inhospitable to the values of equal concern and respect.”331 Clearly, one may 
hesitate to quote the idea of ren in attempts to expand moral concerns, if it is 
deemed so harmful. However, Yuan’s conclusion is problematic for early 
Confucianism since, first, the textual evidence she adopts is beyond the scope of 
early Confucianism as it is defined in this thesis, and second, the possibility that 
an ancient tradition can still be interpreted for modern world is left undiscussed.332 
But to what extent can ren affect the particular version of family-related 
partiality? Although it is generally held that while filial piety refers to specific 
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relationship between parents and children, ren is not limited to any specific 
member of the society, the introduction of ren in an attempt to restrain possible 
excessive partiality toward family member may backfire if we consider the 
discussion of how ren works in Mengzi. It will become clear that although ren 
favors concerns for everyone, the development of ren may actually recognize the 
fact that family members as well as those near and dear will, though perhaps they 
should not, be given special concerns. In Mengzi 2A.6, it is recognized that 
everyone has “a mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others,” which is 
further explained in following example,  
if men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without 
exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress. They will feel so, 
not as a ground on which they may gain the favour of the child's 
parents, nor as a ground on which they may seek the praise of their 
neighbours and friends, nor from a dislike to the reputation of having 
been unmoved by such a thing. (Mengzi, 2A.6) 
According to Mengzi, such feeling for everyone is called the feeling of 
commiseration, which is the beginning or sprout[duan] of ren. However, although 
commiseration is directed toward everyone and it should lead to ren, it is not ren. 
It needs to be developed so as to achieve ren when people will “love and protect 
all within the four seas.” (Mengzi, 2A.6) The process to move from commiseration 
to ren is called extension [tui], which is explained in Mengzi, 1A.7.333 Whether 
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such extension is plausible or not, it is clear that such commiseration can be better 
triggered by those close to us, a suffering ox in front of you on its way to be 
slaughtered, a child in front of you who falls into a well, and perhaps, your family 
members who on many occasions are or were close to you. Therefore, even if we 
recognize that ren can restrain (excessive) partiality toward family members 
because it calls for concerns for everyone, the fact that commiseration as well as 
subsequent concerns are more likely to be evoked by family members is also 
recognized in the idea of ren may beg the question as to how much constraint the 
introduction of ren can exercise on the particular version of family-related 
partiality.  
It should be pointed out that the introduction and emphasis on the concept of 
ren is not the only possible way to ease our worries about the particular version of 
family-related partiality based on the concept of filial piety. For example, Fred 
Dallmayre suggests that we can attempt to accommodate our wider moral 
concerns about total strangers based on the idea of five relationships in Mengzi.334 
Or, we can always turn to other essential ideas in early Confucianism, such as li 
and yi. Li is translated as rituals, rites, propriety, observance of rites, ritual 
propriety, etc.335 The importance of li is emphasized in early Confucian texts.336 
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Filial piety as well as the strength of the particular version of family-related 
partiality has to be curtailed by the function of li. Yi is translated as rightness, 
righteousness, propriety, appropriateness, etc.337 It is understood as suggesting 
that decisions have to be made in each particular case under particular 
circumstances, considering all relevant early Confucian ideals and applying them 
in an appropriate way.338 Accordingly, the partiality suggested by filial piety 
cannot be assessed generally, but only in each particular case where all relevant 
Confucian ideals will play their roles.   
 
Although the general version of family-related partiality in early Confucianism 
is similar to that in both communitarianism and care ethics as it also appeals to the 
concept of self, it is different since, unlike the concept of self in the vocabularies 
of both communitarianism and care ethics, Confucian self is based on the 
reconstruction of early Confucianism as a whole, which would appeal to the idea 
of filial piety, as well as other important Confucian ideals. In this regard, the 
general and the particular version of family-related partiality in early 
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Confucianism are connected differently from those in both communitarianism and 
care ethics, where two versions appeal to relatively different yet fundamental 
ideas in each theory. Since the Confucian self pays more attention to particularity 
than communitarian self and directly emphasizes the status of family members, 
the general version in early Confucianism is obviously stronger than that in 
communitarianism, in terms of supporting partial concerns for family members. 
The comparison between early Confucianism and care ethics is however more 
difficult to reach a definite answer since the concepts of self in both theories 
attend to the particularity. As for the particular version of family-related partiality 
based on filial piety, it does call for partiality toward family members without any 
internal restraint in itself. But two cases in early Confucianism do suggest that it 
does not follow that such partial concerns are unlimited, in terms of totally 
denying other concerns in wider areas. Moreover, there are other essential ideas in 
early Confucianism which would exercise their pull in different direction 





The aim of this thesis, as it is stated at the beginning of the first chapter, is to 
examine family-related partiality from the perspectives of communitarianism, care 
ethics, and early Confucianism. Two points have been therefore established. First, the 
endeavor here is not to provide a comprehensive discussion of partiality and 
impartiality. Second, the investigation is not intended to achieve overall studies of as 
well as comparison between communitarianism, care ethics, and early Confucianism. 
Why choose these three theories when dealing with family-related partiality? Why not 
turn to some obvious alternative, such as conducting the study from the perspective of 
liberalism or utilitarianism?  
The answer may simply be: it is just the plan for this thesis. Or perhaps a relatively 
detailed answer can be offered here. Although the issue of partiality could well be 
investigated as it pertains to (possible) conflicts between our commitment to certain 
generally highly regarded ideals, such as impartiality, and our deepest appreciation of 
those around us as well as the (possible) dilemmas thereof, and has been examined in 
the area of moral and political theorizing, most of such studies are conducted within 
the dominant framework, liberalism for example. However, such choice represents the 
view that other moral and political theories may not be treated seriously in an attempt 
to reveal their potential to provide defensible proposals regarding the issue of 
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partiality and impartiality.339 As it has been done in the previous chapters, theories 
other than the dominant ones have a lot to offer. If we want to adequately assess the 
issue of partiality as well as raising questions regarding the status of dominant 
theories therein, we cannot do so without properly understanding what kinds of 
alternatives we may have, which is what has been achieved in this thesis.  
In this thesis, instead of investigating the issue of family-related partiality within 
the dominant theoretical frameworks in contemporary moral and political theories, 
liberalism or utilitarianism for example, the issue of family-related partiality has been 
examined within the frameworks of communitarianism, care ethics, and early 
Confucianism, none of which are normally considered the mainstream in moral and 
political theorizing. Although these three theories are presumably friendly to the idea 
of family-related partiality, or rather the partial concerns toward family members, 
efforts have been made to further distinguish one from another in terms of the extent 
of such partiality. To accomplish this goal, the examination of family-related partiality 
in each theory has been further distinguished into two kinds, the general version and 
the particular version of family-related partiality. While the general versions may 
reveal the similarities among these three theories in general, especially in relation to 
the issue of partiality, the particular versions appeal to particular characteristics for 
each theory. However, the terms “general version” and “particular version” may be 
misleading, which requires some further elaboration here. The distinction between the 
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“general version” and the “particular version” does not imply that elements in each 
theory related to each of these two versions can be precisely separated from each other. 
The conception of communitarian self, for example, cannot be actually separated from 
the investigation of community. Once again, the further distinction between the 
general and the particular version is meant to emphasize the similarities among these 
three theories regarding the conception of self as well as partiality toward family 
members.  
For the general version of family-related partiality, it is based on the conception of 
self in each theory, the examination of which not only shows the similarities regarding 
the conception of self in each theory but also indicates the differences in terms of the 
extent of partiality toward family members. In order to connect the conception of self 
with family-related partiality, the idea of identity-holding has been introduced in the 
first chapter, which suggests that since family members contribute (more) to one 
another’s identity-holding, both identity-holding as a person and identity-holding as a 
particular person, partial concerns should be extended toward one another. Since 
communitarian self, relational self in care ethics, and Confucian self can all 
accommodate the contribution of family members to the project of identity, the 
general version of family-related partiality in each theory would therefore support 
partial concerns for family members. Meanwhile, the differences between conceptions 
of self in three theories would also lead to different strength of such partiality.  
For the communitarian self, it recognizes others’ contribution to one’s identity in 
terms of membership in different communities. As it has been argued that among all 
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possible types of community, family is just one of them and the membership in family 
is not specially emphasized. Moreover, those ideas which are usually associated with 
communitarian self, such as language, tradition, common values, etc., are obviously 
beyond the domain of family and hence the lesser importance of family for 
communitarian self. However, since all communities are specific for each member, 
such memberships in different communities still indicates the particularity of self to 
some extent and hence identity-holding as a particular person can be still be addressed 
by communitarian self.  
For the relational self in care ethics, since it is fundamentally connected with 
relationships with concrete others, it also recognizes the contribution of others’ to 
one’s identity-holding and hence the general version of family-related partiality. 
Different from communitarian self regarding partiality, the relational self emphasizes 
the idea of dependency and pays relatively more attention to particularity. Since 
dependency in relational self is best manifested in mother-child paradigm, it can be 
better accommodated within family context and hence provide stronger support for 
partiality toward family members based on relational self. However, this does not 
work through the idea of identity-holding as well as the general version of 
family-related partiality. On the contrary, the relatively more emphasis on particularity 
in relational self does suggest stronger partial concerns for family members through 
identity-holding, especially through the identity-holding as a particular person.  
Confucian self is different from both communitarian self and relational self in care 
ethics in terms of its reconstructive nature in early Confucianism. Although various 
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terms in early Confucian texts can be located as referring to the individual subject in 
the first person, they are not philosophically significant compared to the concept of 
self in communitarianism and care ethics. This suggests that the examination of 
Confucian self as well as the general version of family-related partiality is more 
closely connected with essential ideas in early Confucianism, filial piety for example. 
Since Confucian self, similar to both communitarian self and relational self in care 
ethics, recognizes the importance of others to the identity of the moral subject, it also 
accommodates the general version of family-related partiality and hence partial 
concerns for family members. Although it can be argued that Confucianism pays more 
attention to the idea of particularity in its conception of self compared with 
communitarianism, it is undetermined whether it surpasses care ethics in terms of 
emphasizing particularity in the conception of self. However, Confucian self is unique 
in its direct emphasis on the significance of family members, which may also be 
traced back to the idea of filial piety, which offers stronger support for partiality for 
family members.  
Unlike the similar construction of general version of family-related partiality for 
all three theories, the particular version of family-related partiality varies from one to 
another, which may better represent the unique characteristics for each theory. For 
communitarianism, the particular version appeals to the concept of community for 
communitarianism. Although community mostly refers to small social groups, such as 
neighborhood community, efforts have already been made in communitarianism to 
argue for a whole nation being a type of community. In order to establish the 
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particular version of family-related partiality based on the idea of community, chapter 
two attempts to expand the scope of community, which may include family and the 
whole world. However, even if we can agree on the view of family being a type of 
community, the particular version would suggest partiality toward family members 
while indicating that such partiality must be rather limited since family is just one 
among many communities. The attempt to examine the scope of community also 
indicates that not only can community extend to the family but it can also extend to 
the whole world, that is, the global community. This would, on the one hand, restrain 
the strength of this particular version of family-related partiality, and on the other 
hand, render it more defensible against the critique that communitarianism cannot 
address wider concerns.  
For care ethics, the particular version of family-related partiality appeals to the 
idea of caring. Whatever caring is, a desirable character, a practice, a relationship, etc., 
we can differentiate different interpretations of caring into two kinds, in terms of its 
range, that is, whether caring is limited within close encounters or beyond such 
encounters. Although conclusion may be drawn that if caring is limited to close 
encounters, it can be relatively better addressed among family members and hence 
stronger partial concerns for family members, we may not reject caring beyond close 
encounters for being less friendly to partiality toward family members if we consider 
the emotional or psychological element in caring. Whether such element can be best 
represented by sympathy or empathy, it is clear that they both appeal to close 
encounters and hence partiality toward family members.  
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For early Confucianism, the particular version of family-related partiality is based 
on the idea of filial piety. After differentiating two kinds of interpretations of filial 
piety, it is pointed out that the investigation is based on the narrow interpretation of 
filial piety. Although filial piety as well as the particular version supports stronger 
partial concerns for family members, other essential ideas, such as ren, in early 
Confucianism may restrain the extent of such partial concerns.  
If we consider together the general and the particular version of family-related 
partiality, we may conclude that communitarianism provides relatively weaker 
support for partial concerns for family members while care ethics and early 
Confucianism both provide stronger support, despite different interpretations of caring 
and the consideration of other essential ideas in early Confucianism. This is obviously 
only a preliminary result for an endeavor that can be developed in both directions. It 
can be further developed into a thorough investigation of partiality and impartiality or 
comprehensive comparative studies of communitarianism, care ethics, and early 
Confucianism. This thesis, however, ends here as it aims to further our understanding 
of communitarianism, care ethics, and early Confucianism in relation to the issue of 
family-related partiality and partiality in general, which will prepare us to move on to 
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